Dynamic Dependability Analysis using HOL Theorem Proving with Application in Multiprocessor Systems by Elderhalli, Yassmeen
Dynamic Dependability Analysis using HOL







Electrical and Computer Engineering
Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements
For the Degree of












This is to certify that the thesis prepared 
 
By:  Yassmeen Farouk Said Elderhalli 
 
 Entitled: Dynamic Dependability Analysis using HOL Theorem Proving with 
Application in Multiprocessor Systems 
 
and submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of 
 
 
Doctor Of Philosophy  (Electrical and Computer Engineering) 
 
 
complies with the regulations of the University and meets the accepted standards with respect to 
originality and quality. 
 
Signed by the final examining committee: 
 
 
                                          Chair 
 Dr. Rene Witte 
 
                                                                             External Examiner 
 Dr. William M. Farmer 
 
                                                                              External to Program 
 Dr. Rajagopalan Jayakumar 
 
                                                                              Examiner 
 Dr. Yan Liu 
 
                                                                              Examiner 
 Dr. Mohammed Reza Soleymani 
 
                                                               Thesis Supervisor 
 Dr. Sofiène Tahar 
 
   
 
Approved by                                                                                                                      
    Dr. Rastko Selmic, Graduate Program Director  
 
 
 December 9, 2019           
    Dr. Amir Asif, Dean 
    Gina Cody School of Engineering & Computer Science 
ABSTRACT
Dynamic Dependability Analysis using HOL Theorem Proving with
Application in Multiprocessor Systems
Yassmeen Elderhalli, Ph.D.
Concordia University, 2019
Dynamic dependability analysis has become an essential step in the design pro-
cess of safety-critical systems to ensure the delivery of a trusted service without fail-
ures. Dependability usually encompasses several attributes, such as reliability and
availability. A dynamic dependability model is created using one of the dependability
modeling techniques, such as Dynamic Fault Trees (DFTs) and Dynamic Reliability
Block Diagrams (DRBDs). Several analysis methods, including paper-and-pencil or
simulation, exist for analyzing these models to ascertain various dependability related
parameters. However, their results cannot be always trusted since they may involve
some approximations, truncations or even errors. Formal methods, such as model
checking and theorem proving, can be used to overcome these inaccuracy limitations
due to their inherent soundness and completeness. However, model checking suffers
from state-space explosion if the state space is large. While, theorem proving was used
only for the static dependability analysis without considering the system dynamics.
In order to conduct the formal dependability analysis of systems that exhibit
dynamic failure behaviors within a theorem prover, these models need to be captured
formally, where their structures, operators and properties are properly formalized. In
this thesis, we provide a complete framework for the formal dependability analysis
of systems modeled as DFTs and DRBDs in the HOL4 higher-order logic theorem
iii
prover. We provide the formalization of DFT gates and verify important simplifica-
tion theorems based on well-known DFT algebra. In addition, our framework allows
both qualitative and quantitative DFT analyses to be conducted using theorem prov-
ing. We use this formalization to formally verify the DFT rewrite rules, that are used
by automated DFT analysis tools, to ascertain their correctness. Due to the lack
of a DRBD algebra that allows the analysis using a theorem prover, in this thesis,
we develop and formalize a novel algebra that includes operators and simplification
theorems to formalize traditional RBD structures, such as the series and parallel,
besides the DRBD spare construct. We formally verify their reliability expressions,
which allows conducting both the qualitative and quantitative analyses of a given sys-
tem. Leveraging upon the complementary nature of DFTs and DRBDs, our proposed
framework provides the possibility of formally converting one model to the other,
which allows reasoning about both the success and failure of a given system. Our
framework provides generic expressions of probability of failure and reliability that
are independent of the failure distribution of an arbitrary number of system compo-
nents, which cannot be obtained using other formal tools, such as model checking. In
order to demonstrate the usefulness of the proposed framework, we formally model
and analyze the dependability of the terminal, broadcast and network reliability of
shuffle-exchange networks, which are multistage interconnections networks that are
used to connect the elements of multiprocessor systems. Conducting a sound analysis
with generic expressions is essential in these systems, where it is required to accurately
capture and analyze the failure behavior.
iv
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A man who lacks reliability is utterly useless.
- Confucius (551–479 BC)
The recent decades witnessed huge technological advancements, which took part
in almost all aspects of our lives. While some of the applications that are related to
technology can somehow tolerate errors in their results, there are other applications
where errors can lead to financial losses, disasters and in the worst case losses in
human lives. Crises such as the Toyota global recall [1] increased and necessitated the
need to measure system dependability, which is the ability of a system to provide a
trusted service [2]. Dependability analysis is also required in other types of systems,
such as data centers, where the loss of financial or personal information cannot be
tolerated.
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Dependability generally consists of several attributes such as reliability, avail-
ability, maintainability, safety and confidentiality. Some of these concepts can be
quantified and measured such as reliability and availability. Reliability can be defined
as the probability that a certain system when subject to specific conditions will de-
liver its correct function in a given period of time. This means that the probability
that a system will not encounter any failure for a specific period can be calculated
and analyzed based on certain requirements. On the other hand, availability is the
probability that the system or a component of a system will provide its service at a
certain moment of time [2]. Dependability is commonly modeled using combinatorial
models, such as fault trees (FTs) [3], reliability block diagrams (RBDs) [4] and event
trees (ETs) [5]. However, these traditional modeling techniques cannot capture the
dynamic failure behavior of systems and thus cannot truly model many real-world
systems that exhibit sequential failures and dependencies among system components.
A dynamic dependability, on the other hand, generally captures the dependent
failure and repair sequences that the regular combinatorial dependability models
cannot represent. Dynamic dependability analysis is considered as an important step
in the design process of any system that possesses a dynamic behavior, especially
safety-critical systems. The appropriate modeling technique is chosen to estimate
the system dynamic dependability. These modeling techniques include Dynamic
Fault Trees [3] and Dynamic Reliability Block Diagrams [6]. A Dynamic Fault Tree
(DFT) is a graphical representation of the sources of faults that cause the failure of a
system represented as the top event of the DFT. It utilizes dynamic gates to model
the failure dependencies of the basic events. Dynamic Reliability Block Diagrams
(DRBDs) have been introduced as an extension to traditional RBDs to capture the
dynamic success paths of a given system.
2
Traditionally, dependability models are analyzed using paper-and-pencil based
proof methods or using simulation. The former provides a flexible way to model and
analyze systems. However, it is prone to human error. On the other hand, simulation
provides an easy and automated method to conduct the analysis, which justifies its
common use in analyzing a wide range of applications. For example, in [7], the relia-
bility of Solid State Drives (SSDs) of two different configurations are compared using
simulation. However, due to the high computational cost of simulation, only part of
the space could be analyzed, and thus the results cannot be termed as accurate or
complete.
Formal methods, such as model checking [8] and theorem proving [9] have been
used for the analysis of dependability models to overcome the inaccuracy limitations
of the above-mentioned techniques. For example, the PRISM model checker [10] has
been used in the reliability analysis of many applications, such as defect-tolerant sys-
tems [11]. More recently, the STORM model checker [12] has been used in the safety
analysis of a vehicle guidance system [13] using DFTs. Although probabilistic model
checkers provide an automatic way to conduct the analysis of dependability models,
the state space explosion problem often limits its scope especially when analyzing
complex systems. Moreover, the reduction algorithms embedded in these tools are
usually not formally verified, which questions the accuracy of the reduced models.
More importantly, probabilistic model checkers inherently assume the failures to be
exponentially distributed for system components [14], and thus cannot capture, for
example, the aging factor of these components.
Since the formalization of the probability theory in higher-order logic (HOL) [15,
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16, 17, 18], theorem proving has also been used for dependability analysis. For exam-
ple, some properties for continuous random variables were employed to formally reason
about some system reliability properties, such as Mean-Time-To-Failure (MTTF) [19].
Moreover, some reliability theory elements were formally verified and used in the for-
mal analysis of a reconfigurable memory array with stuck-at and coupling faults [20].
In [21] and [22], two frameworks for the analysis of FTs and RBDs, respectively, using
theorem proving were proposed and used to formally analyze some real-world appli-
cations, like an air traffic management system [22] and a solar array for a satellite
system [23]. However, this HOL formalization cannot handle or be extended to verify
the dynamic properties of DFTs and DRBDs. Generally, using a theorem prover in
the analysis allows having verified generic expressions of dependability that are inde-
pendent of the distribution of system components. Accordingly, the results are not
limited to exponential distributions.
Taking into account the concerns mentioned above about dynamic dependability
analysis of systems, in particular safety-critical ones, there is a dire need to have an
accurate framework for modeling and analysis of dynamic dependability models. In
this thesis, we aim to provide a formal framework for the accurate dynamic depend-
ability analysis of systems modeled as DFTs and DRBDs. Mainly, the idea is to build
a mathematical model for the dynamic dependability of the system using either DFTs
or DRBDs based on the system description and requirements, and then to utilize the
expressiveness and sound nature of HOL theorem proving to perform the analysis of
such models to provide generic expressions of dependability. It is worth mentioning
that such generic expressions cannot be provided using model checking, which adds to
the importance of the proposed framework as the first of its kind in providing sound
generic expressions of dynamic dependability models that are formally verified. As
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an illustration of the usefulness of the proposed framework, we apply it in verifying
some rewrite rules that are used in automatic DFT analysis tools, like the STORM
model checker, to reduce DFT models, which demonstrates the soundness of these
rules. Furthermore, we utilize this framework to conduct the formal dependability
analysis of two safety-critical systems from the medical and automotive domains to
reason about their dynamic failure behaviors. Furthermore, we apply our framework
for the dependability analysis of real-world systems, namely multiprocessor networks,
where the increased number of processing elements requires having a sophisticated
interconnection network that must be on one hand efficient with low cost and on
the other hand more reliable [24]. In particular, we propose to formally model and
conduct the dynamic dependability analysis of shuffle-exchange networks (SENs) [25]
using DFTs and DRBDs to reason about their behaviors. SENs are multistage inter-
connection networks (MINs) [26], which are widely used in multiprocessor systems to
establish communication between system nodes, including processors, memories and
I/O peripherals.
In this thesis, we use the HOL4 theorem prover [27] to formalize DFTs and
DRBDs and perform the above-mentioned analysis. We choose HOL4 as we are using
existing theories (libraries), such as probability [17] and Lebesgue integral [28], to
build and verify the underlying foundations of these dependability models.
1.2 Dynamic Fault Trees
Dynamic fault trees (DFTs) [3] are introduced to model the failure dependencies
among system components that cannot be captured using traditional FTs, i.e., static
fault tress (SFTs). A DFT is a graphical representation of the sources of failure of
a given system. The modeling starts with an undesired top event that represents
5
(a) BE (b) CONST() (c) CONST(⊥) (d) AND (e) OR (f) PAND
Figure 1.1: Some DFT Elements
the failure of the whole system or a subsystem. Inputs of the DFT represent basic
events that contribute to the occurrence (failure) of the top event. The relationships
and dependencies among these basic events are modeled using DFT gates, such as
Priority-AND (PAND) gate.
DFTs are directed acyclic graphs (DAG) with typed nodes (AND, OR, etc.).
Successors of a node v in the DAG are inputs of v. Some commonly used DFT elements
are shown in Figure 1.1. Nodes without inputs are basic events (BE, Figure 1.1(a))
that represent atomic components, which can fail according to a failure distribution.
Special cases of BEs are constant failed elements (CONST(), Figure 1.1(b)) that
always fail and constant fail-safe elements (CONST(⊥), Figure 1.1(c)), that can never
fail. DFT gates are nodes with inputs and are used to model the state dependen-
cies and redundancies among system components. Some commonly used DFT gates
include SFT gates (AND, OR) as well as the PAND DFT gate. The output event
of the AND gate (Figure 1.1(d)) fails when both input events fail. The OR gate
(Figure 1.1(e)) requires that at least one of its input events fails for the output event
to fail. The PAND gate (Figure 1.1(f)) acts in a similar way to the AND gate, i.e.,
it requires that both input events fail. However, an additional condition is needed,
where the inputs should fail in sequence, usually from left to right. There are also
other DFT gates that are used to model the dynamic behavior in systems, like the
Functional-DEPendency (FDEP) and spare gates.
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Fault tree analysis (FTA) can be generally carried out qualitatively or quan-
titatively [29]. In the qualitative analysis, the combinations and sequences of basic
events that contribute to the occurrence of the top event (failure of the system) are
identified. The sets that include these combinations are called cut sets, while the
cut sequences determine the required sequences of failure of the basic events. These
combinations and sequences represent the cut sets and cut sequences [3], respectively.
In the quantitative analysis, attributes, such as the MTTF and the probability of fail-
ure, can be evaluated based on the failure distribution of the basic events and their
relationships. Dynamic FTA has been commonly conducted using a DFT algebra [30]
or by analyzing the corresponding Continuous Time Markov Chain (CTMC) of the
given DFT [29]. In the former method, an algebra similar to the ordinary Boolean
algebra is defined with some temporal operators and simplification properties that
allow the structure function of the top event to be reduced. Based on this structure
function, both the qualitative and quantitative analyses can be carried out, where the
probability of failure of the DFT’s top event can be expressed based on the failure
distribution of the basic events. On the other hand, the given DFT can be converted
into its equivalent CTMC and then this CTMC is analyzed to find the probability
of failure of the top event [29]. Complex systems can generate CTMCs with a large
state space. This can be handled by applying a modularization approach, where the
DFT is divided into static and dynamic parts. The static FT can be analyzed using
one of the conventional methods, such as binary decision diagrams (BDDs) [3]. The
dynamic part can then be analyzed by converting it to its corresponding CTMC. This
kind of modulerization is implemented in the Galileo tool [31].
Dynamic FTA can be conducted analytically to manually generate probability of
failure expressions. The cut sets and sequences are identified and then the probabilistic
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principle of inclusion and exclusion (PIE) is applied to provide the probability of
failure expression [30]. However, the results of this manual manipulation are prone to
human error. Simulation, on the other hand, can provide a scalable and automated
alternative to conduct the FTA. For example, in [32], DFT analysis is performed by
combining the DFT algebra of [33] and Monte Carlo Simulation [34]. There also exist
other tools for DFT analysis, such as BlockSim [35], Mo¨bius [36] and isograph [37];
however, as mentioned earlier, their analysis results cannot be termed as complete
nor accurate due to the sampling nature of their simulation method.
In order to overcome the limitations of simulation in terms of inaccuracies
and completeness, formal methods can be used in the dynamic FTA. The DFTCalc
tool [38] analyzes DFTs using an Input/Output Interactive Markov Chain, an exten-
sion of CTMCs, which is built based on a compositional aggregation technique [39].
Probabilistic model checking (PMCs) has been utilized to perform the analysis of
DFTs. For example, the STORM model checker is used to conduct the quantitative
analysis of DFTs in the form of probability of failure and MTTF [40]. However, generic
expressions of probability of failure cannot be obtained based on this kind of analysis.
Moreover, the failure distributions of the inputs are assumed to be exponential due
to the state based nature of PMCs.
On the other hand, HOL theorem proving has been used in [21] to formalize SFTs
and reason about their properties. However, this formalization cannot handle the
dynamic aspects of real-world systems that are captured using DFTs. Furthermore,
it cannot be extended to model and analyze the dynamic behavior of systems, and
thus a new formalization is needed.
Due to the high expressive nature of HOL, in [41], we proposed a methodology to
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conduct the DFT’s qualitative analysis using the HOL theorem prover and the quan-
titative analysis using the STORM model checker. We provided the formalization of
DFTs based on the algebraic approach [30]. In the algebraic approach, identity ele-
ments and temporal operators are defined to express the structure function of a DFT
event. Several simplification properties are introduced that facilitate the reduction of
this function. However, the arithmetic foundation of this approach was not formally
verified, which puts a question mark on the soundness of the reported results. In [41],
we provided the formalization of the DFT gates, operators and their simplification
theorems. This allows the qualitative analysis to be performed within the sound core
of a HOL theorem prover. In addition, we proposed to use the STORM model checker
to find the probability of failure of the formally verified reduced DFT structure func-
tion. However, we cannot obtain generic expressions of probability of failure based
on this methodology as a PMC is involved in the quantitative analysis. Moreover,
our definitions in [41] cannot handle the DFT probabilistic analysis. Therefore, in
this thesis, we propose new definitions of DFT gates and temporal operators, which
allow us to conduct qualitative as well as quantitative analyses of DFTs in the form
of generic expressions of probability of failure in a theorem prover.
1.3 Dynamic Reliability Block Diagrams
A dynamic reliability block diagram (DRBD) models the paths of success in a given
system using system components as blocks that are connected in the traditional series,
parallel, series-parallel and parallel-series structures. The connections between system
blocks are modeled using connectors (lines) to create one or more paths from the
DRBD input to its output. These paths represent the required working blocks (system
components) for the system to have a successful operation. The modeled system fails
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(a) Series (b) Parallel
(c) Spare (d) State Dependency (e) Load Sharing
Figure 1.2: Dynamic DRBD Constructs
when components fail in such a manner that leads to the disconnection of all the
paths between the input and the output. Additional constructs are used to model the
dynamic dependencies among system blocks.
The main dynamic DRBD structures and constructs are shown in Figure 1.2 [42].
In DRBDs, the blocks can be connected in series, parallel or deeper nested structures.
For the series structure, shown in Figure 1.2(a), all system blocks should function
properly in order to maintain a successful behavior. On the other hand, at least one
of the blocks of the parallel structure in Figure 1.2(b) must work to have a successful
system behavior. These two structures can be connected in a hierarchical manner
to model complex systems. The spare construct (Figure 1.2(c)) is used to model
spare parts in systems, similar to the DFT spare gate. The state dependencies (Fig-
ure 1.2(d)) are used to model the effect of activation(A)/deactivation(D)/failure(F)
among system components. In Figure 1.2(d), the A/D/F of the trigger will cause
the state dependency controller (SDEP) to signal the A/D/F of components X1...Xn.
Finally, the load sharing (LSH) construct is used to model the effect of sharing the
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same load among several components on the failure effect of the overall system. For
example, the LSH in Figure 1.2(e) models a load that is shared among n components.
It is required that at least k out of these n components to be working in order for
the functionality of the system to be successful. Therefore, the D/F of some of these
components may cause the D/F of the rest of the components. The last two con-
structs enable modeling more realistic scenarios in system reliability that include the
effect of A/D of one component on the rest of the components. This behavior cannot
be captured using DFTs [43] as they can only capture the failure effect of one system
component on the rest of the components without considering the A/D effect.
Due to the dynamic nature of DRBDs, they can be analyzed by converting them
into a state-space model, i.e, a Markov chain. Then, the resultant Markov chain can
be analyzed using one the of the traditional techniques, including analytical methods
or simulation, such as Monte Carlo simulation. There exist some tools that provide
the DRBD analysis, such as Mo¨bius [36], isograph [37] and BlockSim [35], which
provide a graphical user interface to model DRBDs and conduct the analysis either
analytically or using discrete event simulation. As mentioned previously, complex
systems can generate Markov chains with a large number of states, which hinders the
analysis process. Decomposition can be applied to divide the DRBD into a dynamic
part that can be solved using Markov chains and a static part that can be analyzed
using static RBD analysis techniques [44]. This decomposition would reduce the
state space, but such simulation based analysis cannot provide accurate and complete
results. The formal semantics of DRBDs have been introduced in [45] using the
Object-Z formalism [46]. Then, this DRBD is converted into a Colored Petri net
(CPN) [47], where it can be analyzed using existing Petri net tools. An algorithm
to automatically convert a DRBD into a CPN is also proposed in [48]. However,
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since the given DRBD is converted into a CPN, only state-based properties can be
analyzed. In addition, generic expressions of reliability cannot be obtained, which
represents our target in this thesis. HOL theorem proving has been used for the
analysis of traditional RBDs [22]. However, there is no support for DRBD analysis
using a HOL theorem prover that can handle the analysis of real-world systems that
exhibit dynamic behavior.
In system engineering, it is important to be able to analyze DRBDs qualitatively
in order to identify the sources of system vulnerability, and quantitatively in order to
evaluate the system reliability. However, to the best of our knowledge, so far there
exists no algebra that mathematically models a given DRBD and enables expressing
its function based on basic components like the DFT algebra [30]. Using such alge-
bra in the reliability analysis will result in simpler and fewer proof steps than the
DFT-based algebraic analysis [30], since the probabilistic PIE will not be invoked. In
this PhD thesis, we propose a new algebraic approach for DRBD analysis that allows
a DRBD expression to be used for both qualitative and quantitative analyses. We
introduce new operators to mathematically model the dynamic behavior in DRBD
structures and constructs. In particular, we use these operators to model a DRBD
spare construct as well as traditional series, parallel, series-parallel and parallel-series
structures. Moreover, we provide simplification theorems that allow the structure of
a given DRBD to be reduced. This DRBD structure can be then analyzed to obtain
a generic expression of the system reliability. The reliability expressions obtained
using this approach are generic and independent of the distribution and density func-
tions that represent the system components. Although basic operators, such as OR
and AND, were introduced in [44], they are only useful to model parallel and series
constructs of dependent components. Moreover, there is no general mathematical
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expression that would allow reasoning about the behavior of DRBDs. In addition,
the DRBD constructs of [44] are quite complex, which complicates modeling large
systems. Therefore, in this thesis, we use the constructs proposed in [45] as they are
much simpler, which facilitates defining the new algebra to model various new DRBD
constructs. Leveraging upon the expressive nature of HOL, we formally verify the
soundness of the proposed DRBD algebra using HOL theorem proving. Although the
formalization development can be conducted using many theorem provers, we choose
the HOL4 theorem prover, as our existing formalization of DFT algebra can be useful
since our proposed DRBD algebra is compatible with the DFT’s.
It is worth mentioning that a given DFT can be converted into its equivalent
DRBD and vice-versa, which allows reasoning about both the success and failure of
a given system using one model. This requires the conversion of each DFT gate into
its equivalent DRBD construct or structure. For example, the DFT spare gate can
be modeled using the DRBD spare construct [43].
1.4 Framework for Formal Dynamic
Dependability Analysis
As mentioned earlier, there exist many techniques that can be invoked to analyze
the dynamic dependability of systems. However, none of them provides an accurate,
scalable and expressive framework for dynamic dependability modeling and analysis,
which represents important features in analyzing the dynamic failure behavior of
systems, specially safety critical ones. Therefore, the objective of this thesis is to
provide a framework for the dynamic dependability analysis of systems modeled as
DFTs and DRBDs. The proposed framework is depicted in Figure 1.3.
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Figure 1.3: Overview of the Proposed Framework
.
This framework provides verified generic expressions of dependability using
HOL4 theorem prover of DFTs and DRBDs. The analysis starts by having a system
description, which is assumed to be correct, with some dependability requirements,
such as a certain expression of reliability. This system can be modeled either us-
ing a DFT or DRBD model according to its description. We create formal DFT or
DRBD models utilizing our library of formalized DFT gates and DRBD constructs.
This library also includes the DFT and DRBD simplification theorems and verified
probabilistic behavior as well as the reliability expressions. The formal DFT and
DRBD models can then be analyzed qualitatively or quantitatively. In the former,
the sources of vulnerabilities of the system are verified by identifying the cut sets
and cut sequences. In the latter, we prove generic failure and reliability expressions
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of DFT and DRBD based systems, respectively. It is worth mentioning that un-
like model checking approaches, the formally verified generic expressions of DFT and
DRBD are independent of the probability distributions of the system components.
HOL4 was used in the development of the formalization of static dependability mod-
els, i.e., FTs [21] and RBDs [22]. Therefore, in this thesis, we choose to follow the same
path and use HOL4 as this would facilitate using some of the developed work, such as
the probabilistic PIE theory [23]. In addition, we build our theories utilizing some of
the existing theories in HOL4 such as the theories on measure, Lebesgue integral [49]
and probability [28]. This proposed framework allows conducting the dynamic de-
pendability analysis of many real-world systems to provide generic expressions. It is
important to note that the DFT part of the proposed framework is primarily based on
the formalization of the algebraic approach presented in [30]. However, a distinguish-
ing feature of our formalization is that it allows us to conduct computer based proofs
of the probability of failure expressions for DFT gates within the sound environment
of a theorem prover software. These proofs are either unavailable in [30], or we are
able to conduct them in a simpler manner. In addition, we explicitly define DFT
events that are used to provide the set of time to perform the probabilistic analysis.
Moreover, as we are providing the formalization in a theorem prover, datatypes should
be carefully handled to capture both the behavior of DFT gates and the probability
of their failure. These details are not provided in [30], which signifies the importance
of the proposed methodology. Since this framework integrates both DFT and DRBD
algebras, it provides the capability of formally converting one dependability model to
another based on the equivalence proof of both algebras. This means that the DRBD
model can be converted to a DFT to model the failure instead of the success, then this
model is analyzed using the DFT algebra. Similarly, the DFT model can be analyzed
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by converting it to its counterpart DRBD model. It is worth noting that based on the
system description, the analysis can be conducted at different levels of abstraction in
a hierarchical (modular) manner.
As an application of the formalized DFT algebra, we formally verify within HOL
the DFT rewrite rules that are used in other DFT analysis tool, such as STORM. This
demonstrates the applicability and generality of our DFT formalization. Furthermore,
we apply our framework in the formal DFT analysis of two safety-critical systems:
a cardiac assist system (CAS), and a drive-by-wire (DBW) system. Similarly, we
perform the analysis of the DRBD of the DBW. Finally, we illustrate the usefulness
of the entire framework by conducting the formal dependability analysis of shuffle-
exchange networks, which are widely used in multiprocessor systems. We use both
DFT and DRBD models to perform the analysis and utilize their equivalence to show
the possibility of conducting the analysis in both directions.
1.5 Thesis Contributions
The main contribution of this thesis is to develop a framework for the formal dynamic
dependability analysis of DFT and DRBD models using HOL theorem proving. This
framework represents an alternative approach to other less rigorous ones, such as
simulation and paper-and-pencil. To accomplish this objective, we develop libraries for
each dependability model. Each library has the formalized mathematical foundations
for each algebra, including the DFT gates definitions and the DRBD structures. In
addition, these libraries include the formally verified probabilistic behavior of each
model besides the equivalence proof of both algebras. Below, we provide the list
of contributions of this work along with the related publications available in the
Biography section at the end of the thesis:
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• Formalization of a DFT algebra in HOL, which includes operators and gates
definitions in addition to the verification of the simplification theorems. The
gates and operators are defined based on the time-of-failure of the inputs and the
outputs, which are modeled as random variables of failure that return extended-
real numbers. We verify the simplification theorems based on these definitions
and using the properties of extended-real numbers [Bio-Jr2, Bio-Tr3].
• Formal qualitative analysis of DFTs in HOL. We use the simplification theorems
to reduce the structure function of a given DFT. Then, using the HOL4 theorem
prover, we formally verify the cut sets and cut sequences. Moreover, we formally
conduct the qualitative analysis of the DBW and CAS systems [Bio-Jr1].
• Formal verification of the probabilistic failure behavior of the DFT gates using
HOL theorem proving, which allows conducting the formal quantitative analysis
of a given DFT in HOL. Building this theory requires using the properties of
the Lebesgue integral and the probability theory. We perform the probabilistic
analysis of the DBW and CAS systems to provide generic expressions of prob-
ability of failure that are independent of the failure distributions of the input
events [Bio-Jr2, Bio-Tr4].
• Formal verification of DFT rewrite rules that are useful in reducing a given
DFT. These rewrite rules are used in automated DFT analysis tools, such as
the STORM model checker, which represents the first step towards the formal
verification of these tools. We extend the definitions of DFT gates to n-ary
gates, which are required to formalize these rewrite rules [Bio-Cf2].
• Development of a novel DRBD algebra that allows expressing the structure of a
DRBD with spare constructs. We introduce DRBD operators and simplification
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theorems, similar to the DFT algebra, to enable reducing a given DRBD [Bio-
Cf1, Bio-Tr3].
• The formalization of the new DRBD algebra besides modeling the spare con-
struct and several DRBD structures, such as series and parallel structures. We
formally verify the reliability expressions of the DRBD structures and the spare
construct to allow conducting the reliability analysis of a given DRBD in a
theorem prover [Bio-Cf1, Bio-Tr3].
• Formal verification of the equivalence of DFT and DRBD that allows the bidi-
rectional path between both models. This enables formally analyzing the success
and failure behaviors of systems modeled using either model [Bio-Tr2].
• Formal verification of the terminal, broadcast and network reliability analysis of
several versions of generic shuffle-exchange networks, which are widely used in
the interconnection of multiprocessor systems. We perform the formal analysis
using both DFT and DRBD dependability models and illustrate the utilization
of their equivalence [Bio-Tr1].
1.6 Thesis Organization
The rest of the thesis is structured as follows: In Chapter 2, we provide some prelimi-
naries that are required for the understanding of the rest of this thesis. This includes
an overview of theorem proving and the HOL4 theorem prover. In addition, we pro-
vide a summary of the required theories that are needed to develop the proposed
framework.
In Chapter 3, we present the formalization of DFT operators and gates based
on the algebraic approach. Then, we formally verify a set of simplification theorems
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that are used to conduct the formal qualitative analysis.
In Chapter 4, we provide the verification details of the probabilistic failure anal-
ysis of each DFT gate. Furthermore, we present the formal quantitative analysis of
the CAS and DBW systems in the form of generic expressions of probability of failure.
As an application to our DFT formalization, in Chapter 5, we provide the for-
malization of the rewrite rules of DFTs, which enable the reduction of DFT models in
automated DFT analysis tools. Moreover, we present the HOL formalization of n-ary
gates that are required to model the rewrite rules.
In Chapter 6, we introduce the proposed DRBD algebra including DRBD op-
erators, spare construct and structures. Furthermore, we provide the simplification
theorems that are used to simplify the structure of a given DRBD. We present the
formalization details of the DRBD algebra and the verified reliability expressions. Fi-
nally, we verify the equivalence of the DFT and DRBD algebras, which enables the
analysis of a given system using both models.
We use the proposed framework in Chapter 7 to provide the dynamic dependabil-
ity analysis of MINs of multiprocessor systems, particularly the terminal, broadcast
and network reliability of shuffle-exchange networks. We provide DFT and DRBD
models of these systems and verify generic expressions of probability of failure and
reliability for different system scenarios. Finally, we conclude the thesis in Chapter 8




In this chapter, we provide some preliminaries that are required for the understanding
of the rest of the thesis. We describe the HOL4 theorem prover and its probability
and Lebesgue integral theories. In addition, we introduce some definitions in HOL4
that are required for the formalization of DFTs and DRBDs.
2.1 HOL4 Theorem Proving
Theorem proving is one of the formal methods techniques that uses a computerized
program, i.e., a theorem prover, to carry out mathematical proofs of theorems based
on deductive reasoning. The level of expressiveness of these theorems depends on
the type of logic used, like first-order logic and higher-order logic (HOL). There are
several HOL theorem provers that are available, such as HOL4 [27], Isabelle [50] and
Coq [51], which vary in the availability of the supported libraries.
HOL4 is an interactive theorem prover, which is capable of verifying a wide range
of hardware and software systems as well as mathematical expressions constructed
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in HOL. Being an interactive tool, HOL4 requires the guidance of the verification
engineer to complete the verification process. In order to verify certain properties of
a system, a mathematical model for this system should be created first, then based
on this model, HOL4 can be used to verify several system properties in the form of
theorems. This makes HOL4 an expressive platform for the verification of any system
that can be described mathematically. The main characteristic of HOL theorem
proving is its soundness, i.e., only valid proof goals can be proved. The core of HOL4
consists only of four axioms and eight inference rules. Soundness is assured as any new
theorem should be verified based on these axioms and rules, or based on previously
proven theorems. In addition, no approximation is involved in the models, as their
behavior, such as the failure in the case of DFTs, is captured in mathematical terms.
These features make HOL4 suitable for carrying out the DFT based analysis of safety-
critical systems that require sound verification results. The term formalization means
to mathematically model the behavior of a system in an appropriate logic. A proof
goal consists of a list of assumptions of type Boolean and a conclusion. For example,
“∀ (x:real). 0 < x ⇒ 0 < x-1” is a proof goal, which can be formally verified as
a theorem in HOL4. A theory in HOL4 is a collection of definitions, constants and
theorems that can be included in the working environment to be used in verifying
other proof goals. Table 2.1, lists some of the used symbols in HOL.
2.2 Probability Theory
The probability theory is formalized based on the measure theory in HOL4 [28]. A
measurable space is represented as a pair (X ,A), where X represents a space and
A a set of measurable sets. The functions space and subsets are defined in HOL
to return the X and A, respectively, of a measurable space (X ,A). A measure is
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:: Appends a new element to a list
++ Joins two lists
HD L Head of a list L
TL L Tail of list L
(a, b) A pair with elements a and b
FST First element of a pair
SND Second element of a pair
λx. f x Lamda abstracted function f
{x | P x} Set of elements x that satisfy P (x)
FINITE s set s is finite
A DIFF B A− B
e INSERT s insert element e in set s
s DELETE e A set that has all elements of s except e
DISJOINT A B sets A and B are disjoint
generally a function that designates a certain number to a set, which represents the
size of this set [17]. It is defined as the triplet (X ,A, μ), where X represents the
space, A represents the measurable sets and finally μ represents the measure. Three
functions, m space, measurable sets and measure, are defined in HOL to return
the space (X ), measurable sets (A) and measure (μ) of a measure space, respectively
[52]. A probability space is defined as a measure space, with the added condition that
the probability measure for the entire space is equal to 1.
Random variables are formalized as measurable functions that map events from
the probability space to some other σ- algebra space s. For a collection of subsets of a
space (X ), (A) is a σ- algebra on (X ) if it contains the empty set, and is closed under
countable unions and complements within the space (X ) [17]. Random variables are
defined in HOL4 as in [17]:
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Definition 2.1.
	 ∀ X p s. random variable X p s ⇔
prob space p ∧ X ∈ measurable (p space p, events p) s
where prob space p ensures that p is a probability space with p space as its space and
events as its measurable sets. X ∈ measurable (p space p, events p) s ensures
that X belongs to the set of measurable functions from the probability space p to the
σ-algebra space s [52]. Measurable spaces s and (p space p, events p) are ensured
to be σ-algebra spaces using the measurable function.
The probability distribution of a random variable X represents the probability
that the random variable X belongs to a set A. This is equivalent to finding the
probability of the event {X ∈ A}, which can also be represented using the preimage
as X−1(A). The probability distribution is defined in HOL4 as in [17]:
Definition 2.2.
	 ∀ p X. distribution p X = (λs. prob p (PREIMAGE X s ∩ p space p))
where s is a set of elements of the space that the random variable X maps to. For a
random variable that maps the probability space (p) into another measurable space,
the push forward measure is a measure that uses the space and subsets of the measur-
able space as its space and measurable sets and uses the distribution of the random
variable as its measure part [18]. In general, the push forward measure for any mea-
surable function X from measure M to measure N can be expressed as:
Definition 2.3.
	 ∀ M N f. distr M N f =
(m space N, measurable sets N,
λA. measure M (PREIMAGE f A ∩ m space M))
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A density measure is used to define a density function, f , over the measure space
M as in [53]:
Definition 2.4.
	 ∀ M f. density M f =
(m space M, measurable sets M,
λA. pos fn integral M (λ x. f x * indicator fn A x))
where pos fn integral represents the Lebesgue integral of positive functions as will
be described in the following section.
The cumulative distribution function (CDF) of a random variable X is usually
used when we are interested in finding the probability that the random variable is less
than or equal to a certain value. It is formally defined for real values as in [23]:
Definition 2.5.
	 ∀ p X t. CDF p X t = distribution p X {y | y ≤ (t:real)}
It is worth mentioning that the CDF can be defined for extended-real (extreal)
random variables as well, where extreal is a HOL data-type containing the real
numbers plus ±∞. However, in our formalization we will use the CDF of real random
variables, as it is required to integrate their density functions over the real line.
When dealing with multiple random variables, the probabilistic Principle of
Inclusion and Exclusion (PIE) provides a very interesting relationship between the











It has been formally verified in HOL4 as follows [23]:
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Theorem 2.1.
	 ∀ p L.
prob space p ∧ (∀ x. MEM x L ⇒ x ∈ events p) ⇒
(prob p (union list L = sum set {t | t ⊆ set L ∧ t = {}}
(λt. -1 pow (CARD t+1) * prob p (BIGINTER t))
where L is the list of events that we are interested in expressing the probability of
their union.
In order to be able to handle multiple random variables, a pair measure (often
called binary product measure) is required to be able to model joint distribution
measures. This pair measure can be also used in a nested way to model the joint
distribution measure of multiple random variables. The pair measure is defined as
the product of two measures. It was initially formalized in Isabelle/HOL [18] and was
then ported to HOL4 [53]. The space and the measurable sets of this pair measure are
generated using the Cartesian product of the spaces and the measurable sets of the
participating measures, while the measure part is defined using the Lebesgue integral.
Since there are real and extended-real data-types in HOL4, there exist two
Borel spaces, one over the real line (borel) [54] and the second over the extended-real
line (Borel) [49]. The Lebesgue-Borel measure is required to integrate over the real
line. In particular, we need the Lebesgue-Borel measure in this work to integrate
the density functions of the random variables over the real line. The Lebesgue-Borel
measure is a measure defined over the real line, which uses the real line as its space
and the Borel sets as its measurable sets. The Lebesgue-Borel measure is defined in
HOL4 as lborel, which uses the real borel sigma algebra (borel) generated by the
open sets of the real line as well as the Lebesgue measure [54].
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The independence of random variables is an important property when dealing
with multiple random variables. In general, for any two random variables X and Y ,
the probability of the intersection of their events is equal to the multiplication of the
probability of the individual events. The independence of random variables is defined
as indep vars [53]:
Definition 2.6.
	 indep vars p M X ii =
(∀ i. i ∈ ii ⇒
random variable (X i) p
(m space (M i), measurable sets (M i))) ∧
indep sets p
(λi. {PREIMAGE f A ∩ p space p |
(f = X i) ∧ A ∈ measurable sets (M i)}) ii
where p is the probability space and M is the measure space that the random variable X
maps to. In this case, M and X are indexed by a number from the set of numbers ii,
which gives the possibility of defining the independence for multiple random variables
that map from the probability space to different spaces. The function indep vars
defines the independence by first ensuring that the group of input functions X are
random variables and that their event sets are independent using indep sets. Using
indep sets, the probability of the intersection of any sub-group of events of the
random variables is equal to the multiplication of the probability of the individual
events.




	 indep var p M x X M y Y =
indep vars p (λi. if i = 0 then M x else M y)
(λi. if i = 0 then X else Y) {x | (x = 0) ∨ (x = 1)}
We define several functions that facilitate handling our formalization. The first
function is measurable CDF, which is defined as:
Definition 2.8.
	 ∀ p X. measurable CDF p X =
(λx. CDF p X x) ∈ measurable borel Borel
This function ensures that the CDF of random variable X is measurable from
the borel space to the Borel space. In other words, it ensures that the CDF is
measurable from the real line to the extended-real line. This implies that the domain
for this CDF is the real line and the range is the extended-real line.
We define another function, cont CDF, which ensures that the CDF is continu-
ous. It is formally defined as:
Definition 2.9.
	 ∀ p X. cont CDF p X = ∀ z. (λx. real (CDF p X x)) contl z
where the function real typecasts the value of CDF from extended-real to real data-
type, and contl ascertains that the function is continuous over all values in its domain.
It is worth mentioning that X is a real valued random variable. However, the CDF
returns extended-real. As the continuity of functions is defined in HOL4 for real valued
functions, it is required to typecast the value of the CDF from extended-real to real. In
addition, since the values of the CDF range from 0 to 1, as it represents a probability,
this function is the same in both cases but with different datatypes. Therefore, if
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the function is continuous in the extended-real, then it is continuous using the real
data-type. Furthermore, later we will use extended-real random variables, therefore,
it is required to typecast their values using the real function.
Next, we define a function, rv gt0 ninfinity, to ensure that the input random
variables of a DFT can only have the range [0,+∞):
Definition 2.10.
	 (rv gt0 ninfinity [] = T) ∧
(rv gt0 ninfinity (h::t) = (∀ s. 0 ≤ h s ∧ h s = PosInf) ∧
(rv gt0 ninfinity t))
Finally, we define a function, den gt0 ninfinity to ensure the proper values
for the marginal, joint and conditional density functions:
Definition 2.11.
	 ∀ f xy f y f cond.
den gt0 ninfinity f xy f y f cond ⇔
∀ x y.
0 ≤ f xy (x,y) ∧ 0 < f y y ∧ f y y = PosInf ∧ 0 ≤ f cond y x
where f xy is the joint density function, f y is the marginal density function, and
finally f cond is the conditional density function of X given Y. This function can be




The Lebesgue integral is defined in HOL4 using positive simple functions, which are
measurable functions defined as a linear combinations of indicator functions of mea-
surable sets representing a partition of the space X [28]. A positive simple function,
g, can be represented using the triplet (s, a, x) as [28]:
∀t ∈ X, g(t) =
∑
i∈s
xi1ai(t), xi ≥ 0 (2.2)
where s is a finite set of partition tags, xi is a sequence of positive extreal numbers,
ai is a sequence of measurable sets and 1ai is the indicator function of measurable set
ai and is defined as in [28]:
Definition 2.12.
	 ∀ A. indicator fn A = (λx. if x ∈ A then 1 else 0)
The Lebesgue integral is first defined for positive simple functions and then ex-
tended for positive functions for measure M as pos fn integral M (λx. f x) [28],
where f is the positive function that we are integrating. In this work, we are integrat-
ing the density functions over the real line. Therefore, we will use the Lebesgue- Borel
measure with the Lebesgue integral. The Lebesgue-Borel (lborel) measure is a mea-
sure defined over the real line. As with any measure, lborel should have a space and
measurable sets. For lborel, the real line represents its space and the borel sets repre-
sent the lborel measurable sets [54]. For example, the Lebesgue integral of the posi-
tive function f from 0 to t (
∫ t
0
f(x) dx) can be expressed formally as: pos fn integral
lborel (λx. f x * indicator fn {x’| 0 ≤ x’ ∧ x’ ≤ t} x), where the indi-
cator function is used here to set the interval that we are integrating over. Throughout
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this thesis, we will use a mix of standard and HOL math notation to facilitate the
readability of the text.
It is usually required that the probability of an event for a random variable to be
expressed using the integration of the random variable’s distribution. This is verified
in HOL4 as [17]:
Theorem 2.2.
	 ∀ X p s A.
random variable X p s ∧ A ∈ subsets s ⇒
(distribution p X A =
integral (space s, subsets s, distribution p X)(indicator fn A))
In the above theorem, X can be a continuous or a discrete random variable.
However, in our DFT formalization, we are only interested in continuous random
variables as they represent the time of failure of system components.
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Chapter 3
Formal Qualitative Analysis of
Dynamic Fault Trees
In this chapter, we present our formalization of DFT gates and operators based on
the algebraic approach, which are required in conducting the formal DFT qualitative
analysis. We apply this formalization to qualitatively analyze two case studies to
obtain formally reduced cut sets and cut sequences.
3.1 Methodology
The proposed methodology for conducting the formal qualitative analysis of DFTs
in HOL is depicted in Figure 3.1. The analysis starts by a system description that
can be used to build a DFT model with some dependability requirements, which
are related to the qualitative assessments of DFTs. A formal DFT model of the
given system is developed in HOL, which requires the formal definitions of DFT
gates. These gates include the AND, OR, FDEP, PAND and spare gates with shared
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Figure 3.1: Formal DFT Qualitative Analysis Methodology
spares. Then, the structure function of the DFT’s top event has to be reduced and
we propose to formally verify this reduction based on a library of generic formally
verified simplification theorems. This ensures that the reduced formal DFT model
corresponds to the original DFT model. This verified reduced structure function is
then used in the qualitative analysis to produce a reduced form of the cut sets and
cut sequences that satisfy the requirements. The cut sets can be defined as a group of
sets, where each set has the inputs that their combined failure leads to the occurrence
of the top event. The cut sequences, on the other hand, is a group of lists, where each
list has a certain sequence of inputs that their failure in this particular sequence leads
to the failure of the top event.
It is worth mentioning again that this methodology formalizes the mathematical
foundations of the algebraic approach presented in [30], where the DFT events are
treated based on their time of occurrence (failure of corresponding components d).
This allows us to conduct the qualitative analysis using the sound core of HOL theorem
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prover. Therefore, it is required first to have a library of formalized DFT operators,
gates and simplification theorems to be used in the formal DFT qualitative analysis.
In [30], it is assumed that system components are non-repairable, i.e., the components
are not repaired after failure.
3.2 Identity Elements and Temporal Operators
Similar to ordinary Boolean algebra, the DFT algebraic approach defines identity el-
ements that are important in the simplification process of the DFT [30]. The DFT
identity elements are: the ALWAYS element representing an event that always oc-
curs from time 0 (constant failed element CONST()), i.e., ALWAYS= 0, and the
NEVER element, which describes an event that never occurs (constant fail-safe ele-
ment CONST(⊥)), i.e., NEVER= +∞. We formally define these elements as:
Definition 3.1. Always Element
	 ALWAYS = (λs. (0:extreal))
Definition 3.2. Never Element
	 NEVER = (λs. PosInf)
where PosInf represents +∞ in HOL4. We define the time of failure of the events
as lambda abstracted functions that accept an arbitrary data-type that represents an
element from the probability space and return the time. So that they can be later
treated as random variables. For example, the time of failure of a component is a
random variable X and can be expressed in lambda abstraction form as (λs. X s).
Temporal operators are also required to model the DFT gates in the algebraic
approach [30]. These operators are: Before (), Simultaneous (Δ) and Inclusive
Before (). Each one of these operators accepts two inputs, which can be subtrees
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or basic events that represent faults of system components. The time of occurrence
of the output event of each operator equals the time of occurrence of the first input
event if a certain condition is satisfied, otherwise the output can never occur. The
output event of the Before operator occurs (fails) when the first input event (left) is
less than the time of occurrence of the second input (right), otherwise it can never
occur. It is mathematically expressed as [30]:
d(X  Y ) =
⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
d(X), d(X) < d(Y )
+∞, d(X) ≥ d(Y )
(3.1)
We formally define the Before operator in HOL as lamda abstracted function:
Definition 3.3. Before Operator
	 ∀ X Y.
D BEFORE X Y = (λs. if X s < Y s then X s else PosInf)
where X and Y represent the time of occurrence of events X and Y, respectively.
The time of failure of the Simultaneous operator is equal to the time of occur-
rence of one of the events, only if their time of failure is equal, otherwise, it can never




d(X), d(X) = d(Y )
+∞, d(X) = d(Y )
(3.2)
It is worth mentioning that if the inputs of the Simultaneous operator are basic
events with continuous failure distributions, then the output of this operator can never
fail [30]. This is because the time of failure is continuous, and the possibility that
two system components fail at the same time is negligible. As a consequence, it is
assumed in the algebraic approach that any two different basic events can never fail
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at the same time. This can be expressed for basic failure events of the inputs of the
given DFT as in [30]:
d(XΔY ) = NEV ER (3.3)
We formally define the Simultaneous operator as:
Definition 3.4. Simultaneous Operator
	 ∀ X Y.
D SIMULT X Y = (λs. if X s = Y s then X s else PosInf)
Finally, the Inclusive Before combines the behavior of both the Simultaneous
and the Before operators, i.e., if the first input event (left) occurs before or at the
same time as the second input event (right), then the output event occurs with a time
equals to the time of occurrence of the first input event. This is expressed as [30]:
d(X  Y ) =
⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
d(X), d(X) ≤ d(Y )
+∞, d(X) > d(Y )
(3.4)
We formally define this operator in HOL as:
Definition 3.5. Inclusive Before Operator
	 ∀ X Y.
D INCLUSIVE BEFORE X Y = (λs. if X s ≤ Y s then X s else PosInf)
3.3 Formalization of FT Gates
The mathematical expressions of the FT gates; static and dynamic, are listed in
Table 3.1. In [30], the DFT gates are defined using the temporal operators and the
definitions of the AND and OR. However, in this work, we present mathematical
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definitions for the gates based on the time of failure of the output event, then we
verify the equivalence of these definitions with the definitions presented in [30].
Table 3.1: DFT Gates Mathematical Expressions
Gates Mathematical Expressions
d(X · Y ) = max(d(X), d(Y ))
AND




d(Y ), d(X) ≤ d(Y )
+∞, d(X) > d(Y )PAND




d(X), d(Y ) < d(X)
+∞, d(Y ) ≥ d(X)
d(QHSP ) = max(d(Y ), d(X))
Spare
d(QWSP ) = d(Y · (Xd  Y ) +Xa · (Y Xa) + YΔXa + YΔXd
d(Q1) = d(X · (Zd X)+Za · (X  Za)+X · (Y X))
Shared
Spare
3.3.1 AND and OR Gates
The AND (·) and OR (+) are considered as operators and as static gates as well.
They can be modeled based on the time of occurrence of their output events. For the
AND gate, the output occurs when both of its input events occur and the time of
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occurrence of the output is modeled as the maximum time of occurrence of both input
events [30]. For the OR gate, the output occurs once one of its input events occurs.
Therefore, we formalize it as the minimum time of occurrence of the inputs [30]. We
formally define the AND and OR in HOL as:
Definition 3.6. AND Gate/Operator
	 ∀ X Y. D AND X Y = (λs. max (X s)(Y s))
Definition 3.7. OR Gate/Operator
	 ∀ X Y. D OR X Y = (λs. min (X s)(Y s))
where max and min are the HOL4 functions that return the maximum and the mini-
mum of their input arguments, respectively. It is important to notice that we define
the AND and OR gates as lambda abstracted functions that accept two inputs that
are also functions. This enables defining the inputs later as random variables to rep-
resent the time of failure function of system components. This also applies to the
formal definitions of the rest of DFT gates.
3.3.2 Priority AND Gate (PAND)
The PAND gate, shown in Table 3.1, captures the sequence of occurrence (failure)
of its inputs. The output event of this gate occurs if all input events occur in a
certain sequence (conventionally from left to right). In Table 3.1, we provide the
mathematical definition of the PAND gate. We formalize this expression in HOL as:
Definition 3.8. PAND Gate
	 ∀ X Y. PAND X Y = (λs. if X s ≤ Y s then Y s else PosInf)
The behavior of the PAND gate can also be represented using the temporal
operators as defined in [30]:
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Q = Y · (X  Y ) (3.5)
We verify the above relationship in HOL4 as follows:
Theorem 3.1.
	 ∀ X Y. PAND X Y = D AND Y (D INCLUSIVE BEFORE X Y)
This result ascertains that the behavior of PAND gate is correctly captured in our
formal definition.
3.3.3 Functional DEPendency Gate (FDEP)
The FDEP is used to model the dependencies in the failure behavior between the
system components. In other words, it is used when the failure of one component
triggers the failure of another. For the FDEP gate, shown in Table 3.1, event X can
occur if it is triggered by the failure of Tr or if it occurs by itself. As a result, the
occurrence time of XTr (triggered X) equals the minimum time of occurrence of Tr
and X. From the FDEP definition, we can notice that its behavior is equivalent to the
behavior of the OR gate, which is similar to what is proposed in [55, 56] We formally
define the FDEP as:
Definition 3.9. FDEP Gate
	 ∀ X Tr. FDEP X Tr = (λs. min (X s)(Tr s))
In [30], the behavior of the FDEP gate is represented using the temporal oper-
ators as:
XTr = Tr + (X  Tr) (3.6)
We verify the above relationship in HOL4 as follows:
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Theorem 3.2.
	 ∀ X Tr. FDEP X Tr = D OR Tr (D INCLUSIVE BEFORE X Tr)
3.3.4 Spare Gates
Modeling spare parts in real systems is necessary when analyzing the probability of
failure of the overall system, as these spares are used to replace the main parts after
their failure. The main part Y of the spare gate, shown in Table 3.1, is replaced by
the spare part X after a failure occurs. The spare gate has three variants depending
on the type of the spare:
• Cold SPare Gate (CSP): The spare part can only fail while it is active.
• Hot SPare Gate (HSP): The spare part can fail in both the active and the
dormant states with the same probability.
• Warm SPare Gate (WSP): The spare part can fail in both the dormant and
active states with different probabilities.
While manipulating the structure function of the DFT, it is required to distinguish
between the two states of the spare part, i.e., the active state and the dormant state.
Therefore a different variable is assigned to each state. For example, for the spare gate
in Table 3.1, the variable X is assigned Xd and Xa for the dormant and active states,
respectively [30]. This is required in case of a WSP gate, where the spare part has
two different states. Recall that in the case of a CSP gate, it is not necessary to use
these subscripts, since the spare part in the CSP gate does not work in the dormant
state. Therefore, the active state only affects the DFT behavior and is included in the
expressions. In the HSP gate, the spare part has the same behavior for both states
and no subscript is required to distinguish between these two.
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It can be noticed from the definition of the WSP gate that the output of the
spare occurs in two cases: if the spare fails in its dormant state, then the main part
fails or the main part fails then the spare is activated and then it fails in its active
state. The last two terms in the WSP definition cover the possibility that the spare
and the main part fail at the same time. This can happen if the main part and
the spare are functionally dependent on the same trigger. The WSP represents the
general case for the spare gates, while the CSP and HSP represent special cases of the
WSP, where the spare cannot fail or is fully functioning in its dormant state. We have
defined mathematical expressions for both the CSP gate for basic events and the HSP
gate to facilitate using their expressions in DFT analysis. However, as will be seen
shortly, we have verified that the behavior of our expressions is equivalent to a WSP
under certain conditions. For the CSP gate, the output occurs if the main part fails
then the spare is activated and then the spare fails while it is active. Since the spare
part of the HSP has the same failure distribution in both of its states, the output of
the HSP occurs when both inputs (main and spare) fail. Therefore, its behavior is
equivalent to an AND gate.
We formally define in HOL the three variants of the spare gate as:
Definition 3.10. CSP Gate
	 ∀ X Y. CSP Y X = (λs. if Y s < X s then X s else PosInf)
Definition 3.11. HSP Gate
	 ∀ X Y. HSP Y X = (λs. max (Y s)(X s))
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Definition 3.12. WSP Gate
	 ∀ Y Xa Xd.
WSP Y Xa Xd =
D OR
(D OR
(D OR (D AND Y (D BEFORE Xd Y))
(D AND Xa (D BEFORE Y Xa)))
(D SIMULT Y Xa))(D SIMULT Y Xd)
Then, we formally verify that the WSP gate is equivalent to an HSP gate when
the spare part in its dormant state is equal to its active state.
Theorem 3.3. 	 ∀ X Y. WSP Y X X = HSP Y X
Moreover, we formally verify that the WSP gate is equivalent to a CSP gate, if
the spare part cannot fail in its dormant state. We formally verify this as:
Theorem 3.4.
	 ∀ Xa Xd Y. (Xd = NEVER) ∧
(∀ s. ALL DISTINCT [Y s; Xa s]) ⇒ WSP Y Xa Xd = CSP Y Xa
where Xd = NEVER indicates that the spare part cannot fail in its dormant state, and
ALL DISTINCT ensures that the inputs cannot fail at the same time. This is because
we defined the CSP gate for basic events. As can be seen from the above theorem,
the CSP gate only deals with the active state of the spare, therefore, when dealing
with a CSP there is no need to use the subscript.
In some real-world applications, a spare part can replace one of two main parts.
This case is represented using shared spare gates, as shown in Table 3.1 [41]. The
expression of the output Q1 of the first gate is listed in Table 3.1 [30]. This expression
41
implies that the output Q1 of this gate occurs in three different situations: (i) if the
main part Y fails, then the spare fails while it is active (Xa), (ii) if the spare part
fails in its dormant state Xd, then the main part fails, or (iii) if the second main part
(of the other gate) Z fails before Y , and thus the spare is not available to replace Y
when it fails. We use the DFT operators to formally model the behavior of this gate:
Definition 3.13. Shared Spare
	 ∀ Y Z Xa Xd.
shared spare Y Z Xa Xd =
D OR
(D OR (D AND Y (D BEFORE Xd Y))
(D AND Xa (D BEFORE Y Xa)))
(D AND Y (D BEFORE Z Y)))
3.4 Formal Verification of the Simplification
Theorems
In the DFT algebraic approach, many simplification theorems exist and are used to
reduce the structure function of the top event [30]. In [41], we verified over 80 sim-
plification theorems. However, these theorems were based on our old definitions of
the DFT gates and operators that do not support probabilistic analysis. We verify
all these theorems for the new definitions, presented in this work. These simplifica-
tion theorems range from simple ones, such as commutativity of the AND, OR and
Simultaneous operator, to more complex ones that include combinations of all the op-
erators. Table 3.2 includes some of these verified properties. The verification details
of these theorems as well as the gates definitions are available at [57].
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Table 3.2: Examples of Formally Verified Simplification Theorems
DFT Algebra Theorems HOL Theorems
X + Y = Y +X 	 ∀ X Y. D OR X Y = D OR Y X
X ·NEV ER = NEV ER 	 ∀ X. D AND X NEVER = NEVER
X  (Y + Z) = (X  Y ) · (X  Z)
	 ∀ X Y Z. D BEFORE X (D OR Y Z) =
D AND (D BEFORE X Y)(D BEFORE X Z)
X  (Y + Z) = (X  Y ) · (X  Z)
	 ∀ X Y Z.
D INCLUSIVE BEFORE X (D OR Y Z) =
D AND (D INCLUSIVE BEFORE X Y)
(D INCLUSIVE BEFORE X Z)
(X  Y ) + (XΔY ) = X  Y
	 ∀ X Y. D OR (D INCLUSIVE BEFORE X Y)
(D SIMULT X Y) = D INCLUSIVE BEFORE X Y
3.5 Formal Qualitative Analysis of DFT
Examples
In this section, we illustrate, using three small DFT examples (Figure 3.2), the appli-
cation of the proposed framework to qualitatively analyze a given DFT.
Using our proposed methodology, we are able to build a HOL formal DFT
model and formally verify the reduction of the given DFT examples as expressed in
the following three theorems. We assume that all inputs are basic events, i.e., they
cannot fail at the same time. This condition can be relaxed if we are modeling a
system with a common cause of failure for the inputs.
Theorem 3.5. Reduced CPAND
	 ∀ X Y Z. (∀ s. ALL DISTINCT [X s; Y s; Z s]) ⇒
(PAND (PAND Z Y) X =
D AND X (D AND (D BEFORE Z Y) (D BEFORE Y X))
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(a) CPAND (b) AND-FDEP (c) WSP-OR
Figure 3.2: DFT Examples
Theorem 3.6. Reduced AND-FDEP
	 ∀ X Y Z. X·(FDEP Y Z) = D OR (D AND X Y)(D AND X Z)
Theorem 3.7. Reduced WSP-OR
	 ∀ Y Xa Xd Z.
(∀ s. ALL DISTINCT [Y s; Xa s; Xd s; Z s])⇒
(D OR (WSP Y Xa Xd) Z =
D OR (D AND Xa (D BEFORE Y Xa))(D OR (D AND Y (D BEFORE Xd Y)) Z)
As mentioned previously, each theorem can have a list of required conditions
and a conclusion. For Theorem 3.5, the condition ensures that all random variables
that represent system components are not equal, i.e., these random variables rep-
resent basic events. This is accomplished using the HOL4 function ALL DISTINCT.
The left hand side of the conclusion of this theorem represents the formal DFT ex-
pression for the given DFT, while the right hand side represents the verified reduced
structure function. This also applies to Theorems 3.6 and 3.7. Using these verified
reduced expressions, one can determine the cut sets and cut sequences to conduct the
qualitative analysis. For example, the CPAND has only one sequence that can cause
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the occurrence of the top event which is [Z;Y ;X]. Similarly, the AND-FDEP DFT
has only two cut sets {X;Y } and {X;Z}. Finally, the WSP-OR DFT has two cut
sequences [Y ;Xa] and [Xd;Y ] and one cut set represented by the single element {Z}.
This indicates that using our proposed methodology, we have been able to formally
conduct the qualitative analysis and determine the cut sets and cut sequences of a
given DFT.
In order to emphasize on the importance of formally verifying the underlying
math of the algebraic approach and the significance of knowing the required conditions
for the analysis results to be valid, we provide more details regarding a flaw in one
of the algebraic approaches. In [58], a simple algebra is introduced that provides
definitions and simplification theorems for DFTs. We have been able to identify an
error in one of the simplification theorems, which is the distributivity property of the
sequence operator over the OR operator, i.e.,:
A.(B + C) = A.B + A.C (3.7)
where . and + represent the sequence and OR operators, respectively. The sequence
operator indicates that its output occurs if the input events occur in sequence from
left to right, i.e., the time of occurrence of the left input event is less than that of
the right input event. While the OR operator is represented by the minimum time
of occurrence for the input events. Now, assuming that the time of occurrence of
the input events A, B, and C are dA, dB and dC , respectively, the left hand side
of Equation (3.7) occurs only if dA < min(dB, dC). While, the right hand side of
the same equation occurs if dA < dB or dA < dC . This property fails to hold when
dA > min(dB, dC) but at the same time dA < max(dB, dC), i.e., dA falls in the middle
between dB and dC . In this particular case, the left hand side of Equation (3.7) will
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not occur because dA is not less than the minimum of dB and dC , however, one of
the terms of the right hand side occurs. For this property to hold, it is required to
have the condition dA < min(dB, dC). We have been able to identify this flaw using
theorem proving, as the property was not verifiable for the aforementioned case unless
this particular condition is added. As a consequence, using this property without the
required condition in any application, including the application part of the mentioned
paper [58], would lead to erroneous results, which is serious specially for safety-critical
systems that cannot tolerate any error in the analysis. These findings emphasize on the
importance of having a rigorous formal framework for DFT analysis, which is essential
for safety-critical systems. In the next section, we will apply our methodology on two
real-world case studies.
3.6 Formal Qualitative Analysis Case Studies
In this section, we apply our methodology for conducting the qualitative analysis of
two safety-critical systems, i.e., a drive-by-wire (DBW) system to control the brakes
and throttle systems of modern vehicles [59] and a cardiac assist system (CAS) that
provides care to patients with heart failure [60]. The analysis of these systems should
be carefully conducted as any error may lead to the loss of life in extreme cases.
In order to conduct the formal qualitative analysis using our framework, we
provide generic steps that can be followed:
1. Express the structure function of the top event of the DFT using the DFT
algebra.
2. Simplify the structure function and formally verify that the simplified and orig-
inal functions are equal using the simplification theorems.
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Figure 3.3: DFT of Drive-by-wire System
3. Obtain a reduced form of the cut sets and cut sequences.
We demonstrate the utilization of these steps in the formal qualitative analysis
of the DBW and CAS systems.
3.6.1 Qualitative Analysis of DBW
The DFT of the drive-by-wire (DBW) system is shown in Figure 3.3 [59]. We chose to
analyze the brake and the throttle parts of this system, which consists of the following
parts: the brakes control unit (BC), the throttle failure (TF ), two sensors; the brake
sensor (BS) and the throttle sensor (TS), the engine failure (EF ) and finally the
primary central control (PC) unit with its spare part (SCd and SCa for both the
dormant and active states, respectively). We model the spare part of the central
control unit as a warm spare, as this is the general case for the spare. In addition,
this is the most convenient way to model it as the spare control unit can be working
in the sleep mode, and it will only be activated after the main unit fails.
We proceed with the analysis of the DBW system following the steps outlined in
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our proposed methodology. We first start by verifying the reduction of the structure
function. The reduced structure is:
QDBW = TF +EF +BC + SCa · (PC  SCa) +PC · (SCdPC) + TS +BS (3.8)
We formally verify this reduced form as:
Theorem 3.8. Reduced DBW
	 ∀ BS TS PC SCa SCd BC EF TF.
(∀ s. ALL DISTINCT
[BS s; TS s; PC s; SCa s; SCd s; BC s; EF s; TF s]) ⇒
(D OR
(D OR (D OR (D OR TF EF) (WSP PC SCa SCd)) BC)





(D OR (D OR TF EF) BC)
(D AND SCa (D BEFORE PC SCa)))
(D AND PC (D BEFORE SCd PC))) TS) BS)
From this expression, we can find a reduced form of the cut sequences :
[PC, SCa] , [SCd, PC]
which means that the top event can fail due to two different sequences of input failures.
The first one is the failure of the main control unit (PC) followed by the failure of
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Figure 3.4: DFT of Cardiac Assist System
the spare in its active state (SCa). The second sequence is when the spare part fails
in its dormant state (SCd) followed by the failure of the main control unit.
In a similar way, a reduced form of the cut sets can be extracted from the
reduced top event expression as:
{TF}, {EF}, {BC}, {TS}, {BS}
3.6.2 Qualitative Analysis of CAS
The DFT for the cardiac assist system (CAS) is shown in Figure 3.4 [60]. The system
consists of three sub-systems: pumps, motors and CPUs. There are two main pumps
PA and PB. After the failure of one of these pumps, a shared spare PS replaces
the failed one. There are two motors MA and the spare MB and a switch MS. The
motor sub-system fails if MS then MA fail in sequence or if MA and the spare MB
fail. Finally, there is one main CPU P and its spare B. Both CPUs are functionally
dependent on the union of a crossbar switch (CS) and the system supervisor (SS).
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We consider here different variations of spare gates, to make this case study
more general and inclusive to all the formalized gates, as shown in Figure 3.4. A
simplified version of this DFT, where we assumed that all spare gates are HSPs gates,
was verified in [61]. However, the variations that we assume here for the spares
allow modeling and verifying the probability of failure of the given system, while the
independence of some of the events does not hold anymore, which makes it a more
general case.
We start first by verifying a reduced version of the structure function of the top
event to enable us to perform the qualitative analyses on a reduced function. The
reduced form of the structure function can be expressed as:
QCAS =CS + SS +MA · (MS MA) +MB · (MAMB)+
Ba · (P  Ba) + P · (Bd  P ) + PA · PB · PS
(3.9)
We formally verify this reduction in HOL4 as:
Theorem 3.9. Reduced CAS
	 ∀ PA PB PS MS MA MB Ba Bd CS SS P.
(∀ s. ALL DISTINCT
[MA s; MS s; PA s; PB s; PS s; MB s; P s; Bd s; Ba s; CS s; SS s] ∧
(D BEFORE Ba P = NEVER) ⇒(
D OR
(D AND (shared spare PA PB PS PS)
(shared spare PB PA PS PS))
(D OR
(D OR (PAND MS MA) (CSP MA MB))
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(WSP (FDEP (D OR CS SS) P)(FDEP (D OR CS SS) Ba)






(D OR CS SS)(D AND MA (D BEFORE MS MA)))
(D AND MB (D BEFORE MA MB)))
(D AND Ba (D BEFORE P Ba)))
(D AND P (D BEFORE Bd P)))(D AND Pa (D AND PB PS))
)
where ALL DISTINCT ensures that the inputs do not occur at the same time, and
(D BEFORE Ba P = NEVER) ascertains that the spare part B in its active state cannot
fail before P . This ensures the proper behavior of the WSP gate. It is worth mention-
ing that such a condition is not required for the HSP gate as the spare part exhibits
the same failure behavior in both of its states.
It is important to mention that since the inputs of the WSP gate are functionally
dependent on the union of CS and SS, we use (FDEP (CS+SS) P), (FDEP (D OR CS
SS) Ba) and (FDEP (D OR CS SS) Bd) for the main, the spare in its active state and
the spare in its dormant state, respectively.
From the verified reduced top event, we can conclude a reduced form of cut
sequences as follows:
[MS;MA], [MA;MB], [P ;Ba], [Bd;P ]
Moreover, a reduced form of the cut sets is deducted as:
{CS}, {SS}, {PA, PB, PS}
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3.7 Summary
In this chapter, we provided the formalization of the DFT operators and gates based on
the DFT algebraic approach. Furthermore, we formally verified several simplification
theorems that are utilized to reduce the structure function of a given DFT. We used
this reduced format to conduct the qualitative analysis and obtain a reduced form
of the cut sets and cut sequences. We provided the details of a flaw in a published
DFT algebra, which further highlights the importance of our formalization. Finally,
we conducted the formal qualitative analysis of two case studies. One of the main
challenges faced during our formalization is choosing the proper data-type that can be
used to capture the behavior of each gate and at the same time allows the verification of
the simplification theorems. In the next chapter, we provide the verification details of
the probabilistic behavior of each gate to enable performing the quantitative analysis
formally within a theorem prover.
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Chapter 4
Formal Quantitative Analysis of
Dynamic Fault Trees
In this chapter, we introduce a methodology for the formal DFT quantitative analysis.
We provide the verification details of the probabilistic failure expressions of DFT gates.
Based on these verified expressions and the proposed methodology, we perform the
quantitative analysis of two case studies to verify generic expressions of probability of
failure that are independent of the failure distributions of systems components.
4.1 Methodology
The DFT formal quantitative analysis methodology is depicted in Figure 4.1. The
analysis starts with a system description that is used to create a DFT model. Based
on the formalized DFT gates, a formal DFT model is created. Then we use the
simplification theorems to verify a reduced DFT model, i.e., a reduced structure
function. The quantitative analysis is conducted by utilizing this reduced structure
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Figure 4.1: Formal DFT Quantitative Analysis Methodology
function to generate formally verified generic expressions of probability of failure.
This last step requires having a library of verified probabilistic failure expressions of
DFT gates and operators, like AND and PAND gates. Creating this library requires
some existing HOL4 libraries, such as the measure, Lebesgue integral, probability
and probabilistic PIE theories. We provide probability of failure expressions that are
generic by using universally quantified probability density and distribution functions.
The distribution and density functions and the variables in these generic expressions
can be instantiated and evaluated in any other tool, such as MATLAB [62], to evaluate
the probability of failure of a given system. A set of probabilistic expressions for
the gates and operators was proposed in [30]. However, these expressions were not
formally verified, and thus they cannot be fully trusted for the formal DFT analysis
as such. Furthermore, there are some missing gaps in the paper-and-pencil proofs
available in [30] that we were able to fill using our formalization, which is built on top
of the Lebesgue integral and probability theories. In [30], there is no direct description
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on how to build the DFT analysis based on the above-mentioned theories. Besides
this, we also had to use different strategies for some proofs. All these differences will
be highlighted throughout this chapter. We present a summary of the challenges that
we faced during the formalization of the probabilistic failure behavior of DFT gates
at the end of this chapter.
4.2 Probabilistic Model of DFT Gates
The foremost requirement for formally conducting the probabilistic analysis of DFTs
in a HOL theorem prover is to have verified expressions for the probability of failure
of DFT gates. Therefore, it is required to formally model and verify the probability
of failure expression for each DFT gate. We assume that the basic events of the DFT
are independent. However, in some cases these events can be dependent; in particular
in the case of CSP and WSP, where the failure of the main part affects the operation
and failure of the spare part. We handle this by first introducing the probabilistic
behavior of the gates for independent events, and then we present the probabilistic
behavior of the WSP and the CSP gates, which deal with dependent events.
Assuming that we are interested in finding the probability of failure until time
t, the following four expressions can be used to express the probability of any DFT
gate with independent basic events [30]:
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Pr{X · Y }(t) = FX(t)× FY (t) (4.1a)
Pr{X + Y }(t) = FX(t) + FY (t)− FX(t)× FY (t) (4.1b)
Pr{Y · (X  Y )}(t) =
∫ t
0
fY (y) FX(y) dy (4.1c)
Pr{X  Y }(t) =
∫ t
0
fX(x)(1− FY (x)) dx (4.1d)
where FX and FY represent the CDFs of the random variables X and Y , respectively,
and fX and fY represent their corresponding probability density functions (PDFs).
Equation (4.1a) represents the probability of the AND and HSP gates, which
results from the probability of intersection of two independent events. Equation (4.1b)
describes the probability of the OR and FDEP gates, which corresponds to the prob-
ability of union of two independent events. Equation (4.1c) represents the probability
of having two basic events occurring in sequence one after the other until time t, i.e.,
Pr(X < Y ) until time t or Pr(X < Y ∧Y ≤ t), which is the failure probability of the
PAND for basic events. Finally, the probability of the Before operator is represented
by Equation (4.1d), which is the probability of having event X occurring before event
Y until time t, i.e., Pr(X < Y ∧X ≤ t). The difference between the last two events
(before and after) is that in the before event, we are just interested in finding the
probability of failure of X until time t with the condition that X fails before Y . So,
it is not necessary that Y fails. While in the after event, we find the probability of
failure of Y until time t with the condition that Y fails after X. So, it is required
that both X and Y fail in sequence.
Since the probability is applied for sets that belong to the events of the proba-
bility space, we define a DFT event that satisfies the condition that the input function
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is less than or equal to time t, which represents the moment of time until which we
are interested in finding the probability of failure. Without this DFT event, there
is no possible way to apply the probability directly to DFT gates. We first need to
create the DFT event for the time-to-failure function of the output event of any gate
or DFT, then apply the probability to it.
Definition 4.1. DFT Event
	 ∀ p X t. DFT event p X t = {s | X s ≤ Normal t} ∩ p space p
where Normal typecasts the type of t from real to extreal, p represents the proba-
bility space and X represents the time-to-failure function.
We formally verify the equivalence between the probability of the DFT event of
an extended real function and its equivalent CDF of the real version of the function as:
Theorem 4.1.
	 ∀ X p t. (∀ s. X s = PosInf ∧ 0 ≤ X s) ⇒
(CDF p (real o X) t = prob p (DFT event p X t))
where real is the mirror opposite to the typecasting Normal operator. This type-
casting is required as the DFT event is defined for extreal data-type, and the CDF
is defined for real random variables only. Therefore, it is required to ensure that the
input function does not equal +∞ and is greater than or equal to 0 since it represents
the time of failure of a system component.
4.2.1 Probabilistic Model of AND Gate
To formally verify Equation (4.1a), we verify the equivalence of the DFT event of the
AND gate to the intersection of two events:
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Lemma 4.1.
	 ∀ p t X Y.
DFT event p (D AND X Y) t = DFT event p X t ∩ DFT event p Y t
Based on the independence of random variables and using Theorem 4.1, we
formally verify Equation (4.1a) in HOL4 as:
Theorem 4.2.
	 ∀ p t X Y. rv gt0 ninfinity [X; Y] ∧
indep var p lborel (real o X) lborel (real o Y) ⇒
(prob p (DFT event p (D AND X Y) t) =
CDF p (real o X) t * CDF p (real o Y) t
where indep var ensures the independence of the random variables, X and Y , over
the Lebesgue-Borel (lborel) measure [53]. rv gt0 ninfinity is required since we are
dealing with the real versions of the random variables. It is a logical condition, since
any real-world component will eventually fail, so we are interested only in dealing
with the time of failure that is not +∞.
In Theorem 4.2, the random variables are typecasted as real-valued, using the
operator real, to function over the Lebesgue-Borel (lborel) measure. lborel is
purposely used here to facilitate the Lebesgue integration over the real line when
expressing the probabilities of the before and after events. Theorem 4.2 represents
the probability of the AND gate and the HSP gate, since the behavior of the HSP
is equivalent to the behavior of the AND gate.
4.2.2 Probabilistic Model of OR and FDEP Gates
To formally verify Equation (4.1b), we verify the equivalence of the DFT event of the
OR as the union of two events:
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Lemma 4.2.
	 ∀ p t X Y.
DFT event p (D OR X Y) t = DFT event p X t ∪ DFT event p Y t
We formally verify Equation (4.1b) based on the probabilistic PIE, the indepen-
dence of random variables and using Theorem 4.1 as:
Theorem 4.3.
	 ∀ p t X Y. rv gt0 ninfinity [X; Y] ∧
All distinct events p [X;Y] t ∧
indep var p lborel (real o X) lborel (real o Y) ⇒
(prob p (DFT event p (D OR X Y) t) =
CDF p (real o X) t + CDF p (real o X) t -
CDF p (real o X) t × CDF p (real o Y) t)
where All distinct events asserts that the event sets are not equal. We formally
define it as:
Definition 4.2.
	 All distinct events p L t =
ALL DISTINCT (MAP (λx. DFT event p x t) L
where ALL DISTINCT is a HOL4 predicate, which ensures that the elements of its
input list are not equal and MAP is a function that applies the input function (λx.
DFT event p x t) to all the elements in the list L and returns a list. This condition
is required for the probabilistic PIE.
Theorem 4.3 provides the probability of the OR gate as well as the FDEP gate,
since the behavior of the FDEP is equivalent to the OR gate.
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It is worth noting that in [30], Equations (4.1a) and (4.1b) were just presented
without any information on how to link them to the definitions of the AND and OR
gates. We should recall that the AND and OR gates are defined as the maximum and
minimum of their operands. Looking at these definitions does not give any knowledge
about how the probability of the AND gate is equivalent to the probability of the
intersection or how the probability of the OR gate is equal to the probability of
the union. However, using our formalization and utilizing our formal definition of
DFT event, we are able to verify that the DFT event of the AND gate is equal to the
intersection of the input events and that the DFT event of the OR gate is equal to the
union of the input events. Based on this, we can ensure that the probability of the
AND and OR gates are represented using Equations (4.1a) and (4.1b), respectively.
4.2.3 Probabilistic Model of PAND Gate and Before
Operator
In this section, we present the formalization details of the probabilistic model of the
PAND gate and the before operator.
We verify Equations (4.1c) and (4.1d) as Theorems 4.4 and 4.5, respectively.
Theorem 4.4.
	 ∀ X Y p fy t.
rv gt0 ninfinity [X; Y] ∧ 0 ≤ t ∧ prob space p ∧
indep var p lborel (real o X) lborel (real o Y) ∧
distributed p lborel (real o Y) fy ∧ (∀ y. 0 ≤ fy y) ∧
cont CDF p (real o X) ∧
measurable CDF p (real o X) ⇒
(prob p (DFT event p (Y·(XY)) t) =
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pos fn integral lborel
(λy. fy y *
(indicator fn {w | 0 ≤ w ∧ w ≤ t} y *
CDF p (real o X) y)))
Theorem 4.5.
	 ∀ X Y p fy t.
rv gt0 ninfinity [X; Y] ∧ 0 ≤ t ∧ prob space p ∧
indep var p lborel (real o X) lborel (real o Y) ∧
distributed p lborel (real o X) fx ∧ (∀ x. 0 ≤ fx x) ∧
measurable CDF p (real o Y) ⇒
(prob p (DFT event p (X  Y) t) =
pos fn integral lborel
(λx. fx x *
(indicator fn {u | 0 ≤ u ∧ u ≤ t} x *
(1- CDF p (real o Y) x)))
where pos fn integral is the Lebesgue integral for positive functions [28], fy and
fx are the PDF of random variables of the real version of the functions Y and X,
respectively. cont CDF is required in Theorem 4.4 as we need to prove that Pr(X ≤ t)
and Pr(X < t) are equal, and this is not valid unless the CDF function is continuous
(cont).
Verifying Theorems 4.4 and 4.5 is not a straightforward task due to the involve-
ment of Lebesgue integration. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first time that
these proofs are formally verified in a theorem prover, where we are able to identify
the exact steps to reach the final form of Theorems 4.4 and 4.5. In addition, in [30],
Equation (4.1c) is presented without any proof, while a proof is presented for Equation
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(4.1d) that is based mainly on the probability of disjoint events and utilizes deriva-
tives to reach the final expression. However, we have been able to verify the same
expression of Equation (4.1d), but following a different and simpler proof, which is
similar to the proof of Equation (4.1c) to reach the final form of Theorem 4.5 without
using derivatives. We first prove the probability of sets of real random variables in
the form of integration before extending the proofs to extended real functions.
Proof Strategy for Theorem 4.4
To verify Theorem 4.4, we first express the event set that corresponds to the integra-
tion in Equation (4.1c) as:
(X, Y )−1{(u, w) | u < w ∧ 0 ≤ w ∧ w ≤ t} (4.2)
Then, we verify that the probability of this set can be written using integration as in
Equation (4.1c). Therefore, we verify the relationship between the distribution and
the integration of positive functions using the push forward measure (distr):
Theorem 4.6.
	 ∀ X p M A.
measure space M ∧
random variable X p (m space M, measurable sets M) ∧
A ∈ measurable sets M ⇒
(distribution p X A =
pos fn integral (distr p M X) (indicator fn A))
It is worth mentioning that this theorem can be used in the verification process
of other applications and not only for DFT analysis. We use Theorem 4.6 to verify
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the relationship between the probability and the integration of the joint distribution
FXY of two independent random variables as:
Pr(X, Y )−1(A) =
∫
1A dFXY (4.3)
We formalize this relationship in HOL4 and use a property, which converts
the distribution of a pair measure of independent measures into the pair measure of
the individual distributions [53], to split the integral of joint distributions into two
integrals of the individual distributions (
∫ ∫
1AdFXdFY ). In order to reach the final
form of Equation (4.1c), we express it in the form of two integrals:
∫ t
0















The problem in Equations (4.4a) and (4.4b) lies in the fact that the outer integral
is a function of the inner integral, i.e., for the inner integral we are integrating until
y which is the variable of the outer integral. To be able to handle this formally, we
verify that the indicator function of the set in Equation (4.2) can be written in the
form of the multiplication of two indicator functions, where one is a function of the
other.
Lemma 4.3.
	 ∀ x y t.
indicator fn {(u,w) | u < w ∧ 0 ≤ w ∧ w ≤ t}(x,y) =
indicator fn {w| 0 ≤ w ∧ w ≤ t} y * indicator fn {u|u < y} x
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In order to use the above-mentioned lemma and the set on the left hand side, we
need to verify that this set is measurable in the two dimensional borel space, i.e., the
set belongs to the measurable sets of pair measure lborel lborel. This property
can be verified based on the fact that a countable union of measurable sets is also
measurable. We verify this fact on the rational numbers Q as follows:
Theorem 4.7.
	 ∀ m s.
measure space m ∧ (∀ n. n ∈ Q set ⇒ s n ∈ measurable sets m) ⇒
BIGUNION (IMAGE s Q set) ∈ measurable sets m
where m in our case is pair measure lborel lborel. This theorem is generic and
can be used in other contexts than DFTs.
The purpose of using the set of rational numbers is that we need a countable
set that can be used to express the set in Lemma 4.3 as the union of borel rectangles.
We verify this in HOL4 as:
Lemma 4.4.
	 ∀ t. BIGUNION
{{u | u < real q} × {w | real q < w ∧ 0 ≤ w ∧ w ≤ t} |
q ∈ Q set} =
{(u,w) | u < w ∧ 0 ≤ w ∧ w ≤ t}
Besides this, we also verify a lemma that the sets in the union of Lemma 4.4 are
measurable sets in the pair measure lborel lborel as:
Lemma 4.5.
	 ∀ t q. {u | u < real q} × {w | real q < w ∧ 0 ≤ w ∧ w ≤ t} ∈
measurable sets (pair measure lborel lborel)
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We can use the proof steps of the previous lemmas to verify the same properties
for similar sets, which is essential for other gates expressions. This facilitates dealing
with other events in the future, by following the steps in our proof.
By using the above lemmas, we can verify that the original set is a measurable
set in the pair measure lborel lborel as:
Lemma 4.6.
	 ∀ t. {(u,w) | u < w ∧ 0 ≤ w ∧ w ≤ t} ∈
measurable sets (pair measure lborel lborel)




dFXdFY , where A is the set that specifies the boundaries of the integral.
We verify this in HOL4 using the push forward measure as:
Lemma 4.7.
	 ∀ X Y p t.
prob space p ∧ indep var p lborel X lborel Y ⇒
(pos fn integral
(pair measure (distr p lborel X)(distr p lborel Y))
(λ(x,y). indicator fn{(u,w) |u < w ∧ 0 ≤ w ∧ w ≤ t }(x,y) =
pos fn integral (distr p lborel Y)
(λy. indicator fn {w|0 ≤ w ∧ w ≤ t} y *
pos fn integral(distr p lborel X)
(λx. indicator fn {u | u < y} x)))
where pair measure (distr p lborel X) (distr p lborel Y) represents the
joint distribution of the push forward measures of random variables X and Y over
the borel space.
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We verify several essential properties for CDF in order to prove that the inner
integral of Lemma 4.7 is equal to FX(y) or formally to (CDF p X y). In order to have
the PDF of random variable Y in the integral, we assume that the random variable Y
has a PDF by defining a density measure for Y . We ported the following definition,
distributed, from Isabelle/HOL[18], where f in this definition is the PDF of random
variable X, and the measure part of the density measure is the integral of this PDF.
Using this definition, the integral of f is equal to the distribution of the random
variable X.
Definition 4.3. distributed
	 ∀ p M X f.
distributed p M X f ⇔
X ∈
measurable(m space p,measurable sets p)
(m space M,measurable sets M) ∧
f ∈ measurable(m space M,measurable sets M) Borel ∧
AE M {x | 0 ≤ f x} ∧ (distr p M X = density M f)
where density is the density measure, and AE M {x | 0 ≤ f x } ensures that the
PDF f is almost everywhere (AE) positive over the measure M. We also use a theorem
that replaces the integration with respect to the density measure by the PDF with
respect to the original measure (lborel in our case) [18]. In addition to the previously
verified theorems, we also prove some additional properties, such as a sigma finite
measure for the push forward measure over the borel space (sigma finite measure
(distr p lborel X)). We also verify that the space generated by the pair measure of
two distributions over the borel space is a sigma algebra (sigma algebra (m space
(pair measure (distr p lborel X)(distr p lborel Y)), measurable sets
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(pair measure (distr p lborel X)(distr p lborel Y)))). Moreover, we verify
that the space generated by the space and the measurable sets of the pair measure of
lborel is also a sigma algebra (sigma algebra (m space (pair measure lborel
lborel), measurable sets (pair measure lborel lborel))). Finally, we prove
that the set of the left-hand side of Equation (4.1c) is equal to the set that corresponds
to the integration of the right-hand side of the same equation as:
Lemma 4.8.
	 ∀ p t X Y.
rv gt0 ninfinity [X; Y] ∧ 0 ≤ t ⇒
(DFT event p (Y·(XY)) t =
PREIMAGE (λx. (real (X x), real (Y x)))
{(u,w) | u < w ∧ 0 ≤ w ∧ w ≤ t} ∩ p space p
Based on all the above mentioned lemmas, we are able to verify the original goal
for Equation (4.1c) as in Theorem 4.4.
Proof Strategy for Theorem 4.5
For the verification of Theorem 4.5, we follow almost the same steps for the previous
proof. We start by first writing the event set for the integration as:
(X, Y )−1{(u, w) | 0 ≤ u ∧ u ≤ t ∧ u < w } (4.5)




	 ∀ x y t.
indicator fn {(u,w) | 0 ≤ u ∧ u ≤ t ∧ u < w}(x,y) =
indicator fn {u | 0 ≤ u ∧ u ≤ t} x * indicator fn {w | x < w} y
Similar to the procedure explained previously for the set of the after event in
Lemmas 4.4, 4.5 and 4.6, we verify that the set of the before event is a measurable
set in the pair measure lborel lborel.
Finally, we rewrite Equation (4.1d) as:
















We verify some additional properties for the CDF in order to complete the proof.
For example, we verify that
∫∞
x
fY (y) dy is equal to 1 − FY (x). Similarly, we also
formally verify that the event of the left-hand side of Equation (4.1d) is equal to the
set that corresponds to the integration of the right-hand side of the same equation.
We use the set in Equation (4.5) to verify this as:
Lemma 4.10.
	 ∀ p t X Y.
rv gt0 ninfinity [X; Y] ∧ 0 ≤ t ⇒
(DFT event p (XY) t =
PREIMAGE (λs. (real (X s),real (Y s)))
{(u,w) | 0 ≤ u ∧ u < w ∧ u ≤ t} ∩ p space p
Based on all these verified theorems, we are able to formally verify Theorem 4.5.
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So far, we presented the formal verification of the probabilistic behavior of:
• The AND gate using Theorem 4.2.
• The probability of the OR and FDEP gates using Theorem 4.3 (since they are
equivalent).
• The probability of the PAND gate for basic events using Theorem 4.4.
• The probability of the Before operator using Theorem 4.5.
There is no probability of failure for the Simultaneous operator as it is eliminated
for basic events according to Equation (3.3). This implies that the probability of the
Inclusive Before operator is equal to the probability of the Before operator for basic
events.
It is worth mentioning that the inputs of these gates can be dependent in case of
having a common cause of failure. In this case the probability of intersection should
be handled using conditional probabilities, in a similar manner to the spare gate as
will be explained in the sequel.
4.2.4 Probabilistic Model of Spare Gates
As mentioned in Chapter 3, the behavior of the HSP gate is equal to the behavior of
the AND gate. Therefore, Theorem 4.2 can be used to express the probability of the
HSP as long as the main and spare parts are independent. The CSP and WSP gates




The probabilistic behavior of the CSP requires dealing with dependent events, as the
failure of the main part affects the behavior of the spare part. Therefore, it is required
to approach the proof in a different manner.
The failure distribution of the spare part of a CSP gate is affected by the failure
time of the main part, as the cold spare starts working after the failure of the main
part. Hence, the failure distribution of the spare part is dependent on the failure of
the main part. The probability of failure for the output event of a CSP with Y as the









where f(Xa|Y=v) is the conditional probability density function for the spare part in
its active state (Xa) given that the main part (Y ) has failed at time v. As mentioned
previously, the subscript of Xa can be omitted, since the spare part of the CSP gate
does not work in its dormant state and we are only concerned with the active state,
so using X directly with CSP means that we are dealing with the active state and
not the dormant one. It can be seen from Equation (4.7) that the failure distribution
of the spare part is affected by the failure of the main part. Hence, these two input
events are not independent, and we cannot utilize the previously verified relationships
to verify the probabilistic behavior of the CSP gate.
We verify Equation (4.7) as:
Theorem 4.8.
	 ∀ p X Y f xy f y f cond t.
rv gt0 ninfinity [X; Y] ∧ 0 ≤ t ∧
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(∀ y.
cond density lborel lborel p
(real o X) (real o Y) y f xy f y f cond) ∧
prob space p ∧ den gt0 ninfinity f xy f y f cond ⇒
(prob p (DFT event p (CSP Y X) t) =
pos fn integral lborel
(λy.
indicator fn {u | 0 ≤ u ∧ u ≤ t} y * f y y *
pos fn integral lborel
(λx. indicator fn {w | y < w ∧ w ≤ t} x * f cond y x )))
where p is the probability space, f xy is the joint density function for X and Y , f y
is the marginal density function for Y , cond density defines the conditional density
function (f cond) for X given that (Y = y) and den gt0 ninfinity ensures the
proper values for the density functions as mentioned in Section 2.2.
Notice that the spare part in the CSP is used without any subscript, i.e., it is
used as X, since the spare has only one state in the CSP, which is the active state.
Therefore, there is no need to use any subscript to distinguish between the dormant
and the active states. As with the previous theorems, we need to use the typecast
operator real with the random variables, since the random variables are of type
extreal and the integral over the lborel requires real random variables.
In [30], a proof has been introduced for the above expression, which is based
mainly on the total expectation theorem [63]. However, we have been able to conduct
the same proof in a simpler manner based on conditional density functions as explained
below.
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Proof Strategy for Theorem 4.8 (CSP Gate)
In order to verify Theorem 4.8, we formalize the conditional density function as [64]:
Definition 4.4.
	 ∀ M1 M2 p X Y y f xy f y f cond.
cond density M1 M2 p X Y y f xy f y f cond ⇔
random variable X p (m space M1, measurable sets M1) ∧
random variable Y p (m space M2, measurable sets M2) ∧
distributed p (pair measure M1 M2) (λx. (X x, Y x)) f xy ∧
distributed p M2 Y f y ∧ (f cond y = (λx. f(x,y) / f y y))
where p is the probability space, M1 and M2 are the measure spaces that the random
variables X and Y map to, respectively (we will use lborel in our case), f xy is the
joint density function for X and Y , f y is the marginal density function of Y and
finally, f cond is the conditional density function of X given (Y = y).
The conditional density function definition ensures that X and Y are random
variables with the joint density function f xy and the marginal density function f y.
It is noticed from the definition of the conditional density function f cond that it is
a function of x only, and it can have different variants depending on the value of Y
that we are conditioning at, i.e., y. This is why f cond takes y as a parameter.
From Definition 4.4, we formally verify the following relationship between the
conditional density, the joint density and the marginal density functions, given that
fY (y) = 0:
fXY (x, y) = fX|Y=y(x)× fY (y) (4.8)
The above equation can be formalized in HOL4 as:
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Theorem 4.9.
	 ∀ M1 M2 p X Y f cond x y f xy f y.
(∀ y. f y y = 0 ∧ f y y = PosInf ∧ f y y = NegInf) ∧
cond density M1 M2 p X Y y f xy f y f cond ⇒
(f xy (x,y) = f cond y x * f y y)
The condition f y y = 0 is required, as this function will be used in the de-
nominator of the conditional density and it cannot equal to 0. In addition, since we
are dealing with extended-real numbers, f y y cannot equal infinity. This theorem is
applicable to any conditional density function that satisfies the given conditions.
The second step in verifying the expression of the CSP is by verifying that the
probability of the joint random variables is equal to the iterated integrals of the joint
density function. This can be expressed as:
Pr(X, Y )−1(A) =
∫ ∫
1A × fXY (x, y) dx dy (4.9)
We use Theorem 4.6 to verify this in HOL4 as:
Theorem 4.10.
	 ∀ p X Y f xy A.
distributed p (pair measure lborel lborel) (λx. (X x, Y x)) f xy ∧
prob space p ∧ (∀ x. 0 ≤ f xy x) ∧
A ∈ measurable sets (pair measure lborel lborel)⇒
(prob p (PREIMAGE (λx. (X x, Y x)) A ∩ p space p) =
pos fn integral lborel
(λy. pos fn integral lborel
(λx. indicator fn A (x,y) * f xy (x,y))))
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Then, we express the probability of the joint random variables using the conditional
density function as:
Pr(X, Y )−1(A) =
∫ ∫
1A × f(X|Y=y)(x)× fY (y) dx dy (4.10)
which we verify in HOL4, using Theorems 4.9 and 4.10, as:
Theorem 4.11.
	 ∀ p X Y f xy f y f cond A.
(∀ y. cond density lborel lborel p X Y y f xy f y f cond) ∧
prob space p ∧ (∀ x. 0 ≤ f xy x) ∧
(∀ y. 0 < f y y ∧ f y y = PosInf) ∧
A ∈ measurable sets (pair measure lborel lborel)⇒
(prob p (PREIMAGE (λx. (X x, Y x)) A ∩ p space p) =
pos fn integral lborel
(λy.
pos fn integral lborel
(λx. indicator fn A (x,y) * f cond y x * f y y )))
In order to be able to reach the final form of Equation (4.7), we need first to
express the event set that corresponds to the integration in Equation (4.7) as:
(X, Y )−1{(x, y) | y < x ∧ x ≤ t ∧ 0 ≤ y ∧ y ≤ t} (4.11)
We verify in HOL4 that this set corresponds to the DFT event of the CSP gate as:
Lemma 4.11.
	 ∀ X Y p t.
rv gt0 ninfinity [X; Y] ∧ 0 ≤ t ⇒
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(DFT event p (CSP Y X) t =
PREIMAGE (λs. (real (X s), real (Y s)))
{(x,y)| y < x ∧ x ≤ t ∧ 0 ≤ y ∧ y ≤ t} ∩ p space p)
In addition, we verify that the event set in Lemma 4.11 is measurable in
pair measure lborel lborel. Finally, we verify that the indicator function of the
set in Lemma 4.11 can be expressed as the multiplication of two indicator functions
to determine the boundaries of the iterated integrals in Equation (4.7) as:
Lemma 4.12.
	 ∀ x y t.
indicator fn {(w,u) | u < w ∧ w ≤ t ∧ 0 ≤ u ∧ u ≤ t} (x,y) =
indicator fn {w | y < w ∧ w ≤ t} x *
indicator fn {u | 0 ≤ u ∧ u ≤ t} y
Using all these verified theorems and lemmas, we formally verify Theorem 4.8.
Warm Spare Gate
Similar to the CSP, the failure of the main part of the WSP gate affects the behavior
of the spare part. Thus, we need to deal with dependent events.
For the WSP gate with two basic events, the output fails in two cases. Case 1
is when the main part fails, then the spare fails in its active state (this case is similar
to the CSP case). Case 2 is when the spare part fails in its dormant state, then the
main part fails with no spare to replace it. In the latter case, the failure distribution
of the spare part in its dormant state is independent of the main part. Hence, we can
use the previously verified expressions for this case. The probability expression for a
WSP with X as the spare part (Xa for the active state and Xd for the dormant state)













where FXd is the CDF of X in its dormant state. The first part of Equation (4.12)
represents the probability of a CSP and the second part represents the probability
when the spare fails before the main part. For the second part, Y and Xd are consid-
ered to be independent as the failure of one of them does not affect the failure of the
second and hence we can use Equation (4.1c) for this case.
We verify Equation (4.12) as:
Theorem 4.12.
	 ∀ p Y Xa Xd t f y f xy f cond.
prob space p ∧ (∀ s. ALL DISTINCT [Xa s; Xd s; Y s]) ∧
DISJOINT WSP Y Xa Xd t ∧ rv gt0 ninfinity [Xa; Xd; Y] ∧ 0 ≤ t ∧
(∀ y.
cond density lborel lborel p
(real o Xa)(real o Y) y f xy f y f cond) ∧
den gt0 ninfinity f xy f y f cond ∧
indep var p lborel (real o Xd) lborel (real o Y) ∧
cont CDF p (real o Xd) ∧
measurable CDF p (real o Xd) ⇒
(prob p (DFT event p (WSP Y Xa Xd) t) =
pos fn integral lborel
(λy.
indicator fn {u | 0 ≤ u ∧ u ≤ t} y * f y y *
pos fn integral lborel
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(λx. indicator fn {w | y < w ∧ w ≤ t} x * f cond y x ))+
pos fn integral lborel
(λy. f y y *
(indicator fn {u | 0 ≤ u ∧ u ≤ t} y *
CDF p (real o Xd) y )))
In the WSP, we need to distinguish between the two states, i.e., active and
dormant, hence the usage of Xa and Xd. The condition DISJOINT WSP Y Xa Xd t
indicates that until time t, the spare part X can only fail in one of its states. It is
assumed that the spare part in the dormant (Xd) state is independent of the main
part Y since the failure of the spare part in its dormant state is not affected by the
failure of the main part.
Proof Strategy for Theorem 4.12 (WSP Gate)
For the verification of Theorem 4.12, it is evident that the probability expression
involves the probability of the CSP gate in addition to the probability of the after
expression of Theorem 4.4. Therefore, we choose to verify that the event of the WSP
for basic events is equivalent to the union of two sets as:
Lemma 4.13.
	 ∀ p Y Xa Xd t.
(∀ s. 0 ≤ Y s) ∧
(∀ s. ALL DISTINCT [Xa s; Xd s; Y s]) ⇒
(DFT event p (WSP Y Xa Xd) t =
{s | Y s < Xa s ∧ Xa s ≤ Normal t ∧
0 ≤ Y s ∧ Y s ≤ t} ∩ p space p ∪
{s | Xd s < Y s ∧ Y s ≤ Normal t } ∩ p space p)
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Then, we verify that the above two sets are disjoint. As a consequence, the probability
of the original set is equivalent to the sum of the probabilities of the disjoint sets.
Based on this, we verify that the probability of the first set ({s | Y s < Xa s ∧ Xa
s ≤ Normal t ∧ 0 ≤ Y s ∧ Y s ≤ t} ∩ p space p) is equal to the probability
of the CSP gate, which will result in the first term in the addition of the conclusion of
Theorem 4.12. We also verify that the probability of the second set in Lemma 4.13 ({s
| Xd s < Y s ∧ Y s ≤ Normal t} ∩ p space p)) is expressed using Theorem 4.4,
which will result in the second term of the addition of the conclusion of Theorem 4.12.
As a result, we have the probability of the WSP as in Theorem 4.12.
In this section, we formally verified the probabilistic behavior of the DFT gates:
AND, OR, HSP, FDEP, PAND, CSP andWSP besides the formalization of expressions
for Pr(X < Y ∧Y ≤ t) and Pr(X < Y ∧X ≤ t). These verified properties are generic,
i.e., universally quantified for all distribution and density functions, and can be used
to formally verify the probability of failure expression of any DFT. The HOL4 proof
script for this verification as well as the gate definitions is available at [57].
Spare Gates with a Shared Spare
The spare gate with shared spare is formally defined in Chapter 3. It is worth men-
tioning that the definition in [30] does not allow the simultaneous failures of the main
parts and thus we use the same constraint.
Q1 of the spare gate with a shared spare, shown in Table 3.1, is represented as
a sum of disjoint products in order to express its probability. This is accomplished by
introducing the complement of an input event to be able to create the disjoint events.
Thus Q1 can be expressed as [65]:
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Q1 = Xa · (Y  Z) · (Z Xa) + Z · (Y Xa) · (Xa  Z) + Xa · (Y Xa) ·Z +
Z · (Xd  Y ) · (Y  Z) + Y · (Xd  Y ) ·Z + Y · (Z  Y )
(4.13)
whereZ indicates the event when Z cannot happen. We formally verify this as:
Theorem 4.13.
	 ∀ Xa Xd Y Z p t.
rv gt0 ninfinity [Xa; Xd; Y; Z] ∧
(∀ s. ALL DISTINCT [Y s; Xa s; Xd s; Z s]) ∧
DISJOINT WSP Y Xa Xd t ∧
DISJOINT WSP Z Xa Xd t ∧
(∀ s. ((Z  Xd)·(Xd  Y)) s = NEVER s) ∧
(∀ s. ((Y  Xd)·(Xd  Z)) s = NEVER s)∧
(∀ s. ((Xa  Y)·(Xa  Z)) s = NEVER s) ⇒
(DFT event p Q1 t =
DFT event p (Xa·(Y  Z)·(Z  Xa)) t ∪
DFT event p (Z·(Y  Xa)·(Xa  Z)) t ∪
DFT event p (Xa·(Y  Xa)) t ∩
(p space p DIFF DFT event p Z t) ∪
DFT event p (Z·(Xd  Y)·(Y  Z)) t ∪
DFT event p (Y·(Xd  Y)) t ∩
(p space p DIFF DFT event p Z t) ∪
DFT event p (Y·(Z  Y)) t)
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The first two conditions ensure that the time of occurrence of any event is al-
ways greater than or equal to 0 but not equal to +∞ and are not equal. While the
remaining conditions are required to ensure the proper behavior of the spare gates.
For instance, the first two conditions mean that until time t, the spare part can fail
in either the active or the dormant state. While the last two conditions indicate that
the spare part cannot fail after any of the main parts while it is dormant. Since after
the failure of one of the main parts, the spare part will be activated (working in the
active state) and in case it fails it will be in the active state and not the dormant
state. Similarly, the spare part cannot fail in its active state before the failure of both
main parts, as it will be in its dormant state.
The difference between the expression in Equation (4.13) and the verified ex-
pression in Theorem 4.13 is that we formally verified the DFT event of Equation (4.13)
based on the DFT event of the inputs. We decided to deal with the sets of the in-
put events as there is no gate that can exhibit the behavior of Z in the algebraic
approach. This is due to the fact that in the algebraic approach, we are dealing
with extended-real numbers and it is impossible to implement a NOT gate using
extended-reals. This means that instead of ANDing with Z, we intersect with the
complement of DFT event p Z t, i.e., space - DFT event p Z t or more formally
p space p DIFF DFT event p Z t. As a result, instead of verifying Equation (4.13),
we verified that the event of the left hand side is equal to the union of the events of
the six products on the right hand side, and whenever we encounter (· Z) we use (∩
p space p DIFF DFT event p Z t).
Since Q1 is represented as the sum of disjoint products, the probability of Q1















































We verified that these products are disjoint to be able to sum the individual
probabilities. Some of these probabilistic expressions utilize our existing verified ex-
pressions for DFT gates, while the rest requires handling three iterated integrals when
dealing with conditional density functions in addition to verifying the probability of
a complement of a DFT event.
We have been able to verify Equation (4.14), but as the final form of our verified
theorem for Equation (4.14) is quite long, we will explain some details about the proof
and the theorem here; the complete theorem can be accessed from [57]. Since this
theorem combines many previous formalized expressions, it requires the conditions
for those expressions, such as having a conditional density of Xa given Y = y, having
a density function for Y and Z. Also, the CDF of Z is measurable and continuous,
besides the obvious conditions such as 0 ≤ t. The proof of the first of the six terms
in Equation (4.14) is quite similar to the proof of the CSP gate. However, in this
case, we are dealing with three iterated integrals which makes things a bit complex,
since each time we need to prove that the single integral and the double iterated in-
tegrals are measurable. In addition, the independence of the random variables that
correspond to the input events should be handled appropriately, i.e., Z should be
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independent of the joint random variables of (Y,Xa). The proof of the second term
is conducted in a similar way to the first term since it consists of three iterated inte-
grals with conditional density function. However, the density function lies this time
in the inner integral. The proof of the third term is primarily based on proving that
Pr(p space p DIFF DFT event p Z t) = 1−FZ(t). The proof of the fifth term also
requires the same result. The fourth term corresponds to finding the probability of a
cascaded PAND gate for three inputs (this will be explained in a following section).
Finally, the last term corresponds to the probability of the after event.
4.3 Formal Quantitative Analysis of DFT
Examples
In this section, we conduct the quantitative analysis of the DFT examples presented in
Section 3.5. We verify the probability of failure for the CPAND as in Theorem 4.14.
The verification steps are similar to the after event. However, we are dealing now
with three inputs instead of two. Hence, X is assumed to be independent of the joint
random variable (Y, Z) using indep CPAND in Theorem 4.14, where it is defined for X
over the lborel measure and (Y, Z) over the two dimensional lborel.
Theorem 4.14. Probability of CPAND
	 ∀ p X Y Z t fy fx.
prob space p ∧ 0 ≤ t ∧ indep CPAND X Y Z p ∧
rv gt0 ninfinity [X; Y; Z] ∧ (∀ s. ALL DISTINCT [X s; Y s; Z s]) ∧
distributed p lborel (λx. real (X x)) fx ∧
distributed p lborel (λx. real (Y x)) fy ∧
(∀ y. 0 ≤ fy(y)) ∧
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(∀ x. 0 ≤ fx(x)) ∧ cont CDF p (λx. real (Z x)) x)) ⇒








We verify the probability of failure of AND-FDEP DFT as:
Theorem 4.15. Probability of AND-FDEP
	 ∀ X Y Z p t.
rv gt0 ninfinity [X; Y; Z] ∧ All distinct events p [X·Y; X·Z] t ∧
indep vars3 X Y Z p ⇒
(prob p (DFT event p (Q2) t) =
FX(t)×FY(t)+FX(t)×FZ(t) - FX(t)×FY(t)×FZ(t)
The main idea of this proof is to replace the FDEP gate by an OR gate as they
are equivalent. Then, the probability of the union of two events, each of which is
the intersection of two basic events, {X;Y } and {X;Z} is verified. These two events
represent the cut sets of the AND-FDEP DFT. For this proof, it is required to ensure
that the random variables are independent using indep vars3 and that the events of
the two cut sets of the DFT are not equal using All distinct events.
Finally, we verify the probability of the top event of the WSP-OR DFT as in
Theorem 4.16. The top event is composed of the union of the WSP event and the
basic event Z. Hence, the final form of the probability is the probability of the union
of two events; the WSP and Z. Therefore, it is required to include the conditions
needed for expressing the probability of the WSP event in the list of assumptions,
and ensure that the WSP event is independent of event Z using indep var set WOR.
Theorem 4.16. Probability of WSP-OR
	 ∀ Y Xa Xd Z p t fxy fy fXa|Y.
DISJOINT WSP Y Xa Xd t ∧
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(∀ s. ALL DISTINCT [Y s; Xa s; Xd s; Z s]) ∧
All distinct events p [WSP Y Xa Xd; Z] t ∧
rv gt0 ninfinity [Y; Xd; Xa; Z] ∧ 0 ≤ t ∧
(∀ y. cond density lborel lborel p
(real o Xa) (real o Y) y fxy fy fXa|Y) ∧
den gt0 ninfinity fxy fy fXa|Y ∧ cont CDF p (real o Xd) ∧
measurable CDF p (real o Xd) ∧
indep var set WOR Y Xa Xd Z p t ⇒





















After having the verified generic expressions for the probability of failure of the
three examples, these expressions can be used to evaluate the probability of failure
for any integrable distribution functions that represent the failure distribution of the
system components. For example, assuming exponential distributions for the inputs
with failure rates: 2× 10−2, 3× 10−3, and 1× 10−2 for X, Y and Z, respectively, we
can evaluate the probability of failure using MATLAB [62] until 400 working hours
with a dormancy factor of 0.1. The results are shown in Figure 4.2.
4.4 Formal Quantitative Analysis Case Studies
In this section, we present the verification details of the formal quantitative analysis
of the DBW and CAS systems.
We provide generic steps that can be followed in order to use our DFT formal-
ization to conduct the formal quantitative analysis of DFTs in the form of generic
expressions of failure probabilities. These steps are:
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Figure 4.2: Probability of Failure of CPAND, AND-FDEP and WSP-OR
1. Determine the structure function of the top event of the DFT.
2. Simplify the structure function and formally verify that the simplified version
is equal to the original function obtained in step (1).
3. Create the DFT event of the structure function.
4. Express the DFT event of the top event as the union of multiple input events.
5. Apply the probabilistic PIE to the union of events generated in the previous step,
then simplify the result of the PIE. This will result in having the summation of
the probabilities of the intersection of the different events that contribute to the
failure of the top event of the DFT.
6. Replace each term in the result of the PIE by its probabilistic expression based
on the verified expressions in Section 4.2 for each gate and operator.
Step (5) requires proving many lemmas that are necessary for manipulating the
result of the PIE. In order to facilitate the analysis, we verified several generic proper-
ties that can be used to reduce the manual interaction of the reliability engineer in the
theorem proving related tasks. For example, for any group of independent random
variables, we verified that the probability of the preimage of any two random variables
out of the original set equals to the multiplication of the individual probabilities as:
85
Theorem 4.17.
	 ∀ p M X ii A s t. s = t ∧ prob space p ∧
indep vars p M X ii ∧ {s; t} ⊂ ii ∧
(∀ i. i ∈ {s; t} ⇒ A i ∈ measurable sets (M i))⇒
(prob p
(PREIMAGE (X s) (A s) ∩ p space p ∩
(PREIMAGE (X t) (A t) ∩ p space p)) =
prob p (PREIMAGE (X s) (A s) ∩ p space p) *
prob p (PREIMAGE (X t) (A t) ∩ p space p))
The formal DFT analysis now requires proving the required conditions for this
property to hold only. As an example, consider that we have a group of 10 random
variables, and we need to prove that the probability of the preimages of the 6th and
the 8th random variables equals the multiplication of their individual probabilities.
Therefore, in Theorem 4.17, s = 6, t = 8 and ii equals the set of numbers from 0− 9.
We just need to verify the following properties for this proof:
• 6 = 8.
• {6; 8} ⊂ {0; 1; 2; 3; 4; 5; 6; 7; 8; 9}.
• The sets of the preimages are measurable.
These requirements can be easily verified using various built-in arithmetic tactics
in HOL4. Similarly, we verified the same property for up to 10 random variables out
of a group of independent random variables. These properties are very helpful in the
verification process of the probabilistic analysis of DFTs, in particular when applying
the probabilistic PIE. We also verified several additional properties that allow the
direct usage of the PIE in its final form with a system that can be represented as
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the union of six elements as the behavior of both case studies can be represented as
the union of six events. However, our formalization can be extended easily to verify
larger systems, as the flow of the proofs will remain the same but will extend to a
larger number of inputs. We illustrate the utilization of the previous steps to perform
the formal DFT analysis of the DBW and CAS to provide generic expressions for the
probability of failure of the top events.
4.4.1 Formal Quantitative Analysis of DBW
In order to perform the formal quantitative analysis of the DBW system, we use the
verified reduced DFT model of this system of Section 3.6.1 We choose to use a single
event for the WSP as this will reduce the intermediate steps required to reach our
final goal for the probabilistic expression and would result in expressing the top event
as the union of six events. We verify that the DFT event of the DBW is equal to the
union of six events as:
Lemma 4.14. DBW Union of Events
	 ∀ BS TS PC SCa SCd BC EF TF p t.
DFT event p ((TF + EF) + WSP PC SCa SCd + BC + (TS + BS)) t =
union list
[DFT event p TF t; DFT event p EF t; DFT event p (WSP PC SCa SCd) t;
DFT event p BC t; DFT event p TS t; DFT event p BS t]
We apply the probabilistic PIE to perform the formal quantitative analysis of the
top event, by incorporating the existing verified properties. We verify the probabilistic
failure expression of the DBW as Theorem 4.18. In the following, we are presenting
the formalization in mixed formal and standard math notations to make the results
more readable.
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Theorem 4.18. Probability of Failure of DBW
	 ∀ BS TS PC SCa SCd BC EF TF p t
fPC f(SCa|PC) fSCaPC. 0 ≤ t ∧
All distinct events p [TF; EF; BC; WSP PC SCa SCd; BS; TS] t ∧
rv gt0 ninfinity [BS; TS; PC; SCa; SCd; BC; EF; TF] ∧
DISJOINT WSP PC SCa SCd t ∧
(∀ y. cond density lborel lborel p
(real o SCa) (real o PC) y fSCaPC fPC f(SCa|PC)) ∧
den gt0 ninfinity fSCaPC fPC f(SCa|PC) ∧ cont CDF p (real o SCd) ∧
measurable CDF p (real o SCd) ∧
indep vars sets drive [BS; TS; PC; SCa; SCd; BC; EF; TF] p t ⇒
(prob p (DFT event p QDBW t) =






f(SCa|PC=pc) (sca) dsca dpc +∫ t
0
fPC(pc) × FSCd(pc) dpc + FBS(t) + FTS(t) - ... + ... -












fPC(pc) × FSCd(pc) dpc
]
×FBS(t)×FTS(t))
where All distinct events ensures that all event sets are distinct. As listed earlier,
since the events of the WSP are disjoint, we used the WSP event directly to reduce
the proof steps. It is necessary that all random variables representing the input events
to be positive or equal to 0, since they represent the time of failure. This condition is
added by rv gt0 ninfinity. It is also required to ensure the proper behavior of the
WSP by adding the condition DISJOINT WSP PC SCa SCd t, which ascertains that
the events of the WSP are disjoint, i.e., until time t, the spare part can fail in one of
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Table 4.1: Failure Rates for the DBW System (×10−7)
TF EF BCPC SCTS BS
1 4 5 2 3 1 2
Figure 4.3: Probability of Failure of the Drive-by-wire System
its states only. A conditional density f(SCa|PC) of SCa given that PC = pc is defined
using cond density. The function indep vars sets drive adds the condition that
the input events and their sets are independent, and finally we need to ensure that
the CDF of SCd is continuous and measurable. It is worth mentioning that since
the union list of the DBW system has six events, applying the PIE results in the
generation of 63 different terms, and a truncated version of the final expression is
given above.
The reliability engineer working on the analysis of the DBW system just needs
to ensure that the mentioned conditions hold in order to use the results of the anal-
ysis. After formally ensuring that the probability of failure expression is correct, this
expression can be used to evaluate the probability of failure using any tool with any
distribution and density functions that satisfy the listed conditions. Assuming ex-
ponential distributions for the inputs with failure rates as listed in Table 4.1 [59],
we evaluated the probability of failure using MATLAB until 1,000,000 working hours
with dormancy factor of 0.5, as shown in Figure 4.3. The proof script for the DBW
system is around 4950 lines long.
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4.4.2 Formal Quantitative Analysis of CAS
In a similar way to the DBW system, we use the formally verified reduced DFT model
of the CAS in Section 3.6.2 to perform the probabilistic analysis. We verify that the
DFT event of the CAS equals the union of events as:
Lemma 4.15. CAS Union of Events
	 ∀ PA PB PS MS MA MB CS SS P Ba Bd p t.
DFT event p
(CS + SS + MA · (MS  MA) + MB · (MA  MB) +
Ba · (P  Ba) + P · (Bd  P) + PA · PB · PS) t =
union list
[DFT event p CS t; DFT event p SS t; DFT event p (MA · (MS  MA)) t;
DFT event p (MB · (MA  MB)) t;
DFT event p (Ba · (P  Ba) + P · (Bd  P)) t;
DFT event p (PA · PB · PS) t]
Verifying a generic expression of the probability of failure for the CAS requires
dealing with different conditions of independence for the input events, where we con-
sidered different configurations for the spare gates in the CAS from [61]. In particular,
the outputs of the PAND and the CSP gates are no longer independent because of
having MA in common. Therefore, it is required to use conditional probabilities to
verify the probability of intersection that results from applying the probabilistic PIE.
We verify the probability of failure of this system in HOL4:
Theorem 4.19. Probability of Failure of CAS
	 ∀ CS SS MA MS MB P Ba Bd PA PB PS p t fMA fBaP fP fBa|P fMBMA fMB|MA fMS.
0 ≤ t ∧ prob space p ∧ (Ba  P = NEVER) ∧ DISJOINT WSP P Ba Bd t ∧
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ALL DISTINCT RVg [PA; PB; PS; MS; MA; MB; CS; SS; P; Ba; Bd] p t ∧
indep vars setsg [PA; PB; PS; MS; MA; MB; CS; SS; P; Ba; Bd] p t ∧
(∀ y. cond density lborel lborel p
(real o Ba) (real o P) y fBaP fP fBa|P) ∧
(∀ y. cond density lborel lborel p
(real o MB) (real o MA) y fMBMA fMA fMB|MA ∧
den gt0 ninfinity fBaP fP fBa|P ∧ den gt0 ninfinity fMBMA fMA fMB|MA ∧
cont CDF p (real o Bd) ∧ measurable CDF p (real o Bd) ∧
(∀ z. 0 ≤ fMS(z)) ∧ (∀ x. fMBMA(x) = PosInf) ∧
distributed p lborel (λx. real (MS x)) fMS ∧
cont CDF p (real o MS) ∧ measurable CDF p (real o MS) ⇒
(prob p (DFT event p QCAS t)=
FCS(t) + FSS(t) +
∫ t
0

















fP(pp) × FBd(pp) dpp
)
+
FPA(t) × FPB(t) × FPS(t) - ... + ... -
FCS × FSS ×
∫ t
0















fP(pp) × FBd(pp) dpp
]
×
FPA(t) × FPB(t) × FPS(t)
where (Ba  P = NEVER) ∧ DISJOINT WSP P Ba Bd t are required to ensure that
the spare part Ba cannot fail before the main part P and that the events of the WSP
are disjoint, i.e., until time t, the spare part can fail in either the dormant or the active
states. ALL DISTINCT RVg is a predicate required to assert that the inputs and their
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event sets are not equal and that the inputs are greater than or equal to 0 but not
equal to +∞. indep vars setsg ensures the independence of the random variables
and the event sets. It is also required to define conditional density functions for fBa|P
and fMB|MA using cond density. den gt0 ninfinity ensures the proper values for the
joint, marginal and conditional density functions that are used with cond density.
For example, the conditional density functions cannot be equal to 0. In addition,
the density functions cannot equal +∞. It is also required to ensure that the CDFs
of random variables Bd and MS are continuous and measurable using cont CDF and
measurable CDF, respectively. distributed p lborel (λx. real (MS x)) fMS is
used to indicate that MS has a density function fMS. It is worth mentioning again
that the usage of the function real is required here as the random variables return
extreal, while they need to be used with the Lebesgue-Borel measure, which is
defined over the real line. The first six elements of the conclusion of Theorem 4.19
represent the probability of the individual terms of the union list of Lemma 4.15, which
result from applying the probabilistic PIE. While the rest of the elements represent
the probability of the intersection of all combinations of the events. The last term
represents the probability of the intersection of the six elements of the CAS.
As with the DBW system, we assume exponential distributions for the inputs of
the cardiac assist system with the failure rates listed in Table 4.2 [65]. We evaluated
the probability of failure for this generic expression using MATLAB with a dormancy
factor of 0.5 for the spare partMB until 400,000 working hours, as shown in Figure 4.4.
We have illustrated in this section the application of our proposed methodology
to conduct the formal failure analysis of the DBW and the CAS systems. We have
created the HOL formal DFT models for these systems and verified a reduced form
of the structure functions utilizing the verified simplification theorems. We then
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Table 4.2: Failure Rates of CAS (×10−6)
CS SS P B MS MA MB PA PS PB
1 2 4 4 1 5 5 5 5 5
Figure 4.4: Probability of Failure of the Cardiac Assist System
conducted the qualitative and the probabilistic analyses to generate formally verified
expressions of probability of failure. Building upon the expressive and sound nature
of HOL theorem proving, generic intermediate lemmas are verified that are valid
for the analysis of systems similar to the DBW and the CAS systems. Leveraging
upon the current formalization of DFTs, the existing lemmas and theorems can be
extended to analyze more complex systems. In addition, the results obtained using
our methodology, in particular the generic expressions, cannot be obtained formally
using a PMC. Moreover, our proposed methodology overcomes the vulnerability of the
paper-and-pencil analysis results due to human errors, as it inherits the soundness of
HOL theorem proving. Although, providing the formalization of this methodology
is costly in terms of time and lines of script, the results obtained are usable by the
reliability engineer without the need to go through all the steps of the formalization.
The reliability engineer only needs to use the results of the theorems after ensuring
that all the required conditions hold, which provides him/her with a formal proof that
the analysis results can apply to his system if the conditions are met.
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4.5 Summary
In this chapter, we provided a methodology to conduct the formal quantitative analysis
of DFTs within a theorem prover. Furthermore, we explained the verification steps
of the probabilistic failure expressions of DFT gates that are required in the analysis
process. We applied our methodology to perform the quantitative analysis of the
DBW and CAS systems to obtain generic expressions of probability of failure.
In the following, we summarize the main challenges that we faced during our
formalization of the DFT gates, which allows us to formally analyze DFTs in a theorem
prover.
The first challenge is resolving the data-types issue. The problem in the data-
types is that the gates and operators are defined as functions that return extreal.
This is mainly required because we need to model +∞ that represents the NEVER
condition. However, this data-type cannot be used to represent random variables over
the lborel measure. Any random variable defined from a probability space to the
lborel measure should return real data-type. This is required because we need to
integrate the density and distribution functions over the real line. Therefore, we need
random variables that return extreal to model the gates but at the same return real
to be used with lborel. We resolved this issue by using extreal to model the gates,
but when conducting the probabilistic analysis, we use the real version of the random
variable (real o X)).
Secondly, after modeling the DFT and expressing the structure function of the
top event using the DFT gates and operators, it is required to conduct the probabilistic
failure analysis of the top event. However, the structure function cannot be used
directly since it is a time-to-failure function, not a set. Furthermore, in [30], there is no
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clear information on how to create the DFT event and link it to the structure function
of the DFT top event or any other event in the fault tree. Using our formalization,
we have been able to clearly and formally define a DFT event that is used to create
the set of moments of time until the time of failure t, as explained in Definition 4.1.
Thirdly, the probabilities of the AND and OR gates are directly presented in [30]
as the probability of the intersection and union (Equations (4.1a) and (4.1b), respec-
tively). However, the AND and the OR gates are defined using the maximum and
minimum of their input operands, respectively. There is no information in [30] on
how the AND and OR gates are related to the intersection and union of the input
events. Using our formalization, we have been able to verify the relationship between
the AND and the interaction of the input events utilizing our defined DFT event. In
a similar way, we verified the relationship between the OR gate and the union of the
input events.
Another contribution is represented by introducing a formal proof in a theorem
prover for the probability of failure of the PAND and Before operator, which are
represented by Pr(X < Y ) in both forms, i.e., Pr(X < Y ∧ Y ≤ t) and Pr(X <
Y ∧X ≤ t). As mentioned earlier, the first proof of these (Pr(X < Y ∧Y ≤ t)) is not
provided in [30], while the second one (Pr(X < Y ∧X ≤ t)) is presented in a different
manner that involves derivatives. In our formalization, we presented, for the first time,
the formal proof for Pr(X < Y ) in both its formats, i.e., Pr(X < Y ∧ Y ≤ t) that
represents the probability of the PAND gate for basic events; and Pr(X < Y ∧X ≤ t)
that represents the probability of the before operator. In addition, we presented a
formal proof for the probability of the WSP and CSP gates based on conditional
density functions, which we defined, while the proof of these gates is presented in [30]
based on the law of total expectation.
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Finally, while performing all of these formalizations and proofs in HOL, we
identified several missing assumptions or conditions that were required to ensure the
correctness of the theorems. For example, ensuring the proper values for the input ran-
dom variables that represent the time-to-failure functions of the system components.
These important assumptions were either unavailable in [30] or are not explicitly
presented as a requirement in the final form of the theorems in [30].
It is important to highlight that the main benefit of having the formalization
of DFT in higher-order logic is that it enables conducting the formal DFT analysis




Formal Verification of DFT
Rewrite Rules
As mentioned in Chapter 1, probabilistic model checkers, such as STORM, have been
widely used for the probabilistic analysis of DFTs via Markov chains. For example,
STORM supports the analysis of DFTs, among other probabilistic models, and allows
the verification of the probability of failure and the MTTF of the top event of a given
DFT. The scalability of this analysis can be significantly improved by using efficient
DFT rewriting rules, as presented by Junges et al. [66], that facilitate simplifying a
DFT before analysis. The simplification of the DFT is achieved by transforming the
underlying graph of the DFT according to the rewrite rules. Experimental evaluation
in [66] showed that rewriting heavily improves the performance of the DFT analysis.
For example, while originally 68% of the 183 DFTs in [66] could be solved within
2 hours, applying the rewriting beforehand allowed one to solve 95% of the DFTs.
Moreover, the total analysis time was reduced from 41 to 18 hours when using rewrit-
ing. Simplifying DFTs by rewriting enables the analysis of DFTs that could not be
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analyzed before, and can lead to speed-ups and memory savings of up to two orders
of magnitude [66].
The rewrite rules are generic for n-ary gates and can be implemented in any
tool that supports DFT analysis. Proving the correctness of the rewrite rules as
done in [67] is a manual and error-prone process. To the best of our knowledge,
a rigorous, mechanically checkable proof of correctness of these rewriting rules has
not been done. Thus, their usage in a formal analysis raises soundness concerns
especially when dealing with the analysis of safety-critical systems, like transportation
or healthcare.
In this chapter, we propose to use our HOL DFT formalization presented in
Chapter 3, including the simplification theorems, to verify the DFT rewriting rules
of [66] using the HOL4 theorem prover. This requires extending the DFT gates
definitions for an arbitrary number of inputs and defining the VOT gate. Verifying
these rewrite rules provides the assurance of their correctness and thus adds the
confidence to tools that exploit these rules in their DFT analysis.
5.1 DFT Rewrite Rules
In the following, we recap the rewrite rules for DFTs as in [66]. The simplification
of DFTs is performed by graph rewriting [68] on the underlying graph of the DFT.
We represent a DFT as a labeled graph by extending the induced graph with labels
encoding the type of the DFT element and the ordering of the inputs. The graph
transformation on the labeled graph is performed by applying a chain of rewrite rules.
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Figure 5.1: Subsumption of OR Gates by AND Gates [66, Rewrite Rule 8]
5.1.1 Rewrite Framework
A rewrite rule is specified by two (sub-) DFTs: the left-hand side capturing the (sub-)
DFT before applying the rewrite rule and the right-hand side depicting the resulting
(sub-)DFT after the graph rewrite. An example of a rewrite rule is given in Figure 5.1.
The rule depicts the subsumption of OR gates by AND gates.
A rewrite rule can be applied whenever a (sub-)DFT can be matched with the
left-hand side of the rule. Elements represented by a triangle in the rewrite rule match
every gate type. Matched elements might have additional ingoing and outgoing edges
not matched by the rewrite rule. These edges are retained during the rewriting step.
Applying a rewrite rule replaces the matched part with the right-hand side of the
rule. All non-matched parts remain unchanged during the rewriting step. Note that
in general, rewrite rules might lead to inconsistent graphs with dangling edges or
DFTs that are no longer well-formed (e.g., cyclic DFTs). In these cases, the rewrite
rule cannot be applied. It is important to note also that most of the rewrite rules can
also be applied from right to left.
An example application of the given subsumption rule is depicted in Figure 5.2.
Figure 5.2(a) depicts the original DFT used as input. The subsumption rule from
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(a) Original DFT (b) DFT after rewrite step (c) Final DFT
Figure 5.2: Example Application of Rewrite Rule
Figure 5.1 can be applied and the matched sub-DFT is highlighted in blue. Applying
the rule removes the connection between AND gate A and OR gate B and yields the
rewritten DFT in Figure 5.2(b). Further simplification by applying additional rewrite
rules results in the final DFT in Figure 5.2(c). Using the rewrite rules leads to a
simpler DFT, which is considerably smaller—and easier to understand.
During rewriting multiple rules might be applicable for the current DFT or
different sub-DFTs match the left-hand side of a rewrite rule. The sequence of rewrite
steps is chosen by a rewrite strategy. As the rewrite framework is not confluent, the
strategy heavily influences the size of the resulting DFTs and a heuristic approach is
used.
5.1.2 Rewrite Rules
In the following, we consider 22 rules of the 29 rewrite rules given in [66]. Of the
remaining 7 rules, one rule gives the Shannon expansion for VOTk gates, which deals
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Figure 5.3: Left-flattening of Gates [66, Rewrite Rule 5]
with variables as Boolean, whereas generally DFTs, as formalized in HOL, treat vari-
ables as real numbers representing time-to-failure functions. The other 6 rules apply
to FDEPs and spares; both gate types are not considered in this chapter. We recap a
selection of the rewrite rules and use the same rule enumeration as in [66, Sect. 5.3].
General Rewrite Rules
The first rewrite rules 1-7 consider structural identities such as commutativity of static
gates, removal of gates with a single successor or no predecessor, and left-flattening of
gates. As an example, the rewrite rule for left-flattening is given in Figure 5.3. The
rule can only be applied if the top element of the (sub-)DFT is an AND, OR or PAND
gate, and the first input is of the same gate type as the top element (Tp(B) = Tp(A)).
Applying the left-flattening rule adds the inputs of B as first inputs of A. Gate B is
not removed as it might still have connections to other parts of the DFT.
Rules 8-10 capture standard axioms from Boolean algebra on the static gates
such as subsumption of OR gates by AND gates (cf. Figure 5.1).
DFTs containing constant failed CONST() or constant fail-safe CONST(⊥)
events can lead to large simplifications as often complete sub-DFTs can be evaluated
to constant. Rules 11-14 specifically consider constant elements and as an example, we
present the rewrite rule for AND/PAND gates with CONST(⊥) inputs in Figure 5.4.
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Figure 5.4: AND/PAND Gate with CONST(⊥) Successor [66, Rewrite Rule 13]
If at least one of the inputs of an AND/PAND gate is fail-safe, it is impossible for the
gate to fail and therefore it can be set to fail-safe as well.
Encoding of VOT gates by OR/AND gates is given in the rewrite rules 15-16.
Rewrite Rules for PAND gates
So far, the rewrite rules mostly captured simplifications of static gates, which are
based on the corresponding properties in Boolean algebra. The remaining rules 18-23
consider PAND gates where the order of failures is crucial. As an example, consider
the rewrite rule for conflicting PAND gates with independent successors in Figure 5.5.
PAND gate D1 requires that input B fails strictly before C or simultaneously with C.
If C fails strictly before B, D1 becomes fail-safe. D2 requires the opposite behavior.
If both elements B and C are independent, they will not fail simultaneously. Thus,
Figure 5.5: Conflicting PAND Gates with Independent Successors [66, Rewrite Rule
19]
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(a) Original DFT (b) DFT after removal of BE C (c) DFT after merging of BEs
Figure 5.6: Example Application of Non-structural Rules
either PAND gate D1 or D2 will become fail-safe. As the PAND gates can never both
fail, A is fail-safe and can be replaced by CONST(⊥).
Note that the rewrite rule can only be applied if B and C are independent—and
at most one input is CONST(). Otherwise, a common cause failure can let both B
and C fail simultaneously, both PAND gates fail and A fails as well. The independence
assumption in this rewrite rule is a context restriction, which prevents the application
of the rule for certain DFTs.
5.1.3 Non-structural Rules
There are two additional rules that are not present in the rewrite framework as they
go beyond structural rules and are not captured by graph transformations.
Removing BEs The BEs that have no connection to other DFT elements (and are
not the top level element) are called dispensable. Dispensable BEs can be removed
from the DFT as they do not influence the analysis results. An example is given in
Figure 5.6. In the original DFT in Figure 5.6(a), BE C is dispensable and can be
removed yielding the DFT in Figure 5.6(b).
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Merging BEs In our analysis, we are only interested in the reliability of the top
level element. The state of other elements is not important for this analysis. Thus, we
can simplify a DFT by merging multiple BEs into a single BE. Consider the example
DFT in Figure 5.6(b). Both BEs A and B have an exponential failure distribution
with failure rates λA and λB, respectively. The failure distribution of an OR gate is
the minimum over its inputs and is exponentially distributed as well. Thus, we can




i=1 λAi . In our example, merging both BEs leads to the final DFT in
Figure 5.6(c). The resulting OR gate with a single input can be simplified further by
applying the rewrite framework.
After presenting the details of DFT rewrite rules, in the sequel, we present our
efforts in formally verifying them using HOL theorem proving. For some of these rules,
such as Rule 5, it is necessary to formally model DFT gates for an arbitrary number
of inputs. Therefore, in the next section, we introduce the new HOL definitions of
n-ary gates.
5.2 HOL Formalization of n-ary DFT Gates
In order to handle DFT gates with an arbitrary number of inputs, we extend the
definitions of DFT gates of Chapter 3 by utilizing lists to represent the arbitrary
number of inputs. In other words, the input of an n-ary gate is a list of arbitrary size
of time-to-failure functions that represent inputs of a DFT gate.
We formally hence define the n-ary AND gate as:
Definition 5.1. n AND
	 ∀ L. n AND L = FOLDR (λ a b. D AND a b) ALWAYS L
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where FOLDR is used to apply a binary (2-input) function over a list from right to left.
The function in our case here is the binary D AND that accepts two inputs and returns
their result of the DFT AND operation between them. FOLDR requires including an
element that is used to apply the function to the last element of the input list. We
use ALWAYS in this case as it is the identity element of the AND and does not affect
its behavior. L represents the list of inputs to be ANDed. For example, n AND [X;
Y; Z] equals D AND X (D AND Y (D AND Z ALWAYS)).
In a similar manner, we formally define the n-ary OR as:
Definition 5.2. n OR
	 ∀ L. n OR L = FOLDR (λ a b. D OR a b) NEVER L
D OR is the function used with FOLDR in this definition. We use NEVER in this
case as it is the identity element for the OR, i.e., NEVER will not affect the behavior of
the OR gate. It is worth mentioning that FOLDL can be used with these definitions as
well, since the order of applying the OR and AND gates does not matter if it starts
from the left or from the right.
We formally define the n-ary PAND gate as:
Definition 5.3. n PAND
	 ∀ L. n PAND L = FOLDL (λ a b. P AND a b) ALWAYS L
This is similar to the previous definitions. However, since the PAND gate re-
quires that the input events fail from left to right, we use FOLDL in this case. We use
ALWAYS as it does not affect the behavior of the PAND gate, i.e., for any input X that
is greater than or equal to 0, PAND ALWAYS X = X.
The VOTk (k out of n) gate can be defined using the n OR and n AND gates.
Firstly, we need to get the combinations that lead to the failure of the VOT gate. For
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example, a (2/3) VOT gate requires having all possible pairs out of the three inputs.
Therefore, we first need to get all the possible k elements of the input list. We define
k out that accepts a list and a number k, which identifies the number of elements to
be retrieved from the input list.
Definition 5.4. k out
	 ∀ k L. k out k L = {s| s ⊆ (set L) ∧ (CARD s = k)}
where set L returns a set with the elements in list L, and CARD is a HOL function that
returns the cardinality (number of elements) of a given set. This definition basically
returns a set of sets, where the inner sets are subsets of set L. This means that these
inner subsets contain elements from the input list L. The added condition is that the
cardinality of each of these sets equals k. As a result, we get all possible combinations
of the input list that have k elements.
We use k out to define the VOT gate by ANDing the elements of each inner
set, then ORing the result of this ANDing. We need to recall that the n AND and n OR
accept inputs as lists not sets. Therefore, we apply a function that converts a set into
a list (SET TO LIST). We formally define the VOT gate as:
Definition 5.5. VOT
	 ∀ k L. k out n gate k L =
n OR (MAP (λa. n AND (SET TO LIST a)) (SET TO LIST (k out k L)))
where SET TO LIST is a HOL4 function that accepts a set and returns a list of the
elements of this set. MAP is used to map a function over a list and returns a list of the
mapped elements. In this definition, we first convert the outer set of k out to a list
using SET TO LIST (k out k L). Then, we apply n AND to each element of this list
using MAP and convert each inner set to a list. Finally, the n OR is applied to the result
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of the MAP, i.e., the result will be the OR of ANDs and each AND has only k elements
of the input list. We verify several properties for k out and the VOT gate, such as the
finiteness of the inner and outer sets, besides other properties that are useful in the
verification of the DFT rewriting rules. The HOL4 script can be accessed from [69].
5.3 Verification of Rewrite Rules
We list the verification details of some of the rewrite rules described in Section 5.1.
The details of verifying the rest of the rules can be accessed from [69].
5.3.1 General Rewrite Rules
The structural rewrite rules 1-5 and 7 are verified based on the definitions of n-
ary gates and some list and extreal number theories properties, whereas rule 6 is
implemented implicitly in the DFT formalization.
Commutativity of Static Gates (Rule 1)
Theorem 5.1.
	 ∀ L1 L2. PERM L1 L2 ⇒ (n AND L1 = n AND L2)
Theorem 5.2.
	 ∀ L1 L2. PERM L1 L2 ⇒ (n OR L1 = n OR L2)
Theorem 5.3.
	 ∀ L1 L2 k. PERM L1 L2 ⇒ (k out n gate k L1 = k out n gate k L2)
The commutativity property indicates that the order of the inputs of any static
gate will not affect its behavior, i.e., the time of failure for the output of the gate
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remains the same. We use the permutation of two lists (PERM L1 L2) to add the
condition that L1 and L2 have the same inputs but with different orders. We verify
the commutativity of the n AND and n OR gates using induction, FOLDR definition and
some properties of the 2-input AND and OR gates, defined in Chapter 3, such as
associativity and commutativity. The proof of the commutativity property for the
VOT gate is mainly based on the following lemma:
Lemma 5.1.
	 ∀ L1 L2 k. PERM L1 L2 ⇒ (k out k L1 = k out k L2)
which states that the sets returned by k out are the same for two lists that have the
same elements with different orders.
Gate with a Single Successor (Rule 3)
Theorem 5.4.
	 ∀ x. rv gt0 [x] ⇒ (n AND [x] = x)
Theorem 5.5.
	 ∀ x. n OR [x] = x
Theorem 5.6.
	 ∀ x. rv gt0 [x] ⇒ (k out n gate 1 [x] = x)
Theorem 5.7. 	 ∀ x. rv gt0 [x] ⇒ (n PAND [x] = x)
For the static gates and the n PAND gate, if the input list consists of only one
element, then the output fails once the single input fails. The function rv gt0 ensures
that the inputs of the gates are greater than or equal to 0, which is valid as we are
dealing with time-to-failure functions. We recursively define rv gt0 as:
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Definition 5.6. rv gt0
(rv gt0 [] = T) ∧ (∀ h t. rv gt0 (h::t) = (∀ s. 0 ≤ h s) ∧ rv gt0 t)
For n AND and n OR, rule 3 is verified based on some properties of the D AND
and D OR gates. For VOT gate, we use the VOT (1/n) property (Theorem 5.25) that
replaces the VOT gate with the n OR gate. Finally, we verify rule 3 for n PAND using
its definition and some list and extreal numbers properties.
Left Flattening of AND/OR/PAND Gates (Rule 5)
Theorem 5.8.
	 ∀ L1 L2.
rv gt0 (L1 ++ L2) ⇒ (n AND (n AND L2::L1) = n AND (L2 ++ L1))
Theorem 5.9.
	 ∀ L1 L2. n OR (n OR L2::L1) = n OR (L2 ++ L1)
Theorem 5.10.
	 ∀ L1 L2.
rv gt0 (L1 ++ L2) ⇒(n PAND (n PAND L2::L1) = n PAND (L2 ++ L1))
In order to verify Theorem 5.8, we first verify the n AND append property that
would split the AND of two appended lists as:
Lemma 5.2.
	 ∀ L1 L2.
rv gt0 (L1 ++ L2) ⇒ (n AND (L1 ++ L2) = D AND (n AND L1)(n AND L2))
where ++ is a list operator used to append two lists. We verify Theorem 5.8 by first
rewriting n AND L2::L1 as [n AND L2]++L1, where :: is a list operator used to add an
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element to a list, which in the considered case is n AND L2. Then, we use Lemma 5.2
to rewrite the left hand side of Theorem 5.8 to D AND (n AND [n AND L2])(n AND L1)
and use Theorem 5.4 to verify Theorem 5.8. In a similar way, we verify Theorem 5.9
by verifying a lemma for appending two lists with n OR as:
Lemma 5.3.
	 ∀ L1 L2. n OR (L1 ++ L2) = D OR (n OR L1)(n OR L2)
For the left-flattening property of the n PAND gate, we first verify a lemma that
rv gt0 L ⇒ ∀ s. 0 ≤ n PAND L s, which states that the output of the n PAND
gate is greater than or equal to 0 if the inputs follow the same condition. Theorem 5.10
is then verified based on the previous lemma, induction on the list argument and some
P AND and list properties.
Identical Leftmost Successors of AND, OR or PAND Gates (Rule 7)
Theorem 5.11.
	 ∀ x L. n AND (x::x::L) = n AND (x::L)
Theorem 5.12.
	 ∀ x L. n OR (x::x::L) = n OR (x::L)
Theorem 5.13.
	 ∀ x L. rv gt0 [x] ⇒ (n PAND (x::x::L) = n PAND (x::L))
Theorems 5.11 and 5.12 are verified based on the definitions of n AND and n OR
with the associativity and idempotence of D AND and D OR gates. Theorem 5.13 re-
quires verifying that the output of a 2-input PAND gate (P AND defined in Chapter 3)
with an input that already failed (ALWAYS) as the left input fails with the failure of
the second (right) input.
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Lemma 5.4.
	 ∀ X. (∀ s. 0 ≤ X s) ⇒ (P AND ALWAYS X = X)
Finally, we verify the idempotence property of the P AND gate.
Lemma 5.5.
	 ∀ X. P AND X X = X
Subsumption of OR Gates by AND Gates (Rule 8)
Theorem 5.14.
	 ∀ X Y. D AND X (D OR X Y) = X
Subsumption of AND Gates by OR Gates (Rule 9)
Theorem 5.15.
	 ∀ X Y. D OR X (D AND X Y) = X
Distributing OR Gates over AND Gates (Rule 10)
Theorem 5.16.
	 ∀ X Y Z. D OR (D AND X Y)(D AND Y Z) = D AND (D OR X Z) Y
We verify rules 8-10 that are concerned with the standard axioms of Boolean
algebra based on basic properties of D AND and D OR gates, such as the commutativity
and distributivity of the AND over the OR.
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OR Gates with Fail-Safe (NEVER) Successors (Rule 11)
Theorem 5.17.
	 ∀ L1 L2. n OR (L1 ++ [NEVER] ++ L2) = n OR (L1 ++ L2)
OR Gates with Already Failed (ALWAYS) Successors (Rule 12)
Theorem 5.18.
	 ∀ L1 L2. rv gt0 (L1 ++ L2) ⇒ (n OR (L1 ++ [ALWAYS] ++ L2) = ALWAYS)
Rewrite rules 11-14 deal with scenarios that include fail-safe (NEVER) or
CONST(⊥), and failed (ALWAYS) or CONST().
For Theorem 5.17, we use Lemma 5.3 and the definition of n OR with the
property stating that ∀ X. D OR X NEVER = X. We verify Theorem 5.18 based on
Lemma 5.3 and the definition of n OR along with the following lemma:
Lemma 5.6.
	 ∀ X. (∀ s. 0 ≤ X s) ⇒ (D OR X ALWAYS = ALWAYS)
Then, we verify that the output of the n OR is greater than or equal to 0 if the inputs
are all greater than or equal to 0. Theorem 5.18 is then verified using the previous
lemmas and some properties of the D OR gate.
AND Gate with a Fail-Safe (NEVER) Successor (Rule 13)
Theorem 5.19.
	 ∀ L1 L2. rv gt0 (L1 ++ L2) ⇒(n AND (L1 ++ [NEVER] ++ L2) = NEVER)
Theorem 5.20.
	 ∀ L. rv gt0 L ⇒ (n PAND (L ++ [NEVER]) = NEVER)
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Theorem 5.21.
	 ∀ L. rv gt0 L ⇒ (n PAND (NEVER::L) = NEVER)
Theorem 5.22.
	 ∀ L1 L2. rv gt0 (L1 ++ L2) ⇒(n PAND (L1 ++ [NEVER] ++ L2) = NEVER)
We verify Theorem 5.19 using Lemma 5.2 and some properties for the D AND,
such as the commutativity property and ANDing with NEVER.
We verify this rule for the PAND gate by verifying two cases. Firstly, we verify
that the output of the PAND cannot fail if the NEVER input is the rightmost input
(Theorem 5.20). This is mainly verified based on some list properties to manipulate
rv gt0 along with the left flattening property of the PAND (Theorem 5.10). Simi-
larly, we verify the second case when the left most input of the PAND gate is fail-safe
(Theorem 5.21). Finally, we verify a generic property, where the fail-safe input can
be at any position (Theorem 5.22).
AND Gate with a Failed (ALWAYS) Element as Successor (Rule 14)
Theorem 5.23.
	 ∀ L. rv gt0 L ⇒ (n AND (ALWAYS::L) = n AND L)
Theorem 5.24.
	 ∀ L. rv gt0 L ⇒ (n PAND (ALWAYS::L) = n PAND L)
Theorem 5.23 is verified using the definition of the n AND gate with the property
that the output of the gate is greater than or equal to 0 if the inputs satisfy the same
condition. We verify Theorem 5.24 based on the definition of the n PAND and the
idempotence property of the PAND gate.
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The VOT gate can behave as an OR gate, when k = 1 (Rule 15), and as an
AND gate, when k equals the number of its inputs (Rule 16). The verification details
of these rules are listed below.
Voting (1/n) is an OR Gate (Rule 15)
Theorem 5.25.
	 ∀ L. ALL DISTINCT L ∧ rv gt0 L ⇒ (k out n gate 1 L = n OR L)
As mentioned previously, the voting gate is defined as the OR of a list and
each element in the list is the AND of another list of k elements. In order to verify
Theorem 5.25, we need to use the commutativity property of the n OR gate (Theorem
5.2), i.e., we need to verify that the list of the n OR in the voting gate definition (MAP
(λa. n AND (SET TO LIST a))(MAP (λa. {a}) L)) and the input list L possess the
permutation property when k = 1. Therefore, we first verify that the list generated
from k out 1 L is the permutation of the list MAP (λa. {a}) L. We need to recall
that MAP (λa. {a}) L generates another list that has all elements from the input list
L but as sets. Then, we verify that the list generated from applying the n AND to the
list of k out 1 L is the permutation of applying n AND to MAP (λa. {a}) L. We also
verify the following property:
Lemma 5.7.
	 ∀ L. rv gt0 L ⇒
PERM (MAP (λa. n AND (SET TO LIST a)) (MAP (λa. {a}) L)) L
Finally, we use these verified properties of permutation and the commutativity
property of n OR to verify Theorem 5.25.
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Voting (n/n) is an AND Gate (Rule 16)
Theorem 5.26.
	 ∀ L. ALL DISTINCT L ⇒ (k out n gate (LENGTH L) L = n AND L)
Theorem 5.26 is used when k equals the length of the input list (LENGTH L),
i.e., VOT (n/n), and n is the number of inputs of the gate. In this case, the VOT
gate acts as an AND gate. We verify this by first rewriting using the VOT gate and
k out definitions. Then, we verify that {s| s ⊆ set L ∧ (CARD s = LENGTH L)}
= {set L}. This way the original expression of the VOT gate can be reduced to
n OR [n AND (SET TO LIST (set L))]. Then, we verify that PERM L (SET TO LIST
(set L)), which means that the original list and the list generated from the set of
the original list are the permutation of each other. This is a consequence of using
set L in the formal definition of the VOT gate, which requires the added condition
that the elements in the original list are distinct, i.e., they are not equal or repeated.
This condition is added using the HOL predicate ALL DISTINCT L. Finally, we verify
Theorem 5.26 using the commutativity property of the AND (Theorem 5.1) and the
definition of n OR.
5.3.2 Rewrite Rules for PAND Gates
Rules 18-23 deal with PAND gates that require considering the order of the inputs.
Representing AND Gate using OR and PAND Gates (Rule 18)
Theorem 5.27.
	 ∀ X Y. D AND X Y = D OR (P AND X Y) (P AND Y X)
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Conflicting PAND Gates with Independent Successors (Rule 19)
Theorem 5.28.
	 ∀ X Y. (∀ s. ALL DISTINCT [X s; Y s]) ⇒
(D AND (P AND X Y) (P AND Y X) = NEVER)
We verify Theorems 5.27 and 5.28 based on the definitions of D AND, D OR and
P AND gates and some properties of extreal numbers. Note that the added condition
for rule 19 is that the inputs are distinct (ALL DISTINCT), i.e., they cannot fail si-
multaneously. This results from the fact that the inputs are independent (there is no
common cause of failure) and they possess continuous failure distributions. There-
fore, rule 19 cannot be applied unless this context restriction is ensured using this
assumption.
PAND Gate with a PAND Successor (Rule 20)
Theorem 5.29.
	 ∀ B C1 C2 L. rv gt0 (L ++ [B; C1; C2])⇒
(n PAND ([B; P AND C1 C2] ++ L) =
D AND (P AND C1 C2) (n PAND ([B; C2] ++ L)))
We verify Theorem 5.29 based on manipulating the input lists and the PAND
appended with a single element lemma, which we verify as:
Lemma 5.8.
	 ∀ x L. rv gt0 L ⇒ (n PAND (L ++ [x]) = P AND (n PAND L) x)
Based on Lemma 5.8 and list induction and manipulation, we verify that
the left-hand-side of Theorem 5.29 equals: P AND(D AND(P AND C1 C2)(n PAND
(B::C2::L))) x, where x is the additional element generated through induction.
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Then, we verify a property stating that the time of failure of the PAND gate should
be greater than or equal to the failure time of any of its inputs, since it is required
that the failure occurs from left to right.
PAND Gate with a First OR Successor (Rule 21)
Theorem 5.30.
	 ∀ X Y L. rv gt0 [X; Y] ⇒
(n PAND (D OR X Y::L) = D OR (n PAND (X::L)) (n PAND (Y::L))
To verify Theorem 5.30, we first apply induction to the input argument and
rewrite using the rule of n PAND with a single successor. Then, we use the definitions
of the P AND, n PAND and some simplification theorems, such as P AND ALWAYS X =
X. Using some list properties, such as applying a function to two appended lists using
FOLDL (we need to recall that the definition of n PAND is based on FOLDL), we reach a
point where the whole goal can be verified using the following lemma:
Lemma 5.9. 	 ∀ X Y Z. P AND (D OR X Y) Z = D OR (P AND X Z)(P AND Y Z)
PAND Gate with ALWAYS as Non-First Successor (Rule 23)
Theorem 5.31.
	 ∀ L1. L1 = [] ∧ (∀ x. MEM x L1 ⇒ ∀ s. 0 < x s) ⇒
∀ L2. n PAND (L1 ++ [ALWAYS] ++ L2) = NEVER
Theorem 5.31 shows that if the inputs to the left of the input that already failed
(ALWAYS) do not fail from the beginning, i.e., their time of failure is greater than 0,
then the output of the n PAND can never fail. Therefore, we add the condition that
the inputs to the left (list L1) are greater than 0 using ∀ x. MEM x L1 ⇒ ∀ s. 0
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< x s. We verify Theorem 5.31 using induction over list L1. After some basic list and
extreal theory based reasoning, we reach the step for the left-hand-side:
FOLDL (λa b. P AND a b)
(P AND (FOLDL(λa b. P AND a b) h L1) ALWAYS) L2
where h is the appended element that results from induction. We verify that P AND
(FOLDL(λa b. P AND a b) h L1) ALWAYS = NEVER, which can be done if the first
input of the P AND is greater than 0. We verify the following property:
Lemma 5.10.
	 ∀ s L. (∀ x. MEM x L ⇒ ∀ s. 0 < x s) ⇒
∀ h. 0 < h s ⇒ 0 < FOLDL (λa b. P AND a b) h L s
This lemma basically means that if we have a list of inputs and an additional
element, h, that are greater than 0, then the result of applying P AND using FOLDL
is also greater than 0. Using this lemma, the left hand side is reduced to FOLDL
(λa b. P AND a b) NEVER L2. Finally, we use the following lemma to verify the
Theorem 5.31.
Lemma 5.11.
	 ∀ L. FOLDL (λa b. P AND a b) NEVER L = NEVER
This lemma indicates that if we apply P AND to a list of inputs with an element
NEVER at the beginning, then the output equals NEVER.
5.3.3 Non-Structural Rules
The BEs that are not connected to the given DFT can be safely removed. This is
already implicitly embedded in the current DFT formalization, as we are verifying the
rewrite rules by proving that the time of failure before and after rewriting remains
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the same. Therefore, if the BEs are not connected to the DFT, this means that they
are not affecting the time of failure of the top element and thus they can be removed
in the verification process. Since DFT gates are modeled as time-to-failure functions,
merging BEs is also already embedded in the DFT formalization. For example, the
OR gate is modeled using the min function. This means that the inputs of the OR
gate are merged and the output of the OR gate can be replaced with the min function.
We illustrate the usage of the verified rules on the example of Figure 5.2:
Theorem 5.32.
	 ∀ c d f. P AND (D AND c (D OR c d))(D AND d f) = P AND c (D AND d f)
5.4 Summary
As an application of our DFT formalization and analysis framework, in this chapter,
we presented the formal definitions and proofs of the rewriting rules in [66], which we
believe is a novel contribution as details about how to mathematically conduct these
proofs are not available in [66]. In fact, in [66], the correctness of the rewrite rules is
described implicitly based on the behavior of DFT gates rather than on their formal
mathematical models as presented in this work. It is worth noting that our formal
definitions and verified lemmas allowed verifying several DFT rewriting rules that can
be used with tools that simplify DFTs prior to the analysis. In addition, verifying




Formal Analysis of Dynamic
Reliability Block Diagrams
In this chapter, we introduce our novel DRBD algebra that allows conducting both
the qualitative and quantitative analyses based on the structure of the DRBD. We
propose new DRBD operators, similar to the DFT algebra, to capture the dynamic
dependencies among system components. We use these operators to model the three
variants of the spare construct, i.e., hot spare HSP, cold spare CSP, and warms spare
WSP. Furthermore, we model the series, parallel, series-parallel and parallel-series
structures using our newly introduced operators. We propose several simplification
theorems to enable reducing the structure function of a given DRBD. We express the
reliability of the DRBD spare construct and structures to provide generic expressions
of distribution and density functions. We formalize this algebra to ensure its soundness
and allow the analysis within a theorem proving environment. Our ultimate goal is to
develop a formally verified algebra that follows the traditional reliability expressions
of the series and parallel structures in an easily extensible manner and at the same
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time can capture the dynamic behavior of real-world systems. Our formalization
differs from and overcomes the formalization of traditional RBDs presented in [22] in
the sense that it can formally express the structure function of a DRBD using the
introduced DRBD operators. In addition, it can formally model and analyze DRBD
spare constructs. Furthermore, we model the traditional RBD structures, i.e., series,
parallel and deeper structures in a way similar to the mathematical models available in
the literature, which makes it easily understood and followed by reliability engineers
that are not familiar with HOL theorem proving. We illustrate the usefulness of
the proposed developments in conducting the formal analysis of the DBW system.
Finally, we verify the equivalence of both DFT and DRBD algebras, which enables
the analysis in both directions.
6.1 Methodology
Figure 6.1 depicts the proposed methodology to formally conduct the DRBD qualita-
tive and quantitative analyses using HOL4. Similar to the DFT analysis, the formal
DRBD analysis starts with a system description that is interpreted into a DRBD
model and some reliability requirements that should be met. A formal model is
created using the DRBD structures and constructs, such as the series, parallel and
spares. Then, based on the simplification theorems, the DRBD structure is reduced
to enable the qualitative analysis in the form of cut sets and cut sequences. The quan-
titative analysis of the DRBD is performed using the verified reliability expressions
of the DRBD structures. As a result, a generic reliability expression of the modeled
system is formally verified using HOL4. Since the DFT and the DRBD encompass
complementary behavior, we utilize our DFT library to formalize DRBDs, i.e., the
DFT theory is the parent of the DRBD, besides the measure, Lebesgue integral and
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probability theories.
Figure 6.1: Formal DRBD Analysis Methodology
6.2 DRBD Event
Throughout this work, we assume that system components or blocks are represented
by random variables that in turn represent their time-to-failures. In addition, we
assume that system components are non-repairable, i.e., we are interested in express-
ing the reliability of the system considering that the failed components will not be
repaired. It is worth mentioning that our proposed algebra follows the general lines
for the DFT algebra [30], which allows DFTs conversion into DRBDs for conducting
their analysis as well.
The reliability of a single component, which time-to-failure function is repre-
sented by random variable X, is mathematically defined as [4]:
RX(t) = Pr{s | X(s) > t} = 1− Pr{s | X(s) ≤ t} = 1− FX(t) (6.1)
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where FX(t) is the CDF of X.
We call {s | X(s) > t} a DRBD event as it represents the set that we are
interested in finding the probability of until time t:
event (X, t) = {s | X(s) > t} (6.2)
In our formalization, we define the inputs, or the random variables representing
the time to failure of system components, as lambda abstracted functions with a
return datatype of extended-real, which represents real numbers besides ±∞.
We formally define the DRBD event of Equation (6.2) as:
Definition 6.1. DRBD Event
	 ∀ p X t. DRBD event p X t = {s | Normal t < X s} ∩ p space p
where Normal typecasts the real value of t from real to extended-real. This type
conversion is required since we need real-valued random variables. However, we need
to deal with the extended-real data-type to model the NEVER element. Therefore, we
define the time-to-failure functions to return extended-real and typecast the values
from extended-real to real using the function real and vice versa using Normal. This
is similar to our approach of the DFT formalization.
We formally define the reliability as the probability of the DRBD event according
to Equation (6.1):
Definition 6.2. Reliability
	 ∀ p X t. Rel p X t = prob p (DRBD event p X t)
We verify the relationship between the reliability and the CDF of Equation (6.1) as:
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Theorem 6.1.
	 ∀ p X t. rv gt0 ninfinity [X] ∧
random variable (real o X) p borel ⇒
(Rel p X t = 1- CDF p (real o X) t)
where real typecasts the values of the random variable from extended-real to real as
the CDF is defined for real-valued random variables, random variable (real o X)
p borel ensures that (real o X) is a random variable over the real line represented
by the borel space, and rv gt0 ninfinity ensures that the random variable is greater
than or equal to 0 and not equal to +∞, which means that the time of failure of any
component cannot be negative or +∞. Theorem 6.1 is verified based on the fact that
the DRBD event and the set of the CDF are the complement of each other. Therefore,
the probability of one of them equals one minus the other. For the rest of the work,
we will denote CDF p (real o X) t by FX(t) to facilitate the understanding of the
theorems.
6.3 Identity Elements and Operators
Similar to the identity elements of ordinary Boolean algebra and DFT algebra [30],
we introduce two identity elements, i.e., ALWAYS and NEVER, that represent two
states of any system block. The ALWAYS element represents a system component
that always fails, i.e., it fails from time 0. While the NEVER element represents a
component that never fails, i.e., the time of its failure is +∞. These identity elements
play an important role in the reduction process of the structure functions of DRBDs,
as will be introduced in the following sections.
ALWAYS = 0 (6.3)
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NEV ER = +∞ (6.4)
We formally define these elements as:
Definition 6.3. DRBD ALWAYS
	 R ALWAYS = (λs. (0:extreal))
Definition 6.4. DRBD NEVER
	 R NEVER = (λs. PosInf)
We introduce operators to model the relationship between the various blocks in
a DRBD. These operators can be divided into two categories: 1) The AND and OR
operators that are not concerned with the dependencies among system components.
2) Temporal operators, i.e., After, Simultaneous and Inclusive After, that can capture
the dependencies between system components. It is worth mentioning that DRBDs
are concerned with modeling the several paths of success of a given system. Therefore,
if we are concerned in knowing the success behavior of a DRBD until time t, it means
that we are interested in knowing how the system would not fail until time t. As a
result, we can use the time-to-failure random variables in modeling the time-to-failure
of a given DRBD, i.e., its structure function. It is assumed that for any two system
components that possess continuous failure distribution functions, the possibility that
these components fail at the same time can be neglected.
In [44], AND and OR operators were introduced to model the parallel and series
constructs between dependent components only without providing any mathematical
model to these operators. We propose to use the AND (·) and OR (+) operators to
model series and parallel blocks in a DRBD, respectively without any restriction. We
provide a mathematical model for each operator based on the time of failure of its input
to be used in the proposed algebra. The AND operator models the series connection
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(a) Series DRBD (b) Parallel DRBD
Figure 6.2: Two-Block Series and Parallel DRBDs
between two or more system blocks, as shown in Figure 6.2(a). For example, the
DRBD in Figure 6.2(a) will continue to work only if component X and component Y
are working. Once one of these blocks stops working, then there will be no connection
between the input and the output of the DRBD and thus the system will no longer
work. We model the AND operator as the minimum time of its input arguments.
Similarly, the OR operator models the connection between parallel components in a
DRBD. For example, the DRBD in Figure 6.2(b) will continue to work if X is working
or Y is working. All the components in a parallel structure should fail for this DRBD
to fail. Therefore, we model the OR operator as the maximum time of failure of its
input arguments, which represents the time of failure of basic system blocks or sub-
DRBDs. This approach facilitates using these operators to model even more complex
structures.
We define the AND and OR operators as:
X · Y = min (X, Y ) (6.5)
X + Y = max (X, Y ) (6.6)
We formally define these operators as:
Definition 6.5. DRBD AND
	 ∀ X Y. R AND X Y =(λs. min (X s) (Y s))
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Definition 6.6. DRBD OR
	 ∀ X Y. R OR X Y =(λs. max (X s) (Y s))
If X and Y are independent, then the reliability of the systems, shown in Fig-
ure 6.2, can be expressed as:
R(X·Y )(t) = RX(t) × RY (t) (6.7)
R(X+Y )(t) = 1− ((1−RX(t))× (1−RY (t))) (6.8)
To reach these expressions, it is required first to express the DRBD events as
the intersection and union for the AND and OR operators, respectively, as:
event ((X · Y ), t) = event (X, t) ∩ event (Y, t) (6.9)
event ((X + Y ), t) = event (X, t) ∪ event (Y, t) (6.10)
We verify their reliability expressions as in Theorems 6.2 and 6.3, respectively.
Theorem 6.2.
	 ∀ p X t. rv gt0 ninfinity [X;Y] ∧
indep var p lborel (real o X) lborel (real o Y) ⇒
(Rel p (X·Y) t = Rel p X t * Rel p Y t)
Theorem 6.3.
	 ∀ p X t. rv gt0 ninfinity [X;Y] ∧
indep var p lborel (real o X) lborel (real o Y) ⇒
(Rel p (X + Y) t = 1 - (1 - Rel p X t) * (1 - Rel p Y t))
We verify Theorem 6.2 by first rewriting using Definition 6.2. Then, we prove
that DRBD event of the AND operator equals the intersection of the individual events,
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as in Equation (6.9). Utilizing the independence of the real-valued random variables
real o X and real o Y, the probability of intersection of their events equals the
product of the probability of the individual events. Since X and Y are greater than 0
and are not equal to +∞, based on the function rv gt0 ninfinity, the events in the
probability space that correspond to X and Y are equal to the ones that correspond
to real o X and real o Y. As a result, the DRBD events of X and Y are independent.
Hence, the probability of their intersection equals the product of the probability of
the individual events, i.e., their reliability. Theorem 6.3 is verified in a similar way.
However, we prove that the DRBD event of the OR operator equals the union of the
individual events, as in Equation (6.10). We verify that this union of events equals to
the complement of the intersection of the complements of the individual events. Now,
Theorem 6.3 can be proven using the independence of random variables.
We extend the definition of the AND and OR operators to n-ary operators,
nR AND and nR OR, that can be used to represent the relationship between an arbitrary
number of elements. We formally define n-ary AND (nR AND) as:
Definition 6.7. nR AND
	 ∀ X s. nR AND X s = ITSET (λe acc. R AND (X e) acc) s R NEVER
where ITSET is the HOL function to iterate over sets. This definition applies the
R AND over the elements of X indexed by the numbers in s. R NEVER is the identity
element of the R AND operator.
Similarly, we formally define n-ary OR (nR OR) as:
Definition 6.8. nR OR
	 ∀ X s. nR OR X s = ITSET (λe acc. R OR (X e) acc) s R ALWAYS
where R ALWAYS is the identity element of the R OR operator. The reliability of these
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two operators would be similar to the reliability of the series and parallel structures,
respectively, as will be described in the following section.
In order to model the dynamic behavior of systems in DRBDs, we introduce
new temporal operators: after (), simultaneous (Δ), and inclusive after(). The
after operator represents a situation where it is required to model a component that
continues to work after the failure of another. The time of failure of the after operator
equals the time of failure of the last component, which is required to fail. However, if
the required sequence does not occur, then the output can never fail, i.e., the time of
failure equals +∞.
X  Y =
⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
X, X > Y
+∞, X ≤ Y
(6.11)
The behavior of the simultaneous operator is similar to the one introduced in
the DFT algebra [30]. The output of this operator fails if both its inputs fail at the




X, X = Y
+∞, X = Y
(6.12)
Finally, the inclusive after operator encompasses the behavior of both the after
and simultaneous operators, i.e., it models a situation where it is required that one
component continues to work after another one or fail at the same time, otherwise it
can never fail.
X  Y =
⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
X, X ≥ Y
+∞, X < Y
(6.13)
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We formally define these temporal operators as:
Definition 6.9. DRBD After
	 ∀ X Y. R AFTER X Y = (λs. if Y s < X s then X s else PosInf)
Definition 6.10. DRBD Simultaneous
	 ∀ X Y. R SIMULT X Y = (λs. if X s = Y s then X s else PosInf)
Definition 6.11. DRBD Inclusive After
	 ∀ X Y.
R INCLUSIVE AFTER X Y = (λs. if Y s ≤ X s then X s else PosInf)
In the case of dealing with basic components, the inclusive after will behave in
a similar way as the after operator. Therefore, their probabilities can be expressed
for independent random variables in the same way as:
R(XY )(t) = 1−
∫ t
0
fX(x)× FY (x) dx (6.14)
where fX is the PDF of X and FY is the CDF of Y .
Finally, we verify this expression utilizing our formalization in Section 4.2.3:
Theorem 6.4.
	 ∀ X Y p fx t. rv gt0 ninfinity [X; Y] ∧ 0 ≤ t ∧
indep var p lborel (real o X) lborel (real o Y) ∧
distributed p lborel (real o X) fx ∧ (∀ x. 0 ≤ fx x) ∧
cont CDF p (real o Y) ∧ measurable CDF p (real o Y) ⇒
(Rel p (XY) t = 1-
∫ t
0
fX(x) × FY(x) dx)
The proof of this theorem is based on Pr(Y < X < t) =
∫ t
0
fX(x) × FY (x) dx,
which has been verified in Section 4.2.3 using the properties of the Lebesgue inte-
gral and independence of random variables. The DRBD after operator represents a
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situation where the system continues to work until two components fail in sequence.
Thus, the above expressions allow us to verify the reliability expression of the after
operator, as the DRBD and DFT events complement one another.
6.4 Simplification Theorems
We introduce several simplification properties to reduce the structure function of a
DRBD. These simplification properties range from simple ones, such as the associativ-
ity and idempotence of the operators, to more complex theorems. The idea of these
properties is to reduce the algebraic expressions based on the time of failure. For
example, X· ALWAYS = ALWAYS means that if a component in a series structure
is not working, i.e., always fails, then the series structure is not working as well. Sim-
ilarly, X + NEV ER = NEV ER means that if a component in a parallel structure
cannot fail, then the whole parallel structure cannot fail as well. X + Y = Y + X,
X · Y = Y · X and XΔY = YΔX represent the commutativity property for the
OR, AND and simultaneous operators, respectively. An example of a more complex
theorem is X  (Y · Z) = (X  Y ) · (X  Z). We formally verify these theorems
in order to perform the reduction of a given DRBD using HOL. Table 6.1 lists these
simplification theorems that we developed and verified using the proposed algebra.
6.5 Spare Construct
The spare construct, shown in Figure 6.3 [45], is introduced in DRBDs to model
situations where a spare part is activated and replaces the main part, after its failure,
by introducing a spare controller to activate the spare [45]. Depending on the failure
behavior of the spare part, we can have three variants, i.e., hot, warm and cold
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Table 6.1: Formally Verified DRBD Simplification Theorems
Simplification Theorems
	 ∀ X. (∀ s. 0 ≤ X s) ⇒ (X · R ALWAYS = R ALWAYS)
	 ∀ X Y Z. (X · Y) · Z = X · (Y · Z)
	 ∀ X Y. X · Y = Y · X
	 ∀ X. X · X = X
	 ∀ X. X · R NEVER = X
	 ∀ X. (∀ s. 0 ≤ X s) ⇒ (X + R ALWAYS = X)
	 ∀ X Y Z. (X + Y) + Z = X + (Y + Z)
	 ∀ X Y. X + Y = Y + X
	 ∀ X. X + X = X
	 ∀ X. X + R NEVER = R NEVER
	 ∀ X Y. X + (X · Y) =X
	 ∀ X Y Z. X rhd (Y  Z) = ((X  Y) + (X  Z)) (Y  Z)
	 ∀ X Y. (X  Y) + (Y  X) = R NEVER
	 ∀ X Y Z. X  (Y · Z) = (X  Y) · (X  Z)
	 ∀ X Y Z. X · (Y + Z) = (X · Y) + (X · Z)
	 ∀ X Y Z. X + (Y · Z) = (X + Y) · (X + Z)
	 ∀ X Y. X  Y = (X  Y) · (X Δ Y)
	 ∀ X Y Z. X  (Y + Z) = (X  Y) + (X  Z)
	 ∀ X Y. X Δ Y = Y Δ X
(H|W |C) spares. The hot spare possesses the same failure behavior in both its active
and dormant states. The cold spare cannot fail in its dormant state and is only
activated after the failure of the main part. The failure behavior of the warm spare
in the dormant state is attenuated by a dormancy factor from the active state. In
order to distinguish between the dormant and active states of the spare, just like the
DFT algebra [30], we use two different symbols to model the spare part of the DRBD
spare construct, one for the dormant state and the other for the active one. For the
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Figure 6.3: Spare Construct
spare construct of Figure 6.3, the spare X is represented by Xa and Xd for the active
and dormant states, respectively. After the failure (F ) of the main part Y , X will be
activated (A) by the spare controller. We model the structure function of the spare
construct (Qspare) using the DRBD operators based on the description of its behavior:
Qspare = (Xa  Y ) · (Y Xd) (6.15)
Thus, we need two conditions to be satisfied in order for the spare to work. The first
one is that the active state of the spare will continue to work after the failure of the
main part (XaY ). The second condition is that the main part will continue to work
after the failure of the spare in its dormant state (Y Xd). However, since the spare
part can only fail in one of its states (Xa, Xd) but not both as it is non-repairable,
only one of the terms in Equation (6.15) affects the behavior and the other term can
never fail, i.e., it fails at +∞.
We formally define the warm spare (WSP) as:
Definition 6.12. DRBD WSP
	 ∀ Y Xa Xd. R WSP Y Xa Xd = (Xa  Y) · (Y  Xd)
Since the spare construct of the DRBD and the spare gate of the DFT exhibit
complementary behavior, i.e., the DRBDs consider the success and the DFTs consider
the failure, we can use the probability of failure of the spare DFT gate [30] to find the
reliability of the spare DRBD construct. It is assumed that the dormant spare and
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the main part are independent since the failure of one does not affect the failure of
the other. However, the failure of the active spare is affected by the time of failure of
the main part, since it will be activated after the failure of the main part. We express










where f(Xa|Y=y) is the conditional density function of Xa given that Y failed at time y.
We use our formalization of the probability of failure of the warm spare gate of
Section 4.2.4 to verify the reliability of the WSP construct:
Theorem 6.5.
	 ∀ p Y Xa Xd t fY fXaY fXa|Y. 0 ≤ t ∧
(∀ s. ALL DISTINCT [Xa s; Xd s; Y s]) ∧ DISJOINT WSP Y Xa Xd t ∧
rv gt0 ninfinity [Xa; Xd; Y] ∧ den gt0 ninfinity fXaY fY fXa|Y ∧
(∀ y. cond density lborel lborel p
(real o Xa)(real o Y) y fXaY fY fXa|Y) ∧
indep var p lborel (real o Xd) lborel (real o Y) ∧
cont CDF p (real o Xd) ∧ measurable CDF p (real o Xd) ⇒(




f Y(y) ∗ (
∫ t
y





where ALL DISTINCT ensures that the main and spare parts cannot fail at the same
time, DISJOINT WSP Y Xa Xd t ensures that until time t, the spare can only fail in
one of its states and den gt0 ninfinity ascertains the proper values of the density
functions; joint (fXY ), marginal (fY ) and conditional (fXa|Y ). Theorem 6.5 is verified
by first defining a conditional density function fXa|Y for random variables (real o Xa)
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and (real o Y). This is required as the failure of the spare part is affected by the
time of failure of the main part. Therefore, we need to define this conditional density
function then prove the expression based on the probability of failure of the DFT
spare gate, which is verified based on the properties of the Lebesgue integral.
Equations (6.15) and (6.16) represent the general behavior of the spare, i.e., the
warm spare. The cold and hot spares represent special cases of the warm spare and
can be expressed as:
Qcoldspare = Xa  Y (6.17)
Qhotspare = X + Y (6.18)
In Equation (6.18), the spare part X has the same behavior in both states and thus
there is no need to use any subscript to distinguish both states.
We formally define the DRBD CSP as:
Definition 6.13. DRBD CSP
	 ∀ Y X. R CSP Y X = (λs. if Y s < X s then X s else PosInf)
This definition means that the CSP construct will continue to work until the
main part fails then the spare part is activated and fails in its active state. It is worth
noting that since the spare part has only one state that affects the behavior of the
CSP, which is the active state, we do not use any subscript with the active state, as
the dormant state has no effect here in the behavior.
Finally, we define the hot spare construct (HSP) as:
Definition 6.14. DRBD HSP
	 ∀ Y X. R HSP Y X = (λs. max (Y s) (X s))
The reliability expression of Equation (6.18) can be expressed using the reliabil-
ity of the OR operator. Therefore, we can use Theorem 6.2 to express the reliability
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of the HSP construct. The reliability of the cold spare construct can be expressed as:





f(Xa|Y=y)(x) fY (y) dx dy (6.19)
We verify the reliability of the CSP construct based on the probability of failure
of the CSP gate as:
Theorem 6.6.
	 ∀ p X Y fXY fY fX|Y t. 0 ≤ t ∧
rv gt0 ninfinity [X; Y] ∧ den gt0 ninfinity fXY fY fX|Y ∧
(∀ y. cond density lborel lborel p
(real o X)(real o Y) y fXY fY fX|Y) ∧(
Rel p (R CSP Y X) t) = 1 - (
∫ t
0





The conditions required for this theorem are similar to the ones of Theorem 6.5,
as the WSP exhibits the behavior of the CSP if the main part fails before the spare.
6.6 DRBD Structures
Beside the dynamic DRBD constructs, system components are represented as blocks
that can be connected in series, parallel, series-parallel and parallel-series fashion, as
shown in Figure 6.4 [4]. Each block in Figure 6.4 represents either a simple system
component or one of the DRBD dynamic constructs.
The series structure (Figure 6.4(a)) represents a collection of blocks that are
connected in series. The system continues to work until the failure of one of these
blocks. We define a series structure that represents the intersection of all events of
the blocks in this structure as in Table 6.2, where Xi represents the i
th block in
the series structure and n is the number of blocks. Interestingly, any block in our
136
(a) Series (b) Parallel
(c) Series-Parallel (d) Parallel-Series
Figure 6.4: DRBD Structures
proposed algebra can represent a basic system component or a complex structure,
such as a spare construct. Moreover, since we are dealing with the events, we can use
the ordinary reliability expressions for the series structure assuming the independence
of the individual blocks. The parallel structure (Figure 6.4(b)) represents a system
that continues to work until the failure of the last block in the structure. The
behavior of the parallel structure can be expressed using the OR operator. We
represent the parallel structure as the union of the individual events of the blocks.
The series-parallel structure (Figure 6.4(c)) represents a series structure, where the
blocks of the series structure are parallel structures. The structure function of this
structure can be expressed using and AND of OR operators. Table 6.2 lists the model
for this structure with its reliability expression, where n is the number of blocks in
the parallel structure and m is the number of parallel structures that are connected
in series. The parallel-series structure (Figure 6.4(d)) represents a group of series
structures that are connected in parallel. Its structure function can be expressed
using an OR of AND operators.
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Table 6.2: Mathematical and Reliability Expressions of DRBD Structures





























We formally define the series structure as:
Definition 6.15. DRBD Series Structure




We define the series structure as a function that accepts a group of sets, Y, that
are indexed by the numbers in set s and returns the intersection of these sets.
The parallel structure is defined in a similar way but it returns the union of the
sets rather than the intersection. We formally define it as:
Definition 6.16. DRBD Parallel Structure




The group of sets, Y, in both structures, represents a family of events, i.e., Y will
be instantiated later with DRBD events. The reliability expressions of the series and
parallel structures are given in Table 6.2. We verify these expressions as:
Theorem 6.7.
	 ∀ p X t s. s = {} ∧ FINITE s ∧
indep sets p (λi. {rv to event p X t i}) s ⇒




(real (Rel p (X i) t))))
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Theorem 6.8.
	 ∀ p X t s. s = {} ∧ FINITE s ∧
indep sets p (λi. {rv to event p X t i}) s ⇒
(prob p (DRBD parallel (rv to event p X t) s) =
1 - Normal (
∏
i∈s
(real (1 - Rel p (X i) t))))
where s ={} ∧ FINITE s ensures that the set of indices, s, is nonempty and finite.
The reliability of the series structure is verified based on the independence of the
input events using indep sets, which ensures that for the probability space p, the
given group of sets ((λi. {rv to event p X t i}) indexed by the numbers in set s
are independent. The family of sets ((λi. {rv to event p X t i}) represents the
DRBD events of the group of time-to-failure functions, X. This is defined as:
Definition 6.17. rv to event
	 ∀ p X t. rv to event p X t = (λi. DRBD event p (X i) t)
The function rv to event enables us to create the group of DRBD event of
time-to-failure functions of system blocks (X). Based on the independence of these
sets and the definition of the series structure (intersection of sets), we verify that
the probability of the series structure is equal to the product of the reliability of the
individual blocks (Rel p (X i) t), where i∈s. The product function (∏) in HOL4
returns a real value and the probability returns extreal, therefore, it is required
to typecast the product function to extreal using Normal. Similarly, the product
function finds the product of real-valued functions, therefore, it is required to typecast
the reliability function (Rel) to real using the real function. The parallel structure
is verified in a similar way. We replace the parallel structure (the union of events)
with the complement of the intersection of the complements of the events. Then, we
verify that the probability of this complement equals one minus the probability of the
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intersection of the complements. This requires the added condition that all DRBD
events created using rv to event belong to the events of the probability space p,
which is an embedded condition in indep sets definition.
In order to express the series and parallel structures using DRBD operators, we
verify that these structures are equal to the DRBD events of the nR AND and nR OR,
respectively:
Theorem 6.9.
	 ∀ p X t s. FINITE s ∧ s = {} ⇒
(DRBD event p (nR AND X s) t = DRBD series (rv to event p X t) s)
Theorem 6.10.
	 ∀ p X t s. FINITE s ∧ 0 ≤ t ⇒
(DRBD event p (nR OR X s) t = DRBD parallel (rv to event p X t) s)
We verify Theorems 6.9 and 6.10 by inducting on set s using SET INDUCT TAC that will
create two subgoals to be solved; one for the empty set and another one for inserting
an element to a finite set. Furthermore, we use the fact that the DRBD events of the
AND and OR operators equal the intersection and the union of the individual events,
respectively. For Theorem 6.10, an additional condition is required, 0≤t, to be able
to manipulate the sets and reach the final form of the theorem.
Interestingly, these structures can be easily extended to model and verify more
complex structures, such as two-level structures, i.e., series-parallel and parallel series
structures. We formally verify the reliability of the series-parallel structure as:
Theorem 6.11.
	 ∀ p X t s J.





(∀ i. i ∈ J ⇒ s i = {} ∧ FINITE (s i)) ∧
FINITE J ∧ J = {} ∧ disjoint family on s J ⇒
(prob p
(DRBD series








(real (1 - Rel p (X i) t)))))
We formally verify the reliability of the parallel-series structure as:
Theorem 6.12.
	 ∀ p X t s J.




(∀ i. i ∈ J ⇒ s i = {} ∧ FINITE (s i)) ∧
FINITE J ∧ J = {} ∧ disjoint family on s J ⇒
(prob p
(DRBD parallel (λj. DRBD series (rv to event p X t) (s j)) J) =






(real (Rel p (X i) t)))))
The main idea in building these two-level structures is to partition the family
of blocks into distinct groups, where we use a set, J, to index these partitions, i.e., it
includes the number of groups in the first top level. Then, for each group in this top
level, we have another set, {s j | j ∈ J}, that includes the indices of the blocks
in the second level, i.e. the subgroups. For example, consider the parallel-series
structure of Figure 6.4(d), if n = m = 1, then the outer parallel structure has two
series structures, where each series structure has two blocks. Thus, J = {0;1}. For
each j∈J, we have a certain set s j that has the indices of the blocks in the inner
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series structure. Thus, s = (λj. if j = 0 then {0;1} else {2;3}). The same
concept is applied to the series-parallel structure. Therefore, the structure of the
DRBD can be determined based on the given sets of indices.
We verify Theorems 6.11 and 6.12 by extending the proofs of the series and
parallel structures. However, it is required to deal with the intersection of unions in
case of the series-parallel structure and the union of intersections in case of parallel-
series structure. Therefore, we need to extend the independence of sets properties to
include the independence of union and intersection of partitions of the events. We
verify these properties as:
Theorem 6.13.
	 ∀ p s J Y. indep sets p (λi. {Y i}) ⋃j∈J (s j) ∧ J = {} ∧
(∀ i. i ∈ J ⇒ countable (s i)) ∧ FINITE J ∧
disjoint family on s J ⇒
indep sets p (λj. {⋃i∈s j (Y i)}) J
Theorem 6.14.
	 ∀ p s J Y. indep sets p (λi. {Y i}) ⋃j∈J (s j) ∧ J = {} ∧
(∀ i. i ∈ J ⇒ countable (s i) ∧ s i = {}) ∧ FINITE J ∧
disjoint family on s J ∧ (∀ i. i ∈ ⋃i∈J (s j) ⇒ Y i ⊂ m space p) ⇒
indep sets p (λj. {⋂i∈s j (Y i)}) J
where set J includes the indices of the partitions and s has the indices of the individual
blocks of each partition, disjoint family on ensures that the indices of the blocks in
different partitions are disjoint and indep sets p (λi. {Y i}) ⋃j∈J (s j) ensures
the independence of the family of blocks {Y i} where the indices of the individual
blocks are given by the union of s. In order to verify Theorems 6.13 and 6.14, we
need the fact that the σ-algebras generated by (λj.
⋃
i∈s j{Y i}) with index set J
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are independent. Then, we verify that ∀ j. j ∈ J, set {⋃i∈s j {Y i}} is a subset
of the σ-algebra generated by
⋃
i∈s j{Y i} . Finally, based on these intermediate
verified steps and the definition of indep sets, we are able to verify these theorems.
In order to verify the reliability of the series-parallel structure, we need to ensure
the independence of the individual blocks. Therefore it is required to combine the
indices of all blocks into a single set using
⋃
j∈J (s j) to be used with indep sets. To
be able to use the reliability of the series structure in this proof, we use Theorem 6.13
to verify the independence of the unions of partitions of events. This means verifying
that the parallel structures are independent, i.e., the probability of intersection of
these parallel structures equals the product of the reliability of the parallel structures.
Finally, several assumptions related to sets {s i| i ∈ J} and J are required, which
include that these sets are finite and nonempty. Finally, it is required that every block
has a unique index, which is ensured using disjoint family on. The reliability of
the parallel-series structure is verified in a similar manner based on the reliability of
the parallel structure. We verify the independence of the intersection of partitions of
events rather than the union using Theorem 6.14. In addition, it is required that all
DRBD events belong to the events of the probability space.
We extend the reliability of the two-level series-parallel structure to verify the
reliability of a more nested structure, i.e., series-parallel-series-parallel, as:
Theorem 6.15.
	 ∀ p X t s L A J.
indep sets p (λi. {rv to event p X t i}) (nested BIGUNION s L A J) ∧















l∈(L a) (1 -
∏
i∈(s l)(real (1 - Rel p (X i) t)))))))
For this four-level nested structure, we have four sets (indexed sets) that de-
termine the structure of the DRBD, which are: J, A, L and s. This is similar to the
two-level nested structure but with a deeper hierarchy. Therefore, in order to com-
bine the indices of all the individual blocks in the DRBD in a single set, we define
nested BIGUNION s L A J to union the elements of all s i, where i∈ L a, a∈ A j
and j∈J. This is done in a hierarchical manner and can be extended easily to deeper
levels. We use the previously mentioned function to ensure that all the individual
events belong to the probability events and are independent as well. Moreover, it
is required to ensure that the sets are finite, disjoint and nonempty, just like the
series-parallel structure. We combine these set-related conditions using the function
sets finite not empty. Finally, we verify Theorem 6.15 within two main steps. The
first step is to verify the reliability of the outer series-parallel, which requires verifying
the independence of the intersection of union of partition of the DRBD blocks, i.e.,
the inner series-parallel structures are independent. The second step is to verify the
reliability of the inner series-parallel structures, which can be done based on some
set manipulation. This theorem can be used to verify even deeper structures, which
would require verifying the independence of more nested structures. We use Theo-
rem 6.15 to verify the reliability of the series-parallel-series structure as it represents a
special case of the series-parallel-series-parallel, where each of the innermost parallel
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structures has only one block. Our formalization follows the natural definitions of
parallel and series structures. Moreover, our verified lemmas of independence allow
verifying deeper structures, which makes our formalization flexible and applicable to
model the most complex systems. The proof script of the DRBD algebra is available
at [70]. In the following section, we utilize our formalization in the verification of the
reliability of the DBW system.
6.7 Formal DBW DRBD Analysis
To demonstrate the applicability of our proposed DRBD algebra, we present the
formal reliability analysis of the DBW system [59] to verify generic expressions that
are independent of the failure distribution of the system components, i.e., we can use
different types of distributions to model the failure of system components as long as
they satisfy the required conditions, such as the continuity.
The DRBD of the DBW system, shown in Figure 6.5, models the successful
behavior. Similar to our DFT analysis of the DBW, we provide the analysis of the
throttle and brake subsystems. The throttle subsystem continues to work as long as
the throttle (TF) and the engine (EF) are working. In addition, the system successful
Figure 6.5: DRBD of Drive-by-Wire System
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operation requires the operation of the brake control unit (BCU). The system includes
a primary control unit (PC) with a warm spare (SC) that replaces the main part after
failure. Finally, the system needs the operation of the throttle sensor (TS) and the
brake sensor (BS). The DRBD of this system is modeled as a series structure with a
spare construct. We express the structure function of this DRBD using our operators:
QDBW = TF · EF · BCU · (R WSP PC SCa SCd) · TS · BS
Since this is a series DRBD, then the cut sets and cut sequences are easily
determined using all the blocks of the system.
Then, we verify the DBW reliability as:
Theorem 6.16.
	 ∀ p TF EF BCU PC SCa SCd TS BS t.
DBW set req p TF EF BCU PC SCa SCd TS BS t ⇒
(prob p (DRBD event p QDBW t) =
Rel p TF t * Rel p EF t * Rel p BCU t * Rel p (R WSP PC SCa SCd) t *
Rel p TS t * Rel p BS t)
where DBW set req ensures the proper conditions for the independence of the blocks
in the DBW system.
In Figure 6.6, we evaluate, using MATLAB, the reliability of the DBW system
assuming exponential distributions for the system components with failure rates as
given in the figure and a dormancy factor of 0.5.
6.8 Formal Equivalence of DFT-DRBD Algebras
The proposed framework integrating DFT and DRBD algebras is depicted in Fig-
ure 6.7. As mentioned in Section 1.4, the proposed methodology can be utilized to
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Figure 6.6: Reliability of DBW System
Figure 6.7: Integrated Framework for Formal DFT-DRBD Analysis using HOL4
conduct both DFT and DRBD analyses using the HOL formalized algebras and allows
formally converting a DFT model into its corresponding DRBD based on the equiva-
lence of both algebras. The analysis starts by a given system description that can be
modeled as a DFT or DRBD. Formal models of the given system can be created based
on the HOL formalized algebras. The DRBD model can be analyzed as described in
this chapter, where a DRBD event is created and its reliability is verified based on
the available verified theorems of DRBD algebra. On the other hand, a DFT model
can be analyzed using the formalized DFT algebra presented in Chapters 3 and 4.
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Furthermore, the DRBD model can be converted to a DFT to model the failure in-
stead of the success, then this model is analyzed using the DFT algebra. Similarly,
the DFT model can be analyzed by converting it to its counterpart DRBD model to
analyze the success.
In order to handle the DFT analysis using DRBD algebra and the DRBD anal-
ysis using the DFT algebra, it is required to be able to represent the DRBD of the
corresponding DFT gates using the DRBD algebra and vice-versa (the equivalence
proof in Figure 6.7). According to [43], the OR, AND and FDEP gates can be rep-
resented using series, parallel and series RBDs, respectively. Therefore, they can be
modeled using AND and OR operators, while the spare gate corresponds to the spare
construct. Finally, the PAND gate can be expressed using the inclusive after operator
(Y X). However, we need to formally verify this equivalence to ensure its correct-
ness. In Table 6.3, we provide the theorems of equivalence of DFT gates and DRBD
operators and constructs, where D AND, D OR, n OR, n AND FDEP, P AND and WSP are the
names of the AND, OR, n-ary OR, n-ary AND, FDEP, PAND and spare DFT gates in
our HOL formalization, respectively. R WSP, nR OR, nR AND are the names of the spare
DRBD construct, n-ary DRBD OR and n-ary DRBD AND operators, respectively, in
our formalized DRBD. ALL DISTINCT [Y Xa Xd] ensures that the inputs cannot fail
at the same time. The proof script of these verified theorems is available at [71].
We need to recall that the DFT n-ary gates accept lists of random variables.
Whereas the DRBD n-ary operators accept an indexed group of random variables
with their indices in another set. Therefore, we use (MAP X (SET TO LIST s)) to
create a list of random variables from the group of indexed random variables.
In order to use these verified expressions in Table 6.3, we need to verify that the
DRBD event and the DFT event possess complementary sets in the probability space.
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Table 6.3: Verified Equivalence of DFT and DRBD Algebras
DFT Gate DRBD Operator/Construct Verified Theorem
AND OR 	 ∀ X Y. D AND X Y = R OR X Y
OR AND 	 ∀ X Y. D OR X Y = R AND X Y
n AND nR OR
	 ∀ X s. FINITE s ⇒
(n AND (MAP X (SET TO LIST s)) =
nR OR X s)
n OR nR AND
	 ∀ X s. FINITE s ⇒
(n OR (MAP X (SET TO LIST s)) =
nR AND X s)
FDEP AND 	 ∀ X Y. FDEP X Y = R AND X Y
PAND Inclusive After 	 ∀ X Y. P AND X Y =
R INCLUSIVE AFTER Y X
Spare Spare
	 ∀ Xa Xd Y.(∀ s.
ALL DISTINCT [Y s;Xa s;Xd s]) ⇒
(WSP Y Xa Xd = R WSP Y Xa Xd)
We formally verify this as:
Theorem 6.17.
	 ∀ p X t. prob space p ∧ (DFT event p X t) ∈ events p ⇒
(prob p (DRBD event p X t) = 1 - prob p (DFT event p X t))
where the conditions ensure that p is a probability space and that the DFT event
belongs to the events of the probability space. This theorem can be verified also
if we ensure that the DRBD event belongs to the probability space. This theorem
means that for the same time-to-failure function, the DRBD and DFT events are the
complements of each other. This way, we can analyze DFTs using the DRBD algebra
and vice-versa.
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Based on the verification results obtained in Table 6.3, DFT gates can be for-
mally represented using DRBDs. We show that the amount of effort required by the
reliability engineer to formally analyze DFTs by analyzing its counterpart DRBD is
less than that of analyzing the original DFT model. In Chapter 4, a DFT is formally
analyzed using the DFT algebra by expressing the DFT event of the structure func-
tion as the union of the individual DFT events. Then, the probabilistic PIE is utilized
to formally verify the probability of failure of the top event. The number of terms in
the final result equals 2n− 1, where n is the number of individual events in the union
of the structure function. Therefore, in the verification process, it is required to verify
at least 2n − 1 expressions if the PIE is to be used. On the other hand, verifying a
DRBD would require verifying a single expression for each nested structure.
As an example, consider the reliability analysis of the DBW system. Analyzing
the DFT of this system required verifying 63 subgoals as the top event is composed
of the union of six different events. While analyzing the DRBD of the DBW system
required verifying only one main subgoal to be manipulated to reach the final goal.
Table 6.4 provides a comparison of the size of the script, the required time to develop
it and the number of goals to be verified. Based on these observations, analyzing
the reliability of the DBW using the DRBD required 1/24 of the time needed by the
DFT based on the probabilistic PIE. These results show that it is more convenient to
analyze the DRBD of a system rather than its DFT if the algebraic approach and the
probabilistic PIE are to be used. The only added step will be to formally verify that
the DFT and DRBD are the complements of each other, which is straightforward
utilizing the theorems in Table 6.3. Therefore, we verify this as:
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Table 6.4: Comparison of Formal Analysis Efforts of DBW
# of subgoals # of lines in the script required time
DFT 63 4850 24 hours
DRBD 1 150 1 hour
Theorem 6.18.
	 ∀ p TF EF BCU PC SCa SCd TS BS t.
prob space p ∧ DBW events p p TF EF BCU PC SCa SCd TS BS t ⇒.
(prob p (DRBD event p FDBW t) = 1- prob p (DFT event p QDBW t))
where DBW events p ensures that the DBW DFT events are in the events of the
probability space. Thus, we can use the DRBD reliability expression (Theorem 6.16)
to verify the probability of failure of the DFT, which results in a reduction in the
analysis efforts.
6.9 Summary
In this chapter, we proposed a new algebra to analyze DRBDs. We developed the
HOL formalization of this algebra in HOL4, which ensures its correctness and allows
conducting the analysis within a theorem prover. Furthermore, this algebra provides
formalized generic expressions of reliability that cannot be verified using other formal
tools. This HOL formalization is the first of its kind that takes into account the
system dynamics by providing the HOL formal model of spare constructs and temporal
operators. The proposed algebra is compatible with the reliability expressions of
traditional RBDs as demonstrated by the reliability expressions of the series and
parallel structures. It also facilitates extending the verified reliability expressions to
model complex systems using nested structures. We demonstrated the usefulness
of this formalized algebra by formally conducting the analysis of the DBW system
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to verify a generic expression of its reliability, which is independent of the failure
probability distribution of system components. Finally, we verified the equivalence of
the DFT and DRBD algebras and their gates and constructs, which allows verifying
DFT models using the DRBD algebra and vice-versa.
One of the main challenges that we faced is the lack of a DRBD algebra that
enables the analysis based on the structure function of the DRBD. Having this alge-
bra and the reliability expressions of the DRBD structures and constructs enables the
development of a framework, using a theorem prover, to formally conduct the analy-
sis. Thus, we proposed this novel DRBD algebra, including the temporal operators,
simplification theorems, which allows expressing the structure of the DRBD based on
system blocks. Another challenge is the formalization of this algebra in HOL, partic-
ularly the traditional structures. We needed to formally define these structures in a
manner that is easily understood by users that are not familiar with theorem proving,
but at the same time to be compatible with the dynamic aspects that are captured
using the rest of the definitions, like the spare construct. Furthermore, we needed
to create these formal definitions to be compatible with existing theories in HOL4,
such as the probability and the Lebesgue integral, in particular the independence of
random variables that is of great importance to be able to extend these structures to
model more nested ones and verify their reliability expressions.
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Chapter 7
Formal Dependability Analysis of
Shuffle-exchange Networks
7.1 Overview
With the ongoing demands for intensive processing applications, multiprocessor sys-
tems represent one of the solutions that satisfies such demand. Nowadays, such sys-
tems are feasible due to their reduced cost and thus it is possible to have systems
of hundreds of processors. Multiprocessor systems allow parallel computing, where
tasks are executed in parallel with the possibility of interacting with one another when
required. This parallel execution highly impacts the overall system performance, such
as throughput. However, memory and I/O peripheral resources are shared among
processors and thus an efficient data routing among system nodes is necessary to
maintain high system performance, reliability and low cost. This is of a great im-
portance, particularly with scientific applications, where a huge number of processors
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are used, i.e., large-scale multiprocessor systems [72]. Therefore, a dedicated inter-
connection network is used to connect processors and memory modules, as depicted
in Figure 7.1 [72].
Figure 7.1: Overview of Multiprocessor System Architecture
The complexity of interconnection networks ranges from simple networks, such
as time-shared bus to crossbar switching. The former has a negative impact on the
system performance, while the latter has much higher cost as there exists a separate
link between each pair of nodes in the systems. For example, for a system of N nodes,
i.e., N inputs and N outputs, it is required to have N2 links or switching elements
between each input and output.
Multistage interconnection networks (MINs) are introduced to reduce the num-
ber of required switching elements and hence, reduce the cost while providing better
performance than shared-bus networks. The main idea of MINs is to have multiple
small stages of crossbar switches that are connected between sources (inputs) and
destinations (outputs), which results in a much reduced number of used switching
elements. The number of paths available between each input and output determines
the category of the MIN. A single-path MIN has only one path to route information
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between each source-destination pair. A shuffle-exchange network (SEN) is an exam-
ple of such type of networks. Each stage has N/2 switching elements, where N is the
number of inputs and outputs of the network. Usually the switching elements are of
size 2 × 2 to reduce the cost. The number of stages required to establish the single-
path MIN is log2N , which is lower than crossbar networks. An 8× 8 SEN is shown in
Figure 7.2, where only a single path is available for each input-output pair. However,
the reliability of single-path MINs and SENs depends on the switching elements and
thus a fault in any of these switches cannot be tolerated.
Enhancing the reliability of MINs is of great importance in order to maintain
high system performance. Therefore, redundant switching elements are used to ensure
that the network is able to provide the required switching even after the failure of
some of these elements [73, 74]. Multiple-path MINs are used to increase the fault
tolerance and hence the network reliability. SEN+ is a SEN, where an additional stage
is added to provide two paths between each input-output pair, as shown in Figure 7.3.
However, even with the additional path, the failure of some switches can lead to the
failure of the connection in some situations. Spare parts have been used in [75] to
replace switches after failure. However, the analysis was not conducted formally to
ensure its correctness.
Studying the reliability of SENs has been an active research area [76, 77, 78, 79].
The reliability of MINs are commonly analyzed using simulation or analytically. For
example, in [80], Monte Carlo simulation is used to analyze the reliability of SENs.
However, as mentioned previously, simulation cannot provide accurate results due to
its sampling based nature. Although CTMCs can analytically solve the reliability
of MINs [24], they cannot be used with large-scale systems since the state space
grows exponentially with the increase in the number of system components. On the
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Figure 7.2: An 8× 8 SEN
Figure 7.3: An 8× 8 SEN+
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other hand, when the complexity of the network increases, reliability bounds provides
estimate values for the MIN reliability [81, 82]. RBDs have been also used in the
analysis of MINs with single and multiple paths. For example, in [25], the reliability
of SEN, SEN+ and SEN+2 (a SEN with two additional stages) is modeled using
traditional RBDs. Generic expressions of success rates of the switching elements are
provided analytically assuming that all these elements have the same failure rates.
However, these generic expressions are not formally verified, which may raise questions
about its accuracy. Furthermore, dynamic dependencies among system components,
like warm spares, are not considered or modeled.
Based on the previous discussion, accurate modeling and analysis of these net-
works is necessary to capture the dynamic behavior as this will provide the design
engineers with some measures that can help enhancing the performance of the entire
multiprocessor system. To the best of our knowledge, dynamic dependability analysis
using formal methods has not been used with MINs. Therefore, we propose to add
spare switches to replace the critical ones after failure and conduct the analysis of
MINs, particularly SENs using our formal dependability framework.
Since the reliability of MINs affects the performance of the overall multiprocessor
system, it is required to accurately model and analyze their reliability. In this thesis,
we use both DRBDs and DFTs to model the dynamic reliability of these networks,
particularly SEN and SEN+, and conduct the analysis using our framework. In this
chapter, we formally verify the terminal, broadcast and network reliability of SEN
and SEN+ in HOL and provide generic expressions of reliability and probability of
failure.
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7.2 Terminal Reliability Analysis of
Shuffle-exchange Networks
The terminal reliability is the reliability of the connection between a given source and
destination, i.e., the probability of having a reliable connection between one source-
destination pair. We analyze the terminal reliability of the SEN and SEN+ using
both DFT and DRBD models.
7.2.1 DFT Analysis of SEN and SEN+
We model the sources of failure of both SEN and SEN+ using DFTs. We use n-
ary gates, which enable verifying expressions of the probability of failure for generic
number of system components.
Figure 7.4: DFT of SEN
Figure 7.4 shows the DFT model of the SEN system. Since SENs are single
path MINs, the failure of any of the switches in the path between a given source and
destination leads to losing the connection. Therefore, adding spare parts will lower
the probability of failure. For illustration purposes, we use a spare part to replace the
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main switch Y after failure. The DFT consists of an n-ary OR gate, which means
that the failure of any of the switches, interrupts the connection between the source
and the destination.
Since the top event is an n-ary OR gate, we need first to verify that the
DFT event of the n-ary OR is equal to the union of the individual events, as:
Theorem 7.1.
	 ∀ p X t s. FINITE s ⇒
(DFT event p (n OR (MAP X (SET TO LIST s))) t =⋃
i∈s {rv to devent p X t i})
where s is a set of numbers that has the indices of the system components. X is a
group of random variables that represent the time-to-failure of the switches in the
system. We need to recall that n OR accepts a list of random variables as an argu-
ment. Therefore, we create this list using MAP X (SET TO LIST s). rv to devent, in
Theorem 7.1, is similar to the rv to event of the DRBD, but it creates DFT events.
It is defined as:
Definition 7.1. rv to devent
	 ∀ p X t. rv to devent p X t = (λi. DFT event p (X i) t)
This way, we can use this function to create a group of DFT events for a set of
indexed random variables. Then, we verify the probability of the n-ary OR gate in
a way similar to the probability of the DRBD parallel structure, which is defined as
the union of events.
Theorem 7.2.
	 ∀ p X t s. s = {} ∧ FINITE s
indep sets p (λi. {rv to devent p X t i}) s ∧
159
(∀ i. i ∈ s ⇒ rv gt0 ninfinity [X i]) ⇒
(prob p (DFT event p (n OR (MAP X (SET TO LIST s))) t) =
1 - Normal (
∏
i∈s (real (1 - FXi(t)))))
In Theorem 7.2, it is required that the set of indices, s, to be nonempty and to
be finite, which is a realistic condition as in any system the number of components is
finite. The last condition of Theorem 7.3, ensures that the random variables of X are
greater than or equal to 0 and not equal to +∞, which is required to be able to use
the CDF of the random variable using Theorem 4.1.
We express the structure function of the DFT of SEN as:
QdSEN Terminal = n OR (MAP (λi. if i = 0 then WSP Y Ysa Ysd
else X i) (SET TO LIST {0} ∪ L))
(7.1)
We notice that the structure of the DFT is defined using the indices in {0} ∪
L. 0 is the index of the spare gate and L has the indices of the rest of the switches in
the system.
Finally, we verify the probability of failure of this top event as:
Theorem 7.3.
	 ∀ p X Y Ysa Ysd t L.
DISJOINT {0} L ∧ FINITE L ∧ L = {} ∧
indep sets p (λi. {event set [(DFT event p (WSP Y Ysa Ysd) t, 0)]
(rv to devent p X t) i}) ({0} ∪ L) ∧
(∀ i. i ∈ L ⇒ rv gt0 ninfinity [X i]) ∧
(prob p (DFT event p QdSEN Terminal t) =
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where DISJOINT {0} L ensures that the indices of the elements are unique. While
FINITE L ∧ L = {} ascertain that set L, which has the indices, is finite and not
empty. Finally, the independence of the events is added using indep sets. Theo-
rem 7.3 can be further rewritten using Theorem 4.12. However, the required con-
ditions of the latter should be satisfied, such as the continuity of the distributions.
Since we need a group of indexed sets in indep sets, we define a function event set
that accepts a list of pairs each of which is composed of a DFT event with its index.
This function also accepts the remaining blocks of the DFT that have their indices
embedded in a set (that can be generic of any size).
In SEN+, an additional path is added to increase the redundancy in the system.
Therefore, for the connection between a given source and a destination to be broken,
it is required that these two paths must be disconnected. The DFT of the SEN+ is
shown in Figure 7.5, where two spares are added to replace the main switches Y and
Z after failure. Switch Y is the input switch connected to the source and switch Z is
connected to the destination. This DFT is composed of three levels of OR of AND
of OR gates. Therefore, in order to verify the probability of the top event, we need
first to verify that the DFT event of the n-ary AND gate is equal to the intersection
of the input events. We formally verify this in HOL as:
Theorem 7.4.
	 ∀ p X t s. FINITE s ∧ s = {} ∧ 0 ≤ t ⇒
(DFT event p
(n AND (MAP X (SET TO LIST s))) t =
⋂
i∈s {rv to devent p X t i})
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Figure 7.5: DFT of SEN+ Terminal Connection
Then, we verify the probability of failure of the top event of the AND gate as:
Theorem 7.5.
	 ∀ p X t s. FINITE s ∧ s = {} ∧ 0 ≤ t ∧
indep sets p (λi. {rv to devent p X t i}) s
(∀ i. i ∈ s ⇒ rv gt0 ninfinity [X i]) ⇒
(prob p
(DFT event p




The first three conditions are needed to be able to use Theorem 7.4, while
indep sets ensures the independence of the events.
We use Theorems 7.2 and 7.5 to verify the probability of OR of AND of OR,
which is required for the probability of the top event. We express the top event of the
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DFT of Figure 7.5, QdSEN+ as:
QdSEN+ Terminal = n OR (MAP (λi. if i = 0 then WSP Y Ysa Ysd
else if i = 1 then(
(n OR (MAP X (SET TO LIST L1))) ·
(n OR (MAP X (SET TO LIST L2)))
)
else WSP Z Zsa Zsd) (SET TO LIST {0; 1; 2}))
(7.2)
where {0; 1; 2} indicates that the OR gate has three inputs with indices 0 for the first
spare, 1 for the AND of ORs, and 2 for the second spare. L1 and L2 has the indices
of the switches in the two redundant paths (for the two lower ORs).
The DFT top event can be expressed using union and intersection of events,
which can be quite useful in reusing the existing theorems of probability of union of
intersections and intersection of unions. We verify this relationship as:
Theorem 7.6.
	 ∀ p Y Ysa Ysd Z Zsa Zsd X L1 L2 t.
FINITE L1 ∧ FINITE L2 ∧
disjoint family on (ind set [{0}; L1; L2; {3}]) {0; 1; 2; 3} ⇒





[(DFT event p (WSP Y Ysa Ysd) t,0);
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(DFT event p (WSP Z Zsa Zsd) t,3)]
(rv to devent p X t) i |
i ∈ ind set [{0}; L1; L2; {3}] a} |
a ∈ ind set [{0}; {1; 2}; {3}] j} |
j ∈ {0; 1; 2}})
Finally, we verify the probability of failure of QdSEN+:
Theorem 7.7.
	 ∀ p X Y Ysa Ysd Z Zsa Zsd t L1 L2. 0 ≤ t ∧
SEN set req p L1 L2 (ind set [{0}; L1; L2; {3}])
(ind set [{0}; {1; 2}; {3}]) {0; 1; 2}
(event set [(DFT event p (WSP Y Ysa Ysd) t,0);
(DFT event p (WSP Z Zsa Zsd) t,3)]
(rv to devent p X t)) ∧
(∀ i. i ∈ (L1 ∪ L2) ⇒ rv gt0 ninfinity [X i]) ⇒
(prob p (DFT event p QdSEN+ Terminal t) =
1 -
(1 -





i∈L1 (real (1 - FXi(t)))) *
(1 -
∏
i∈L2 (real (1 - FXi(t))))) *
(1 - prob p (DFT event p (WSP Z Zsa Zsd) t))))
where SEN set req ensures the required conditions of the input sets including that
the sets are finite and nonempty. It also ensures the independence of the input events
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over the probability space. We also define ind set that accepts a list of sets and
returns a group of indexed sets. This is required to be able to create the hierarchy of
the DFT using sets.
Figure 7.6: Probability of Failure of the Terminal Connection of a 128 × 128 SEN+
with and without Spares
In order to use the above generic probability of failure expressions on a concrete
instance of SEN+, we evaluate the probability of failure of the terminal connection of
a 128 × 128 SEN+, where each OR gate of the first level of Figure 7.5 has 6 inputs.
We assume that the failure rate of each switching element is 1 × 10−5. We evaluate
the probability of failure for the SEN+ system without and with spare parts with a
dormancy factor of 0.1, as shown in Figure 7.6. This result shows that considering
the spares in the analysis leads to having more reliable and realistic system than the
traditional FTs.
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7.2.2 DRBD Analysis of SEN and SEN+
For SENs (single-path MIN), the terminal reliability is modeled as a series RBD. For
illustration purposes, we use a spare part to replace the first input switch, and thus
increase the reliability. The DRBD of the modified SEN is shown in Figure 7.7, where
Y is the main switch that will be replaced by Y s after failure and the series structure
has m+ 1 elements.
Figure 7.7: DRBD of SEN
Using the proposed algebra in Chapter 6, we express the structure function of
the SEN DRBD as:
QSEN Terminal = nR AND (λi. if i = 0 then R WSP Y Ysa Ysd
else X i) {0} ∪ L
(7.3)
where X is a group of indexed time-to-failure functions that represent the blocks of
the series structure and L is a set with their indices. L can be instantiated with any
group of numbers, which makes this function generic to represent the reliability model
of any SEN with any size.




	 ∀ p X Y Ysa Ysd t L.
DISJOINT {0} L ∧ FINITE L ∧ L = {} ⇒
(DRBD event p QSEN Terminal t =
DRBD series
(λi. event set
[(DRBD event p (R WSP Y Ysa Ysd) t,0)]
(rv to event p X t) i) ({0} ∪ L) )
where DISJOINT ensures that all sets are disjoint. We use event set and ind set to
create the events, similar to the DFTs. Since we are dealing with a series structure,
we only need to specify the hierarchy of the architecture in one direction using {0}∪L.
We verify Theorem 7.8 using Theorem 6.9 and some set-related theorems.
Based on Theorem 7.8, we verify a generic expression for the reliability of the
SEN system:
Theorem 7.9.
	 ∀ p X Y Ysa Ysd t L.
DISJOINT {0} L ∧ FINITE L ∧ L = {} ∧
indep sets p (λi. {event set [(DRBD event p (R WSP Y Ysa Ysd) t, 0)]
(rv to event p X t) i}) ({0} ∪ L)⇒
(prob p (DRBD event p QSEN Terminal t) =
Rel p (R WSP Y Ysa Ysd) t * Normal (
∏
l∈L (real (Rel p (X l) t))))
In a similar manner, the SEN+ is modeled as a series-parallel-series struc-
ture [25]. To further enhance the reliability, we use spare constructs as shown in
Figure 7.8, where Y and Z are the main single switches that are connected to the
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source and destination with their spares Y s and Zs, respectively. The parallel struc-
ture in the middle represents the reliability model of the two alternative paths between
the source and the destination. Therefore, this DRBD consists of a series of two spare
constructs and one parallel structure that consists of two series structures.
Figure 7.8: Terminal Reliability DRBD of SEN+
Using our DRBD operators, we formally express the structure function of this
DRBD as:
QSEN+ Terminal = nR AND (λi. if i = 0 then R WSP Y Ysa Ysd
else if i = 1 then
(
(nR AND X L1) + (nR AND X L2)
)
else R WSP Z Zsa Zsd) {0; 1; 2}
(7.4)
Thus, the outer series structure is expressed using the nR AND operator over the
set {0; 1; 2} as this structure has three different structures; i.e., two spare constructs
and one parallel structure. In order to re-utilize the verified expressions of reliability,
it is required to express this DRBD using the series and parallel structures. Therefore,




	 ∀ p X Y Ysa Ysd Z Zsa Zsd t L1 L2.
disjoint family on (ind set [{0; 3}; L1; L2]) {0;1;2} ∧
FINITE L1 ∧ FINITE L2 ∧ L1 = {} ∧ L2 = {} ⇒





[(DRBD event p (R WSP Y Ysa Ysd) t,0);
(DRBD event p (R WSP Z Zsa Zsd) t,3)]
(rv to event p X t) i)
ind set [{0}; L1; L2; {3}] a))
(ind set [{0}; {1; 2}; {3}] j)) {0; 1; 2})
where disjoint family on (ind set [{0; 3}; L1; L2]) {0;1;2} ensures that
the sets {0; 3}, L1 and L2 are disjoint, i.e., each switch has a unique index. Since
we are dealing with a series-parallel-series structure, we need three sets to identify
the hierarchy of this nested structure. Set {0; 1; 2} in Theorem 7.10 indicates that
the outer series structure has three elements, i.e., three parallel structures. ind set
[{0}; {1;2}; {3}] indicates that the first parallel structure has only one series struc-
ture with index 0, the second parallel structure has two series structures with indices
1 and 2, and the third parallel structure has only one series structure with index 3.
Finally, ind set [{0}; L1; L2; {3}] implies that the first series structure has only
one element with index 0, the second and third series structures have an arbitrary
number of blocks indexed by L1 and L2. The last series structure has one element
169
with index 3. We verify Theorem 7.10 using Theorem 6.9 and the equivalence of the
event of the OR with the union of events besides some set-related theorems.
Based on Theorem 7.10, we verify a generic expression for the reliability of the
SEN+ system:
Theorem 7.11.
	 ∀ p X Y Ysa Ysd Z Zsa Zsd t L1 L2.
SEN set req p L1 L2 (ind set [{0}; L1; L2; {3}])
(ind set [{0}; {1; 2}; {3}]) {0; 1; 2}
(event set [(DRBD event p (R WSP Y Ysa Ysd) t,0);
(DRBD event p (R WSP Z Zsa Zsd) t,3)]
(rv to event p X t)) ⇒
(prob p (DRBD event p QSEN Terminal t) =
Rel p (R WSP Y Ysa Ysd) t * Rel p (R WSP Z Zsa Zsd) t *
(1 -
(1 - Normal (
∏
l∈L1 (real (Rel p (X l) t)))) *
(1 - Normal (
∏
l∈L2 (real (Rel p (X l) t))))))
where SEN set req is the same function that we use with DFTs. We first rewrite
the goal using Theorem 7.10, then we use the reliability of the series-parallel-series
to verify the final expression. The reliability of the spare constructs can be further
rewritten using Theorem 6.5 given that the required conditions are ensured, such as
the continuity of the CDFs. It can be noticed that the DRBD and the DFT models
possess the same hierarchy represented by the sets of indices, which makes it easy to
be used when going from one model to the other.
Similar to the DFT analysis, we evaluate the terminal reliability of a 128× 128
SEN+, where each inner series structure of Figure 7.8 has 6 blocks. We assume that
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the failure rate of each switching element is 1× 10−5. We evaluate the reliability for
the SEN+ system without and with spare parts with a dormancy factor of 0.1, as
shown in Figure 7.9.
Figure 7.9: Terminal Reliability of 128× 128 SEN+ with and without Spares
7.3 Broadcast Reliability Analysis of
Shuffle-exchange Networks
The broadcast reliability represents the probability of having a working connection
between one source and all destinations. This is required when one of the processors
in the system needs to transmit information to all destinations in the network. We
present in this section, the broadcast reliability of the SEN and SEN+ using both
DFT and DRBD models.
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7.3.1 DFT Analysis of SEN and SEN+
Since in SENs there exists a single path between each source and destination, it
is required to have a successful transmission through all these paths for a proper
broadcast. Therefore, the DFT can be modeled using an OR gate. We further lower
the probability of failure by adding an additional spare gate, as shown in Figure 7.4.
However, the number of DFT inputs, which represent the switches, varies between
the terminal and broadcast reliability models. For example, consider an 8 × 8 SEN.
The number of inputs for the terminal DFT is 3, i.e., log28, while the broadcast DFT





) [25]. Therefore, we can also use Theorem 7.3
for the broadcast, since this theorem is verified for any number of system blocks with
their indices in the set s . This highlights the importance of having generic verified
expressions for any number of system blocks, which enables the re-utilization of the
theorems in different contexts.
Figure 7.10: DFT of Broadcast SEN+
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The DFT model of the broadcast SEN+ is shown in Figure 7.10. Its top event
is modeled using an OR gate that is connected to a spare gate for the input switch,
AND of OR to model the two alternative paths and finally, the rest of the destination
switches in order to have a proper broadcast transmission.
We formally express the structure function of the top event as:
QdSEN+ Broadcast = n OR (MAP (λi. if i = 0 then WSP Y Ysa Ysd
else if i = 1 then(
(n OR (MAP X (SET TO LIST L1))) ·
(n OR (MAP X (SET TO LIST L2)))
)
else (n OR (MAP X (SET TO LIST L3))))
(SET TO LIST {0; 1; 2}))
(7.5)
The hierarchy of the DFT is divided using the sets of indices. We need to recall
that MAP X (SET TO LIST L1), MAP X (SET TO LIST L2) and MAP X (SET TO LIST
L3) are used to create the lists of the group of random variables for the n-ary gates.
L1 and L2 has the indices of the switches in the two alternative paths, i.e., the inputs
of the two lower OR gates in the DFT of Figure 7.10, while L3 has the indices of the
remaining inputs of the top OR gate. The set {0; 1; 2} indicates that the top OR gate
has three inputs, which is similar to the terminal DFT model.
We use this structure function to verify the probability of failure of the top
event:
Theorem 7.12.
	 ∀ p X Y Ysa Ysd t L1 L2 L3 s.
SEN broad set req p L1 L2 L3 (ind set [{0}; L1; L2; L3])
(ind set [{0}; {1; 2}; {3}]) {0; 1; 2}
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(event set [(DFT event p (WSP Y Ysa Ysd) t,0);
(rv to devent p X t)) ∧ 0 ≤ t ∧
(∀ i. i ∈ (L1 ∪ L2 ∪ L3) ⇒ rv gt0 ninfinity [X i]) ⇒
(prob p (DFT event p QdSEN+ Broadcast t) =
1 -
(1 -





i∈L1 (real (1 - FXi(t)))) *
(1 -
∏
i∈L2 (real (1 - FXi(t))))) *
Normal (
∏
i∈L3 (real (1 - FXi(t))))))
where SEN broad set req ascertains the conditions required for the sets such as finite-
ness. It also ensures the independence of the events.
Figure 7.11 shows the evaluation results of the probability of failure of the DFT
of Figure 7.10 for a 128 × 128 SEN+. This SEN+ has 63 inputs for each first level
OR gate and the top level OR gate has 66 inputs. As with the terminal SEN+, we
assume that the failure rate of each switching element is 1 × 10−5 with a dormancy
factor of 0.1.
7.3.2 DRBD Analysis of SEN and SEN+
Similar to the DFT SEN broadcast model, we can use the model in Figure 7.7. How-
ever, as mentioned previously, the number of the blocks is different. Therefore, we
can also use Theorem 7.9 for the broadcast reliability, since this theorem is verified
for any number of system blocks using set s.
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Figure 7.11: Probability of Failure of the Broadcast of a 128× 128 SEN+
The DRBD of the SEN+ is depicted in Figure 7.12. The first block (with the
spare) represents the input switch that is connected directly to the source. The failure
of this switch will interrupt the broadcast transmission. Therefore, we add a spare
part to replace it after failure.
Figure 7.12: Broadcast DRBD Model of SEN+
The series structure on the right side of the figure models the switches of all
destinations, as they are all receiving the transmission. Finally, the parallel-series
structure in the middle, represents the two alternative paths that are available for
each broadcast transmission. For example, for the SEN+ shown in Figure 7.3, the
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number of switches connected to the destinations are four, while each one of the
alternative paths has three switches.
In order to formally verify the reliability of the broadcast of the SEN+, we first
express it using our operators as:
QSEN+ Broadcast = nR AND (λi. if i = 0 then R WSP Y Ysa Ysd
else if i = 1 then
(
(nR AND X L1) +
(nR AND X L2)
)
else (nR AND X L3)) ({0; 1 2})
(7.6)
where L1 and L2 are the sets that have the indices of the inner series structures of the
parallel-series structure in the middle. The set {0; 1; 2} indicates that the outer series
structure consists of three main components. The first spare construct has index 0,
while the parallel-series structure has index 1. Finally, the series structure on the left
side of Figure 7.12 has index 2, and L3 has the indices of the blocks in this series
structure. We verify the reliability of this DRBD as:
Theorem 7.13.
	 ∀ p X Y Ysa Ysd t L1 L2 L3.
SEN broad set req p L1 L2 (ind set [{0}; L1; L2; L3])
(ind set [{0}; {1; 2}; {3}]) {0; 1; 2}
(event set [(DRBD event p (R WSP Y Ysa Ysd) t,0);
(rv to event p X t)) ⇒
(prob p (DRBD event p QSEN+ Broadcast t) =
Rel p (R WSP Y Ysa Ysd) t * Normal (
∏
i∈L3 (real (Rel p (X l) t))) *
(1 - (1 - Normal (
∏
l∈L1 (real (Rel p (X l) t)))) *
(1 - Normal (
∏
l∈L2 (real (Rel p (X l) t))))))
176
We evaluate the broadcast reliability, in Figure 7.13, of a 128×128 SEN+, where
each inner series structure of Figure 7.12 has 63 blocks and the series structure on the
right hand side of the figure has 64 blocks. We use the same failure rates of 1× 10−5
for each switching element with a dormancy factor of 0.1.
Figure 7.13: Broadcast Reliability of a 128× 128 SEN+
7.4 Network Reliability Analysis of
Shuffle-exchange Networks
According to [25], the network reliability of SENs can be defined as the reliability of
all connections between sources (inputs) and destinations (outputs). In other words,
we are looking at the reliability of the overall network. This is usually modeled using
RBDs. In this section, we use both DFT and DRBD models in different scenarios to
model the reliability of the network.
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7.4.1 DFT Analysis of SEN and SEN+
In the SEN, it is required that all switching elements must work properly in order to
maintain a successful behavior of the network. Thus, the system fails with the failure
of any of the switching elements. The behavior can be further enhanced by using
spares. The DFT of the SEN network can be modeled as in Figure 7.4. However, to
further enhance the system reliability, the reliability engineer may suggest to use more
spares to replace the switching elements. Therefore, we present a generic model, where
the number of switching elements that have spares is generic, as shown in Figure 7.14.
This model can be also used with both the terminal and broadcast models, when more
spares are required.
Figure 7.14: DFT of SEN Network with Multiple Spares
We express the DFT top event of Figure 7.14 using the DFT operators as:
QdsSEN Network = n OR (MAP (λi. if i ∈ L1 then WSP (Y i) (Ysa i) (Ysd i)
else X i) (SET TO LIST (L1 ∪ L2)))
(7.7)
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We verify the probability of failure of the top event in a similar way to Theo-
rem 7.3, as:
Theorem 7.14.
	 ∀ p X Y Ysa Ysd t L1 L2.
DISJOINT L1 L2 ∧ FINITE L1 ∧ L1 = {} ∧
FINITE L2 ∧ L2 = {} ∧
(∀ i. i ∈ L2 ⇒ rv gt0 ninfinity [X i]) ∧
indep sets p
(λi.
{rv to devent p
(λi. i ∈ L1 then WSP (Y i) (Ysa i) (Ysd i) else X i)
t i})(L1 ∪ L2) ⇒






(real(1- prob p (DFT event p (WSP (Y i) (Ysa i) (Ysd i)) t)))) *
Normal (
∏
i∈L2 (real(1 - FXi(t)))))
where Y, Ysa and Ysd are groups of indexed random variables that represent the main
and spare switches. Theorem 7.14 provides a generic scenario for the SEN, where L1
and L2 can be instantiated with any number of distinct indices that represent the
system switches, with and without spares.
The DFT model of the SEN+ network is shown in Figure 7.15. It consists of a
spare gate for one of the switches in the input stage. The rest of the input switches
(X1,0 - X1,r) are connected directly to the n-OR gate of the top event. Therefore, the
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failure of any of these switches leads to the failure of the network. The series of ANDs
and ANDs of ORs are used to model the two available paths. Finally, all destination
switches (X4,0 -X4,k) are required to function and thus they are all connected to the
output OR gate. This DFT is composed of three levels; OR of ANDs of ORs, and thus
we can use the theorems of union of intersections of unions to verify its probability of
failure if the sets of indices are handled properly.
Figure 7.15: DFT of SEN+ Network





(λi. if i = 0 then WSP Y Ysa Ysd
else if i = 1 then n OR (MAP X (SET TO LIST L1))
else if i = 3 then (n OR (MAP X (SET TO LIST L2))) ·
(n OR (MAP X (SET TO LIST L3)))
else if i = 4 then n OR (MAP X (SET TO LIST L4))
else (X (2 * i)) · (X (2 * i + 1)))
(SET TO LIST ({0; 1; 3; 4} ∪ L)))
(7.8)
where the spare gate is assigned index 0. The second group of switches has index
1, while the indices of these switches, X1,0 - X1,r, are in set L1. They are repre-
sented as n OR (MAP X (SET TO LIST L1)). The output of the AND of ORs is as-
signed index 3 and is modeled as (n OR (MAP X (SET TO LIST L2))) · (n OR (MAP
X (SET TO LIST L3))), which is similar to both the terminal and broadcast models.
The group of switches, X4,0 -X4,k, has index 4 and is represented using n OR (MAP X
(SET TO LIST L4)). Thus, we have the indices {0; 1; 3; 4} for the outer groups in the
DFT. However, the last part of the DFT, which is the series of ANDs in the middle
of Figure 7.15, has a generic number of AND gates and cannot be assigned a specific
index. Therefore, we use set L to get a unique index for the output of each AND gate.
We use this unique number to create the indices of the inputs of each AND gate. For
example, for an index j in set L, we create two indices for the inputs of the AND gate
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as (2*j) and (2*j+1). This is modeled as (X (2 * i)) · (X (2 * i + 1))) and
set L is used with the set of indices in the outer level as (SET TO LIST ({0; 1; 3;
4} ∪ L)). It is important to highlight that the indices of the individual inputs should
be unique.
We then verify that the DFT event of QdSEN Network is equal to the union of inter-
section of union of events as in the following theorem:
Theorem 7.15.
	 ∀ p L1 L2 L3 L4 L X Y Ysa Ysd t.
FINITE L1 ∧ L1 = {} ∧ FINITE L2 ∧ L2 = {} ∧ FINITE L3 ∧
L3 = {} ∧ FINITE L4 ∧ L4 = {} ∧ FINITE L ∧
DISJOINT {0; 1; 3; 4} L ∧
(∀ i. i ∈ L ⇒ DISJOINT {2 * i; 2 * i + 1} {0; 1; 2; 3; 4}) ∧
disjoint family on
(ind set
[{0}; L1; L2; L3; L4; {2 * i | i ∈ L} ∪ {2 * i + 1 | i ∈ L}])
{0; 1; 2; 3; 4; 5} ⇒




{event set [(DFT event p (WSP Y Ysa Ysd) t,0)]
(rv to devent p X t) i |
i ∈ if a ∈ {2 * i | i ∈ L} ∪ {2 * i + 1 | i ∈ L} then {a}
else ind set [{0}; L1; L2; L3; L4] a} |
a ∈ if j ∈ L then {2 * j; 2 * j + 1}
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else ind set [{0}; {1}; {}; {2; 3}; {4}] j} |
j ∈ {0; 1; 3; 4} ∪ L}
where the conditions are required to ensure that the sets are finite, nonempty and that
at each level of the DFT the indices are unique. It is clear from the theorem how the hi-
erarchy of the DFT is structured using the sets. For example, “if j ∈ L then {2 *
j; 2 * j + 1} else ind set [{0}; {1}; {}; {2; 3}; {4}] j” determines the
indices of the second level of the DFT (the ORs) based on the value of j in the
outer level. The first part “if j ∈ L then {2 * j; 2 * j + 1}” is for the series
of ANDs, while “else ind set [{0}; {1}; {}; {2; 3}; {4}] j” is for the rest of
the parts in the second level. Although some of the parts of the DFT have no inter-
mediate OR gates, like the spare, we implicitly assume that there are OR gates with
single inputs to maintain the consistency. The indices of the second level indicates
the indices of the output of these gates. This can be obvious for the AND of ORs in
Figure 7.15, where the OR gates have indices 2 and 3. We use an empty set ({}) in
the indices of the second level due to the fact that there is no index 2 in the outer
level, and thus we assigned an empty set in the second level for this index.
We verify the probability of failure of QdSEN Network as:
Theorem 7.16.
	 ∀ p L1 L2 L3 L4 L X Y Ysa Ysd t.
SEN network set req p L1 L2 L3 L4 L
(λi.
if i ∈ {2 * i | i ∈ L} ∪ {2 * i + 1 | i ∈ L} then {i}
else ind set [{0}; L1; L2; L3; L4] i)
(λj.
if j ∈ L then {2 * j; 2 * j + 1}
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else ind set [{0}; {1}; {}; {2; 3}; {4}] j)
({0; 1; 3; 4} ∪ L)
(event set [(DFT event p (WSP Y Ysa Ysd) t,0)]
(rv to devent p X t)) ∧
(∀ i.
i ∈ L1 ∪ L2 ∪ L3 ∪ L4 ∪
{2 * i | i ∈ L} ∪ {2 * i + 1 | i ∈ L} ⇒
rv gt0 ninfinity [X i]) ⇒
(prob p
(DFT event p (QdSEN Network) t) =
1 -
(1 - prob p (DFT event p (WSP Y Ysa Ysd) t)) *
Normal (
∏
l∈L1 (real (1 - FXl(t)))) *
(1 -
(1 - Normal (
∏
l∈L2 (real (1 - FXl(t))))) *
(1 - Normal (
∏
l∈L3 (real (1 - FXl(t)))))) *
Normal (
∏
l∈L4 (real (1 - FXl(t)))) *
Normal (
∏
j∈L (1 - real (FX2*j(t) * FX2*j+1(t)))))
where SEN network set req ensures all the required conditions for the sets to be finite,
nonempty and distinct. It also ensures the independence of the input events. It accepts
all the sets of the indices of the three levels. The second condition (rv gt0 ninfinity
[X i]) ascertains that each element in the group of random variables of X that
have their indices in L1 ∪ L2 ∪ L3 ∪ L4 ∪ {2 * i | i ∈ L} ∪ {2 * i + 1 | i
∈ L} are greater than or equal to 0 but not equal +∞. This condition is required
to be able to use the CDF of the random variables.
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Figure 7.16: DFT of SEN+ with Multiple Spares
In a similar manner to the SEN network, we provide a generic model where any
number of spares can be used for the input switches. The modified DFT is shown in




(λi. if i = 0 then WSP (Y 0) (Ysa 0) (Ysd 0)
else if i = 1 then
(n OR (MAP X (SET TO LIST L1)))
else if i = 3 then (n OR (MAP X (SET TO LIST L2))) ·
(n OR (MAP X (SET TO LIST L3)))
else if i = 4 then n OR (MAP X (SET TO LIST L4))
else (X (2 * i)) · (X (2 * i + 1)))
(SET TO LIST ({0; 1; 3; 4} UNION L)))
(7.9)
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where Y, Ysa and Ysd are indexed random variables that represent the main and spare
parts for each spare gate. We choose to use the same hierarchy of Figure 7.15, where
we assign index 0 for the first spare and the rest of the spares have their indices in
set L1. In addition, the model of these additional spares is embedded within X as will
be explained shortly.
We verify the probability of failure of the top event as:
Theorem 7.17.
	 ∀ p L1 L2 L3 L4 L X Y Ysa Ysd t.
SEN network set req p L1 L2 L3 L4 L
(λi.
if i ∈ {2 * i | i ∈ L} ∪ {2 * i + 1 | i ∈ L} then {i}
else ind set [{0}; L1; L2; L3; L4] i)
(λj.
if j ∈ L then {2 * j; 2 * j + 1}
else ind set [{0}; {1}; {}; {2; 3}; {4}] j)
({0; 1; 3; 4} ∪ L)
(λi.
event set [(DFT event p (WSP (Y 0) (Ysa 0) (Ysd 0)) t,0)]
(rv to devent p X t) i) ∧
(∀ i.
i ∈ L1 ∪ L2 ∪ L3 ∪ L4 ∪ {2 * i | i ∈ L} ∪ {2 * i + 1 | i ∈ L} ⇒
rv gt0 ninfinity [X i]) ∧
(∀ i. i ∈ L1 ⇒ (X i = WSP (Y i) (Ysa i) (Ysd i))⇒
(prob p







(real (1 - prob p (DFT event p (WSP (Y l) (Ysa l) (Ysd l)) t))) *
(1 -
(1 - Normal (
∏
l∈L2 (real (1 - FXl(t))))) *
(1 - Normal (
∏
l∈L3 (real (1 - FXl(t)))))) *
Normal (
∏
l∈L4 (real (1 - FXl(t)))) *
Normal (
∏
j∈L (1 - real (FX2*j(t) * FX2*j+1(t)))))
where the conditions are similar to Theorem 7.16. However, we add the condition
that (∀ i. i ∈ L1 ⇒ (X i = WSP (Y i) (Ysa i) (Ysd i)), which adds the ad-
ditional spare gates. This way, we can use Theorem 7.16 to verify Theorem 7.17. Set
{0} ∪ L1 is used to provide the indices of the spares, including the first one with
index 0.
We evaluate the probability of failure of the network DFT, shown in Figure 7.16,
for a 128 × 128 SEN+. The DFT of this SEN has 32 AND gates in the first level.
Each OR gate in the first level has 160 inputs. Furthermore, we assume that all the 64
input switches have spares. Figure 7.17 shows the evaluated result of the probability
of failure, where the failure rates of each switching element is 1×10−5 with a dormancy
factor of 0.1.
7.4.2 DRBD Analysis of SEN and SEN+
Similar to the DFT models, we start first with the network reliability model of the
SEN. Since it is a single path, it can be modeled using the series DRBD of Figure 7.7.
Thus, we can use Theorem 7.9 to provide a generic expression for its reliability. We
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Figure 7.17: The Probability of Failure of the Network of a 128× 128 SEN+
provide a generic model in Figure 7.18, where additional spares are used. This provides
a general case where we can choose how many switches can be replaced with spares.
Figure 7.18: DRBD of SEN Network
We express the structure function of this DRBD using our DRBD operators as:
QsSEN Network = nR AND (λi. if i ∈ L1 then R WSP (Y i) (Ysa i) (Ysd i)
else X i) (L1 ∪ L2)
(7.10)
where L1 and L2 provide the indices of the blocks in the series structure for the spare
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constructs and the remaining blocks, respectively.
Similar to the proof steps of Theorem 7.11, we verify the reliability of the SEN
network as:
Theorem 7.18.
	 ∀ p X Y Ysa Ysd t L1 L2.
DISJOINT L1 L2 ∧ FINITE L1 ∧ L1 = {} ∧
FINITE L2 ∧ L2 = {} ∧
indep sets p
(λi. {if i ∈ L1 then DRBD event p (R WSP (Y i) (Ysa i) (Ysd i)) t
else (rv to event p X t) i}) (L1 ∪ L2)⇒





(real (Rel p (R WSP (Y i) (Ysa i) (Ysd i)) t))) *
Normal (
∏
i∈L2 (real (Rel p (X i) t))))
The DRBD of the SEN+ network is modeled in Figure 7.19, where only one of
the switches of the input stage can be replaced by a spare. This DRBD is composed of
a series-parallel-series structure. The indices of each level can be treated in a similar
manner to the DFT.
We express the structure function using the operators with the same sets of
indices of the DFT as:
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Figure 7.19: DRBD of SEN+ Network
QSEN Network = nR AND
(λi.
if i = 0 then R WSP Y Ysa Ysd
else if i = 1 then nR AND X L1
else if i = 3 then (nR AND X L2) + (nR AND X L3)
else if i = 4 then nR AND X L4
else (X (2 * i)) + (X (2 * i + 1)))
({0; 1; 3; 4} ∪ L))
(7.11)
Then, we verify that the DRBD event of this structure can be expressed as a
series-parallel-series structure as:
Theorem 7.19.
	 ∀ p L1 L2 L3 L4 L X Y Ysa Ysd t.
FINITE L1 ∧ L1 = {} ∧ FINITE L2 ∧ L2 = {} ∧ FINITE L3 ∧
L3 = {} ∧ FINITE L4 ∧ L4 = {} ∧ FINITE L ∧
DISJOINT {0; 1; 3; 4} L ∧




[{0}; L1; L2; L3; L4;
{2 * i | i ∈ L} ∪ {2 * i + 1 | i ∈ L}])
{0; 1; 2; 3; 4; 5} ⇒
(DRBD event p








[(DRBD event p (R WSP Y Ysa Ysd t,0)]
(rv to event p X t) i)
((λi.
if i ∈ {2 * i | i ∈ L} ∪ {2 * i + 1 | i ∈ L} then {i}
else ind set [{0}; L1; L2; L3; L4] i) a))
((λj.
if j ∈ L then {2 * j; 2 * j + 1}
else ind set [{0}; {1}; {}; {2; 3}; {4}] j) j))
({0; 1; 3; 4} ∪ L))
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Finally, we verify the reliability of the DRBD as:
Theorem 7.20.
	 ∀ p L1 L2 L3 L4 L X Y Ysa Ysd t.
SEN network set req p L1 L2 L3 L4 L
(λi.
if i ∈ {2 * i | i ∈ L} ∪ {2 * i + 1 | i ∈ L} then {i}
else ind set [{0}; L1; L2; L3; L4] i)
(λj.
if j ∈ L then {2 * j; 2 * j + 1}
else ind set [{0}; {1}; {}; {2; 3}; {4}] j)
({0; 1; 3; 4} ∪ L)
(event set [(DRBD event p (R WSP Y Ysa Ysd) t,0)]
(rv to event p X t)) ⇒
(prob p
(DRBD event p (QSEN Network) t) =
Rel p (R WSP Y Ysa Ysd) t *
Normal (
∏
l∈L1 (real (Rel p (X l) t))) *
(1 -
(1 - Normal (
∏
l∈L2 (real (Rel p (X l) t)))) *
(1 - Normal (
∏
l∈L3 (real (Rel p (X l) t))))) *
Normal (
∏








((1 - Rel p (X (2 * j)) t) *
(1 - Rel p (X (2 * j + 1)) t)))))
It is worth mentioning that the conditions of the sets are similar to Theorem 7.16
of the DFT.
Finally, we provide a generic model to have any number of spares that can
replace the input switches as shown in Figure 7.20. We choose to use the same indices
of Figure 7.19 in order to reutilize the verified theorems.
Figure 7.20: DRBD of SEN+ Network with Multiple Spares
We express the structure of the DRBD of Figure 7.20 as:
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QSEN Network2 = nR AND
(λi.
if i = 0 then R WSP (Y 0) (Ysa 0) (Ysd 0)
else if i = 1 then nR AND X L1
else if i = 3 then (nR AND X L2) + (nR AND X L3)
else if i = 4 then nR AND X L4
else (X (2 * i)) + (X (2 * i + 1)))
({0; 1; 3; 4} ∪ L))
(7.12)
where (Y 0), (Ysa 0) and (Ysd 0) are indexed groups of random variables that
represent the main parts and their spares.
Finally, we use Theorem 7.20 to verify the reliability of this DRBD as:
Theorem 7.21.
	 ∀ p L1 L2 L3 L4 L X Y Ysa Ysd t.
SEN network set req p L1 L2 L3 L4 L
(λi.
if i ∈ {2 * i | i ∈ L} ∪ {2 * i + 1 | i ∈ L} then {i}
else ind set [{0}; L1; L2; L3; L4] i)
(λj.
if j ∈ L then {2 * j; 2 * j + 1}
else ind set [{0}; {1}; {}; {2; 3}; {4}] j)
({0; 1; 3; 4} ∪ L)
(event set [(DRBD event p (R WSP (Y 0) (Ysa 0) (Ysd 0)) t,0)]
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(rv to event p X t)) ∧
(∀ i. i ∈ L1 ⇒ (X i = R WSP (Y i) (Ysa i) (Ysd i))) ⇒
(prob p





(real (Rel p (R WSP (Y l) (Ysa l) (Ysd l)) t))) * (1 -
(1 - Normal (
∏
l∈L2 (real (Rel p (X l) t)))) *
(1 - Normal (
∏
l∈L3 (real (Rel p (X l) t))))) *
Normal (
∏







((1 - Rel p (X (2 * j)) t) *
(1 - Rel p (X (2 * j + 1)) t)))))
We evaluate the network reliability of a 128×128 SEN+ as shown in Figure 7.21.
In Figure 7.20, there are 32 parallel structures that are connected in series. The DRBD
has 64 spare constructs, while there are 160 blocks in the inner series structures.
Finally, the series structure on the right hand side of Figure 7.20 has 64 blocks. We
assume that the failure rates of each switching element is 1 × 10−5 with a dormancy
factor of 0.1.
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Figure 7.21: The Network Reliability of a 128× 128 SEN+
7.5 Equivalence of SEN DFT and DRBD Models
To illustrate the utilization of the DFT-DRBD equivalence part of the proposed thesis
methodology, we formally verify the equivalence of the DRBD and the complement of
the DFT events for both terminal and broadcast reliability of SEN and SEN+. The
equivalence of the network models can be conducted in a similar manner. Proving
this equivalence allows verifying the probability of one model and directly use the
equivalence proof to provide the probability of the other model.
We verify the equivalence of the DRBD and DFT models of the terminal relia-
bility of both SEN and SEN+ as:
Theorem 7.22. Terminal/Broadcast SEN
	 ∀ p X Y Ysa Ysd t L.





if i = 0 then R WSP Y Ysa Ysd
else X i) {0} ∪ L) t =





if i = 0 then WSP Y Ysa Ysd
else X i)
(SET TO LIST ({0} ∪ L)))) t)
Theorem 7.23. Terminal SEN+
	 ∀ p X Y Ysa Ysd Z Zsa Zsd t L1 L2.
FINITE L1 ∧ FINITE L2 ∧




if i = 0 then R WSP Y Ysa Ysd
else if i = 1 then
(
(nR AND X L1) + (nR AND X L2)
)
else R WSP Z Zsa Zsd) {0; 1; 2}) t =






if i = 0 then WSP Y Ysa Ysd
else if i = 1 then(
(n OR (MAP X (SET TO LIST L1))) ·
(n OR (MAP X (SET TO LIST L2)))
)
else WSP Z Zsa Zsd) (SET TO LIST {0; 1; 2}))) t)
In a similar manner, we verify the equivalence of the DRBD and DFT models
of the SEN+ broadcast reliability as:
Theorem 7.24. Broadcast SEN+
	 ∀ p X Y Ysa Ysd t L1 L2 s.
FINITE L1 ∧ FINITE L2 ∧ FINITE L3 ∧




if i = 0 then R WSP Y Ysa Ysd
else if i = 1 then
(
(nR AND X L1) + (nR AND X L2)
)
else (nR AND X L3)) ({0; 1 2}) t =






if i = 0 then WSP Y Ysa Ysd
else if i = 1 then(
(n OR (MAP X (SET TO LIST L1))) ·
(n OR (MAP X (SET TO LIST L2)))
)
else (n OR (MAP X (SET TO LIST L3))))
({0; 1 2}))) t)
It is worth mentioning that Theorem 7.22 can be used for the equivalence of the
DRBD-DFT models of the SEN in both the terminal and broadcast since they both
share the same structure.
Based on these theorems, we can use one model to verify the probability of the
other model using the probability of the complement.
7.6 Summary
In this chapter, we presented the formal dynamic dependability analysis of SEN and
SEN+ MINs that form a critical part in the routing process of multiprocessor sys-
tems. We provided generic expressions of reliability and probability of failure that are
independent of the failure distributions. Furthermore, we verified these expressions
for an arbitrary number of system blocks that can be instantiated later to a certain
number without the need to repeat the verification process. For instance, we evalu-
ated the reliability and probability of failure using MATLAB for a specific number of
system components based on these generic expressions. It is worth mentioning that
such sound generic results cannot be obtained using simulation or model checking as
the state space should be defined in advance. The proof script of the verification of
SEN and SEN+ is available at [83] and it took around 80 hours to be developed.
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Chapter 8
Conclusions and Future Work
8.1 Conclusions
In this thesis, we proposed a framework to formally conduct the dynamic dependability
analysis of systems modeled as dynamic fault trees (DFTs) and dynamic reliability
block diagrams (DRBDs) using HOL theorem proving. This framework overcomes the
limitations of existing techniques, such as simulation and model checking, in terms of
soundness and scalability, which allows reasoning about generic properties of a system
without specifying particular models.
We provided the formalization of a well-known DFT algebra to ensure the sound-
ness of its mathematical foundations. We formalized the DFT gates and operators
and verified several simplification theorems based on the properties of extended-real
numbers. This allows obtaining a reduced form of the structure function of a given
DFT, which enables having formally verified cut sets and cut sequences to qualita-
tively analyze a given DFT. We reported our findings of a flaw in one of the published
DFT algebras, which further emphasize on the importance of formally validating the
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correctness of the mathematical foundations of such algebras, specially if they are to
be used in the context of safety-critical systems analysis. Furthermore, we formally
verified several probabilistic expressions, based on the HOL4 probability and Lebesgue
integral theories, that allow reasoning about the probabilistic behavior of DFT gates
and thus performing the DFT quantitative analysis. Furthermore, based on our DFT
formalization, we formally verified, using the HOL4 theorem prover, the DFT rewrite
rules that are utilized within other DFT analysis tools, such as the STORM model
checker. These rewrite rules cover general n-ary OR, AND and Voting gates, as well
as the PAND gate.
On the other hand, we developed a novel DRBD algebra, similar to the DFT’s,
and introduced several operators and simplification theorems to mathematically model
traditional RBD structures as well as the dynamic spare construct. We provided the
formalization of this novel algebra in HOL and verified the reliability expressions of
its structures. Our formalization allows modeling and verifying the most complex
structures thanks to its scalable definitions and theorems. For example, we verified
several theorems that are concerned with the independence of union and intersection
of events in order to verify the reliability of nested structures. Furthermore, our
formalization overcomes and outperforms the existing formalization of the static RBD
as it allows reasoning about the dynamic behavior of the system that the previous
formalization cannot perform.
Due to the complementary modeling nature of DFTs and DRBDs, i.e., DFTs
model the failure and DRBDs model the success, our framework allows formally con-
ducting DFT analysis of a system modeled as a DRBD and vice-versa. This means
that we are able to reason about both failure and success of a system represented
using only one of the models.
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The framework developed in this thesis provides generic expressions of probabil-
ity of failure and reliability that are independent of the failure distribution of system
component. This is of great importance as it overcomes the limitation of other for-
mal tools, such as model checking, where the analysis is only limited to exponential
distributions that cannot properly capture the dynamic behavior, such as aging. Fur-
thermore, our expressions are verified for an arbitrary number of system components,
which is useful in modeling a generic form of the system without the need to specify
instances of it, such as multistage interconnection networks (MINs) of multiprocessor
systems.
We demonstrated the strengths of our framework by formally conducting the
dynamic dependability analysis of multistage interconnection networks (MINs), par-
ticularly shuffle-exchange networks (SEN) and SEN+ (an SEN with an additional
stage). These SENs connect the processing, memory, and peripherals elements of
multiprocessor systems. In particular, we provided the formal dynamic terminal re-
liability analysis of SEN and SEN+ using both DFT and DRBD models. Moreover,
we formally verified the broadcast and network reliability analysis of both types of
networks using DRBDs and DFTs. We verified generic expressions for arbitrary num-
ber of switching elements that can be instantiated later according to the size of the
network without the need to repeat the entire verification process. This highlights




Dynamic dependability analysis is gaining a growing interest as it is able to model
more realistic properties of real-world systems. Building a formal framework that uti-
lizes HOL theorem proving is necessary to obtain sound modeling and analysis results.
The framework proposed in this thesis represents the foundation of a more general
and complete one that allows the analysis of various dependability properties. Based
on the formalizations presented in this thesis work, we propose several extensions that
can further enrich the available formalization:
• Our proposed framework allows having generic expressions of probability of fail-
ure and reliability that can be instantiated using any distribution and density
functions that satisfies the required conditions. However, evaluating these ex-
pressions when dealing with the Lebesgue integral requires verifying the equiv-
alence of the Lebesgue and Riemann integrals in HOL4. This will further
strengthen the proposed framework by adding the possibility of performing and
evaluating the expressions based on specific instances of the given system.
• In the current formalization, we have been able to deal with iterated (multiple)
integrals with a predetermined number, i.e., the number of integrals is specific
and known. For example, we have been able to deal with two iterated integrals
that require integrating over a pair measure. However, sometime it is required
to have an undetermined number of iterated integrals, i.e., n iterated integrals
that require the product of n measures. This can be useful in verifying the prob-
ability of failure of n-ary PAND gate and similar expressions. Extending the
measure and integral theories in HOL4 to support product measures and iter-
ated integrals will be quite helpful not only within the context of dependability
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analysis, but also in reasoning about other probabilistic systems.
• Since HOL4 is an interactive HOL theorem prover, the verification process re-
quires providing interactively most of the proof steps. Furthermore, many proofs
have a common pattern and the same steps had to be repeated for each of these
proofs, making the verification process tedious. Machine learning can be quite
helpful in speeding up and automating the verification process. In [Bio-Cf3],
we proposed a road map for conducting the DFT based analysis with the help
of machine learning techniques. Particularity, we proposed using TacticToe ap-
proach implemented in [84] that automates the selection of the proper tactics
to prove a goal in HOL4. This will allow end-users that are unfamiliar with
theorem proving to benefit from our DFT and DRBD formalization to provide
sound analysis.
• In our proposed DRBD algebra, we have modeled the behavior of the spare
construct. However, DRBDs also have other constructs such as load sharing
that model the effect of sharing a load among system components on the system
reliability and state dependencies that take into consideration the activation
and deactivation effect on system reliability. Another open direction for our
framework is to develop mathematical models for these constructs and formally
verify their reliability expressions, which enables analyzing various systems.
• Dynamic dependability can be modeled and analyzed using CTMCs that cap-
ture the dynamic behavior as state machines. Formalizing CTMCs in HOL4 to
conduct both the transient and steady state analysis represents another future
direction that can be used in the context of dynamic dependability analysis,
specially verifying properties, such as the system reliability and availability.
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